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Abstract
In this thesis we study Impulse-Radio Ultra-Wide Band (IR-UWB), a physical layer radio tech-
nology offering many features that make it a promising choice for future short-range wireless
networks. The challenges in such networks are many, ranging from the cost-complexity con-
straints of devices, through the presence of interference created by other users, up to stringent
security requirements imposed by sensitive applications.
Our main goal is to understand and show how a low-complexity IR-UWB receiver can be
designed such that it is able to cope with the difficult environment that it will face in such
networks. Although IR-UWB systems promise to provide a solution for some of the above-
mentioned challenges, IR-UWB is not a panacea: More often than not, it will be able to live up
to its promises only if the entire system is carefully designed.
One example is robustness to interference from concurrent users, which is the topic of the
first part of this thesis. Short-range wireless networks are expected to be self-organized and un-
coordinated rather than centrally organized. This in turn leads to uncontrolled interference due
to concurrent transmissions from uncoordinated devices. Thanks to its large bandwidth, com-
bined with low duty-cycle transmissions, IR-UWB should in theory be able to accommodate a
large number of concurrent users while keeping multi-user interference (MUI) levels low. We
show that, if not properly addressed, MUI can severely affect the performance of an IR-UWB
receiver, making this benefit of IR-UWB void. This is especially true if low complexity ar-
chitectures, such as the popular non-coherent energy-detection receiver, are used. Further, we
show that MUI affects all aspects of physical layer packet reception and appropriate algorithms
to deal with it are thus required at every level.
The first crucial step to receive an IR-UWB data packet is signal acquisition. We present
a robust and low-complexity algorithm that allows for reliable signal acquisition with an IR-
UWB energy-detection receiver in the presence of MUI, even in near-far scenarios.
After signal acquisition, the receiver performs a phase of channel estimation. Channel
estimation is of particular importance for interference mitigation: it allows the receiver to dis-
i
tinguish the signal of the user of interest from MUI. In the case of energy-detection receivers
that are compliant with the IR-UWB standard IEEE 802.15.4a, channel estimation is especially
challenging because with this standard the signalling structure changes within a data packet.
We introduce a novel receiver structure that takes this peculiarity into account and allows for
the design of robust low-complexity receivers for IEEE 802.15.4a networks.
The final step in receiving a data packet is demodulation and decoding of the payload. We
show that an adaptive thresholding scheme that uses the channel state information, obtained
during channel estimation, can yield very good robustness against MUI. We also introduce
more sophisticated algorithms that are based on statistical interference modeling and show that
they yield an additional increase in robustness against MUI.
In the second part of this thesis we investigate clock-offset tracking for IR-UWB energy-
detection receivers. Clock-offset tracking is needed because the oscillators driving the clocks
of low-complexity receivers are of average quality at best. We show that the resulting de-
synchronization between transmitter and receiver may lead to a huge performance degradation
in the case of adaptive energy-detection receivers. To overcome this sensitivity to clock offsets,
we present a clock-offset tracking algorithm that is constructed around the Radon transform,
an image processing tool traditionally used to detect line features in images. Our algorithm is
fully compatible with the IEEE 802.15.4a standard, does not increase the hardware complexity
of the receiver and reduces the performance loss due to clock offsets to a marginal level.
In the third part of this thesis, we look at IR-UWB from the viewpoint of security. We eval-
uate to what extent IEEE 802.15.4a is vulnerable to distance-decreasing attacks on the physical
layer. These attacks target the ranging mechanism that allows two wireless devices to estimate
their mutual distance. Commonly, ranging is secured by secure ranging protocols employing
cryptographic mechanisms that guarantee that the estimated distance is an upper-bound on the
actual distance. However, a new breed of attacks bypasses these cryptographic mechanisms,
introduced at higher communication layers, by directly attacking the physical layer. Under-
standing the impact of these attacks on IEEE 802.15.4a is of the utmost importance: its high
precision ranging capabilities make IR-UWB a natural candidate for ranging applications, and
IEEE 802.15.4a is the only wireless standard that has been specifically designed for ranging.
Our analysis shows that IEEE 802.15.4a, does not automatically provide security against such
attacks. We find that with the mandatory modes of the standard and no appropriate counter-
measures in place, an external attacker can decrease the measured distance by more than one
hundred meters with a very high probability.
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Résumé
Dans cette thèse, nous étudions la radio par impulsions à bande ultra-large ou Impulse-
Radio Ultra-Wide Band (IR-UWB). Cette technologie de couche physique radio offre de nom-
breuses fonctionnalités, qui en font un choix prometteur pour les futurs réseaux sans fils à
courte portée. Les défis dans de tels réseaux sont nombreux : des contraintes de coût et de com-
plexité des dispositifs, la présence d’interférences créées par d’autres utilisateurs ou encore des
exigences de sécurité rigoureuses imposées par des applications sensibles.
Notre objectif principal est de comprendre et de montrer comment un récepteur IR-UWB à
faible complexité doit être conçu de telle manière à ce qu’il soit en mesure de faire face aux en-
vironnements difficiles qu’il va rencontrer dans de tels réseaux. Bien que les systèmes IR-UWB
promettent de fournir une solution pour certains des défis évoqués plus haut, la technologie IR-
UWB n’est pas une panacée. En effet, la plupart du temps, elle ne sera en mesure d’honorer ses
promesses que si l’ensemble du système est conçu avec soin.
Un exemple, qui est le sujet de la première partie de cette thèse, est la robustesse à l’interfé-
rence multi-utilisateurs (IMU). Plutôt que d’être organisés d’une manière centrale, les réseaux
sans fils à courte portée vont être auto-organisés. Cela entraîne à son tour de l’interférence
incontrôlée due aux transmissions simultanées par des dispositifs sans coordination. Grâce à
sa grande largeur de bande, IR-UWB devrait en théorie être en mesure d’accueillir un grand
nombre d’utilisateurs simultanés, tout en gardant l’IMU à un faible niveau. Nous montrons que
ce bénéfice d’IR-UWB peut être complètement annulé si l’IMU n’est pas traitée correctement.
Ceci est particulièrement vrai si des architectures à faible complexité, tels que le détecteur
d’énergie, sont utilisées. Nous montrons que l’IMU affecte tous les aspects de la couche phy-
sique et que des algorithmes appropriés pour y faire face sont donc requis à tous les niveaux.
La première étape cruciale pour recevoir un paquet de données IR-UWB est l’acquisition
du signal. Nous présentons un algorithme robuste et à faible complexité permettant une acquisi-
tion fiable du signal en présence d’IMU. Après l’acquisition du signal, le récepteur effectue une
phase d’estimation du canal de propagation. L’estimation du canal est d’une importance par-
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ticulière pour l’atténuation de l’interférence : elle permet au récepteur de distinguer le signal
utile de l’IMU. Dans le cas des détecteurs d’énergie qui se conforment à la norme IR-UWB
IEEE 802.15.4a, l’estimation du canal est particulièrement difficile parce qu’avec cette norme,
le format du signal change à l’intérieur d’un paquet. Nous introduisons une structure de récep-
tion nouvelle qui prend cette particularité en compte et qui permet la conception de récepteurs
à faible complexité pour des réseaux IEEE 802.15.4a.
La dernière étape dans la réception d’un paquet de données est la démodulation et le dé-
codage de l’information transmise. Nous montrons qu’un simple seuillage adaptatif qui utilise
de l’information sur l’état du canal obtenu lors de l’estimation de ce dernier, amène une excel-
lente robustesse contre l’IMU. Nous introduisons également des algorithmes plus sophistiqués
qui sont basés sur la modélisation statistique de l’IMU et nous montrons que ces algorithmes
résultent dans une augmentation supplémentaire de la robustesse face à l’IMU.
Dans la seconde partie de cette thèse, nous étudions l’influence du décalage de l’horloge
d’un détecteur d’énergie IR-UWB avec l’horloge de l’émetteur correspondant. Nous montrons
que la désynchronisation résultante entre émetteur et récepteur peut, dans le cas d’un détecteur
d’énergie adaptatif, entrainer une dégradation considérable de la performance. Nous présentons
un algorithme de correction constante du décalage de l’horloge qui est entièrement compatible
avec la norme IEEE 802.15.4a, n’augmente pas la complexité du récepteur au niveau hardware,
et limite la perte de performance en raison de décalages d’horloge à un niveau marginal.
Dans la troisième partie de cette thèse, nous examinons IR-UWB du point de vue de la sécu-
rité. Nous évaluons dans quelle mesure IEEE 802.15.4a est vulnérable à des attaques qui visent
le mécanisme du “ranging”. Le ranging est un mécanisme qui permet à deux dispositifs sans-fil
d’estimer leur distance réciproque. Habituellement, la sécurité de tels mécanismes est garan-
tie par des protocoles de ranging sécurisés qui emploient des mécanismes cryptographiques
pour garantir que l’estimée de la distance constitue une borne supérieure de la distance réelle.
Toutefois, un nouveau type d’attaques contourne ces mécanismes en s’attaquant directement
à la couche physique. Comprendre l’impact de ces attaques sur IEEE 802.15.4a est de la plus
haute importance car IR-UWB est un candidat naturel pour des applications de ranging grâce
à sa capacité d’exécuter des mesures de distances avec une grande précision. En outre, IEEE
802.15.4a est la seule norme pour la communication sans fil qui a été spécifiquement conçue
pour le ranging. Nos analyses montrent que IEEE 802.15.4a, ne fournit pas de sécurité systéma-
tique contre de telles attaques : avec les modes obligatoires de la norme IEEE 802.15.4a et sans
contre-mesures appropriées en place, un attaquant externe peut diminuer la distance mesurée
de plus d’une centaine de mètres et cela avec une probabilité de succès très élevée.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In the past few years we have seen a rapid emergence of short-range wireless networks. An
increasing number of electronic devices are capable of communicating via such networks. Until
recently, a typical mobile phone for example could only interact with the cellular network.
Today it also communicates with other devices using short-range technologies such as WiFi or
Bluetooth.
As we keep equipping more and more devices and even everyday objects with wireless
networking capabilities to constitute an Internet of Things, several challenges arise.
First of all, although existing technologies such as WiFi may be suitable for mobile phones,
they are not suitable for networked objects of the future, such as tiny sensor nodes, because of
cost, complexity and energy constraints.
Second, as wireless short-range networks grow both in size and number, it becomes im-
practical, if not infeasible, to coordinate and manage them in the traditional centralized and
infrastructure-based fashion. Rather, we can expect to have a large number of coexisting net-
works that are self-organized and uncoordinated. This in turn leads to an increase in uncon-
trolled interference due to concurrent transmissions from uncoordinated devices.
Third, as wireless networks grow in importance, they also become more attractive targets
for hackers. At the same time, more and more applications emerge that require a device to be
location aware. A location aware device is able to infer its own physical location by communi-
cating with its environment. It may then base its actions on the obtained location information.
This opens up a whole new space of possible attacks that target the inherently security sensitive
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location information.
In this thesis we study Impulse-radio Ultra-wide Band (IR-UWB), a physical layer radio
technology that has many features that make it a promising choice for future short-range wire-
less networks. The defining characteristic of IR-UWB is its large bandwidth that can range
from several hundred megahertz to a few gigahertz. Thanks to this large bandwidth, combined
with low duty-cycle transmissions, IR-UWB should in theory be able to accommodate a large
number of concurrent users while keeping interference low. A large bandwidth also results in a
fine temporal resolution that can be exploited to yield accurate ranging capabilities that enable
location based services. Consequently, IR-UWB has been standardized in the form of the IEEE
802.15.4a amendment to the IEEE 802.15.4 standard for low data-rate wireless personal area
networks (WPAN) with extensive battery life and very low complexity.
The main goal of this thesis is to understand and show how a low-complexity IR-UWB re-
ceiver can be designed such that it is able to cope with the challenging environment it will face
in future short-range wireless networks. In our analysis we take an integral system-level ap-
proach where we consider the whole process of receiving data packets, covering physical layer
functions from packet detection and timing acquisition up to and including payload decoding.
1.2 Dissertation Outline
We start this thesis with an introduction to IR-UWB in Chapter 2. We then introduce the
physical layer models and our main assumptions that are used throughout this thesis and present
common architectures for IR-UWB receivers. Finally, Chapter 2 also contains an overview of
the IEEE 802.15.4a standard. In Chapter 3 we discuss the current state-of-the-art, covering
work that is related to our work presented in subsequent chapters.
The main part of this thesis is organized in three parts. Part I is devoted to multi-user in-
terference (MUI) and starts with Chapter 4. In Chapter 4 we evaluate the performance of the
IEEE 802.15.4a standard in the presence of MUI with a low-complexity receiver that is based
on energy-detection. We find that such a setting is highly vulnerable to MUI and that every as-
pect of physical layer data packet reception is affected. More robust solutions are thus needed
for synchronization as well as data reception. We address data reception in Chapter 5 and pro-
pose a novel adaptive energy-detection receiver architecture that is more robust to MUI. Since
our solution requires estimation of the channel energy-delay profile, robust estimation thereof
is also covered in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 covers synchronization and presents several algorithms
for robust packet detection and timing acquisition with an energy-detection receiver. Further,
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we address robust algorithms for detection of the start frame delimiter, a special sequence that
marks the beginning of the payload in IEEE 802.15.4a packets. In Chapter 8 we shortly leave
energy-detection receivers and explore whether mitigation of MUI can be more efficiently per-
formed in coherent receivers, if interference is modeled according to a non-Gaussian process.
We derive a receiver that is built on this principle and indeed mitigates interference better than
existing solutions. Of the two interference models that we explore, the Gaussian mixture model
has a lower complexity and still yields a good performance. We show in Chapter 8 that this
model can also be applied to the energy-detection receiver that we developed in Chapter 5 and
Chapter 6, further improving its robustness to MUI.
Chapter 9 constitutes Part II of this thesis. In this chapter, we evaluate the effect of clock
offsets between the transmitter and the receiver on architectures based on energy-detection. We
find that especially adaptive receivers, like the ones we developed in the first part of this thesis,
are very sensitive to such drifting clocks and we propose potential solutions to this problem.
Part III of this thesis deals with security in IR-UWB ranging. In Chapter 10 we show
that the IEEE 802.15.4a standard is vulnerable to distance-decreasing attacks on the physical
layer. Such attacks compromise the security of secure ranging protocols by leading two ranging
devices to believe that they are closer to each other than they actually are. Having identified
and quantified this threat, we evaluate possible countermeasures and make recommendations
on how to perform ranging over IEEE 802.15.4a in a secure manner.
Finally, we conclude this thesis in Chapter 11 with a summary of the main findings and a
discussion of possible directions for future work.
1.3 Contributions
The following is a list of the main contributions of this thesis.
• We demonstrate that interference mitigation at the IR-UWB physical layer is possible,
even with low-complexity devices. This is a powerful result since it verifies one of the
key assumptions underlying the design of optimal IR-UWB MAC protocols [1], which
explicitly allow concurrent transmissions.
• We provide a comprehensive performance evaluation of a complete packet based IEEE
802.15.4a system based on energy-detection and evaluate how it is affected by MUI.
The resulting catalog of causes for reduced performance can serve as a basis for more
interference resistant receiver and network designs.
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• We derive the optimal energy-detection receiver structure for the IEEE 802.15.4a stan-
dard and show how it can be adapted to yield a low-complexity receiver that maintains a
good performance in the presence of MUI.
• We present algorithms for packet detection, timing acquisition and start frame delim-
iter detection with energy-detection receivers in the presence of MUI. Such robust syn-
chronization mechanisms are a crucial building block for IR-UWB networks, since they
enable concurrent transmissions.
• We show that interference mitigation can be improved by construction of receivers that
assume MUI to follow a statistical, non-Gaussian model. For such receivers, we identify
the need to classify MUI into different types and to deal with each of them in an appro-
priate manner. Finally, we show that in a realistic multipath environment, MUI is best
characterized by a model with memory.
• We show that contrary to common belief, energy-detection receivers may be vulnerable
to clock-offsets between transmitter and receiver; and we propose an elegant solution to
alleviate this problem.
• We expose the vulnerability of ranging within the IEEE 802.15.4a standard to distance-
decreasing attacks on the physical communication layer. We quantify the effect of these
attacks in different scenarios and make recommendations on how to improve the security
of IEEE 802.15.4a ranging.
Chapter 2
System Model and Assumptions
In this chapter, we introduce the IR-UWB physical layer (PHY) models, that are used through-
out this thesis, as well as their underlying assumptions. We also provide an overview of possible
receiver structures for IR-UWB with an emphasis on the energy-detection architecture, which
is the architecture of choice in several chapters. Finally, we introduce the IEEE 802.15.4a
standard for IR-UWB low data-rate networks.
This chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.1 we give a general introduction to IR-
UWB. The classical IR-UWB PHY is introduced in Section 2.2. Possible receiver structures for
IR-UWB are presented in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 introduces the IEEE 802.15.4a standard and
Section 2.5 gives a set of assumptions that are made throughout this thesis when conducting
performance evaluations with the IEEE 802.15.4a standard.
2.1 IR-UWB, One Flavor of UWB
Ultra-Wide Band is a wireless communication technology that uses signals occupying a very
large bandwidth. According to the common definition, a signal is required to either have an
absolute bandwidth exceeding 500 MHz, or a fractional bandwidth of at least 20%, in order to
qualify as UWB [2]. Strictly speaking, UWB has been around since the early days of radio:
the very first attempts at wireless transmissions can be considered to be of UWB nature. More
recently, renewed interest into UWB sparked in 2002, when the US Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) issued a regulation, authorizing the unlicensed use of UWB in the fre-
quency range from 3.1 to 10.6 GHz [2]. Similar regulations followed in Europe [3] and Japan.
What all of these regulations have in common is that they impose strict limits on the allowable
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emitted power levels in order to limit interference from UWB to coexisting systems that reside
in the same frequency range. The FCC ruling, e.g., specifies that the power spectral density
must not exceed −41.3 dBm/MHz in the 3.1 to 10.6 GHz range. These stringent limits on the
transmitted power result in a relatively short communication range of UWB systems, usually
in the order of several meters to a few tens of meters.
Current UWB systems can broadly be divided into two classes: Impulse-Radio Ultra-Wide
Band (IR-UWB) based systems and Multi-Band OFDM (MB-OFDM) based systems. The fo-
cus of this thesis, and therefore also of the rest of this chapter, is on IR-UWB. IR-UWB has
been chosen as a possible PHY for the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [4] for low data-rate (LDR) de-
vices with an emphasis on very low complexity and power consumption wireless personal area
networks (WPAN). IR-UWB owes its name to its pulse-based transmission scheme, transmit-
ting very short pulses with a low duty cycle. MB-OFDM, on the other hand, uses orthogonal
frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) modulation and has been standardized in two ECMA
standards for high data-rate (HDR) wireless personal area networks (WPAN)[5, 6]. It targets
applications with data rates of several hundred Mb/s over a few meters and is, e.g., the technol-
ogy that is underlying Wireless USB [7] that is meant to replace USB cables with a wireless
link. MB-OFDM is not considered in this thesis.
2.2 The Classical IR-UWB Physical Layer
The classical IR-UWB PHY structure is based on the work by Win and Scholtz [8, 9, 10]. The
main idea is to send a train of short pulses, each pulse having a width Tp in the order of a
nanosecond or less, resulting in an UWB signal. Consecutive pulses have a separation much
larger than Tp. Consequently, the resulting transmission has a low duty cycle, typically around
only 1%. This in turn allows multiple users to access the wireless medium at the same time
and to transmit concurrently. Still, with a uniform pulse separation, it may happen that a large
number of pulses from signals of two users overlap. To avoid such catastrophic collisions
the separation between pulses is randomized through a pseudo-random time-hopping sequence
(THS).
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2.2.1 Transmitted IR-UWB Signal
We assume that PHY transmissions occur in packets of Ns symbols. The transmitted signal
corresponding to the transmission of a single packet is then given by
x(t) =
Ns−1∑
i=0
ai · p(t− iTf − cTHS,iTc − diTb). (2.1)
Here p(t) denotes the waveform of the transmitted pulse with width Tp. Every data symbol is
formed by one pulse. The main time unit is a chip of duration Tc and generally, Tc ≥ Tp. Nc
consecutive chips form a frame of duration Tf = NcTc. One symbol is sent per frame, thus
resulting in a duty cycle of Tp/Tf. Within a frame, each pulse is shifted by a certain number
of chips according to the THS. For the i-th pulse this offset is cTHS,iTc. The THS {cTHS,i} is a
pseudo-random sequence, whose elements are integers from the set [0, Nh−1]. Nh thus denotes
the number of chips that are available for time-hopping. Nh is usually smaller than Nc, leaving
a guard interval of Ng = Nc −Nh chips to prevent inter-symbol interference (ISI).
To transmit information, two modulation formats can be used: pulse amplitude modulation
(PAM) and pulse position modulation (PPM). In this thesis we restrict ourselves to binary PAM
(BPAM) and binary PPM (BPPM) because they are more commonly used than their M-ary
counterparts. With BPAM, the i-th information bit to be sent is conveyed by the amplitude ai
of the pulse (and consequently, di = 0). The pulse is sent with a different amplitude depending
on whether a 0-bit or a 1-bit is being sent. The two most common forms of BPAM are bi-
nary phase-shift keying (BPSK) and on-off keying (OOK). With BPSK, 0-bits and 1-bits have
opposite amplitudes, i.e.,
ai ∈ {−1, 1}
With OOK, a 1-bit is signalled by the presence of the pulse, a 0-bit by its absence, i.e.,
ai ∈ {0, 1}
With BPPM, the i-th information bit to be sent is conveyed by the position of the pulse through
the offset diTb (and consequently, ai = 1). Usually, a 0-bit is signalled by sending the pulse
with no offset and a 1-bit by sending the pulse with an offset of half the frame duration, i.e.,
di ∈ {0, 1}, Tb = Tf/2
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The frame is then divided into a 0-block and a 1-block . To signal a 0-bit, a pulse is sent in the
0-block, to signal a 1-bit, a pulse is sent in the 1-block.
BPSK and BPPM can also be used in combination, in which case every symbol carries two
information bits, one conveyed by the amplitude of the pulse and one by the position of the
pulse.
2.2.2 Multipath Channel
The transmitted signal x(t) propagates through the wireless medium to reach the receiver. The
received signal is given by
r(t) = x(t) ∗ h(t− ν) + n(t), (2.2)
where n(t) is zero-mean additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with two-sided power spectral
density N0/2, ν denotes the line-of-sight (LOS) propagation delay, h(t) is the impulse response
of the wireless channel and ∗ denotes convolution.
One fundamental concept here is multipath propagation, the fact that a signal reaches the
receiver via different paths due to reflections by surrounding objects. This effect is especially
pronounced indoors [11] resulting in a large number of replicas of the transmitted signal, called
multipath components, to be received at the receiver. Depending on its propagation path, each
multipath component arrives with a certain delay, attenuation and phase. In narrowband sys-
tems, multipath propagation leads to multipath fading if overlapping multipath components
combine in a destructive way. Multipath fading can severely degrade the quality of the received
signal. With UWB signals this effect is less pronounced because the multipath components
remain resolvable due to the short pulse duration.
A widely used model for the impulse response of the UWB multipath channel h(t) is the
tapped-delay-line model, under which
h(t) =
L−1∑
l=0
αlδ(t− τl). (2.3)
L is the number of multipath components corresponding to the different propagation paths. αl
and τl are the attenuation coefficient and the delay induced by the l-th multipath component, re-
spectively. δ denotes the Dirac delta function. A lot of research has been devoted to measuring
the UWB channel and building models for τl and αl that characterize it well. For a recent survey
on this research topic, the reader is referred to [12]. A popular model is the Saleh-Valenzuela
(SV) model [13] that assumes that multipath components form clusters whose arrival times are
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Poisson distributed. The SV model has also been adopted in the standardized IEEE 802.15.4a
channel models [14, 15]. Throughout this thesis, the IEEE 802.15.4a channel models are used
for simulations and performance evaluation.
The model in (2.3) is a relatively simple model that ignores frequency and path dependent
distortions of the pulse. On the other hand, such effects mainly affect UWB signals with a large
relative bandwidth [12]. UWB signals like the IEEE 802.15.4a signals considered in this thesis
have a large absolute bandwidth only and are less affected by these effects.
Further, αl and τl usually change over time because of variations of the environment. The
environment varies due to, e.g., the motion of people. Still, throughout this thesis we assume
the channel impulse response to be invariant for the duration of one packet. This is motivated
by the rate of such changes in the environment that is very slow compared to the packet duration
in the order of a millisecond.
2.2.3 Multiple Access and Multi-User Interference
A large part of this thesis is devoted to multi-user interference (MUI). By MUI we understand
concurrent transmissions from other IR-UWB users that overlap in time with the transmission
of the user of interest (UOI). We only consider MUI from users that also use an IR-UWB PHY.
In particular, we are not concerned with coexistence of IR-UWB and narrowband systems;
i.e., with interference from narrowband systems on IR-UWB, or vice versa. Coexistence is a
research topics on its own and out of the scope of this thesis. For a recent survey on UWB
coexistence, the reader is referred to [16] and the references therein.
Concurrent transmissions may stem from coexisting IR-UWB networks that are operating
near-by. They may also originate from within the same network if the medium access control
(MAC) protocol allows concurrent transmissions like it is, e.g., the case with IEEE 802.15.4a
(Section 2.4.4). We further assume in general that concurrent transmissions are uncontrolled,
i.e., that there is no power control mechanism preventing the near-far problem and that inter-
fering signals may thus be received with a power exceeding the power of the UOI.
With Nu concurrent users present in the system, the signal at the receiver becomes a su-
perposition of the received signals from the individual users and of the additive noise term:
r(t) =
Nu−1∑
u=0
∑
k
x
(u)
k (t) ∗ h(u)k (t− ν(u)k ) + n(t). (2.4)
Here, x(u)k (t) denotes the transmitted signal corresponding to the k-th packet of the u-th user
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that has a propagation delay ν(u)k and that is given by
x
(u)
k (t) =
Ns−1∑
i=0
a
(u)
k,i · p(t− iTf − c(u)THS,iTc − b(u)k,i Tf/2 − τ (u)pkt,k) (2.5)
Apart from τ (u)pkt,k, denoting the time instant at which the transmission of the k-th packet by
the u-th user starts, this still corresponds to (2.1). The only difference is that we introduced
appropriate sub- and superscripts for packet and user dependent variables.
The same goes for the channel impulse response h(u)k (t) that differs between users and pack-
ets because we assume time invariance only for the duration of one packet (see Section 2.2.2)
and because it depends on the users’ physical positions:
h
(u)
k (t) =
L
(u)
k −1∑
l=0
α
(u)
k,l δ(t− τ (u)k,l ). (2.6)
Without loss of generality, we assume that the UOI is the user with index u = 0. The
explicit description of the full received signal model given by (2.4)-(2.6) is quite cumbersome.
For most parts of this thesis, however, we can work with a simpler representation. We can make
a first simplification by only considering the reception of a single packet of the UOI, e.g., the
one with index k = 0. By further denoting the contribution of the UOI to the received signal as
x˜(t), given by
x˜(t) = x
(0)
0 (t) ∗ h(0)0 (t− ν(0)0 ), (2.7)
and by additionally aggregating all MUI terms as
w(t) =
Nu−1∑
u=1
∑
k
x
(u)
k (t) ∗ h(u)k (t− ν(u)k ), (2.8)
we can get rid of the indices u and k altogether, resulting in the much simpler received signal
model given by
r(t) = x˜(t− ν0) + v(t)
=
L−1∑
l=0
αl
Ns−1∑
i=0
ai · p(t− iTf − cTHS,iTc − diTf/2 − τl − ν0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
x˜(t−ν0)
+w(t) + n(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
v(t)
(2.9)
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where v(t) = w(t) + n(t) denotes the aggregate of MUI and AWGN. Further, ν0 denotes the
time of arrival (TOA) of the UOI packet and is given by
ν0 = ν
(0)
0 + τ
(0)
pkt,0. (2.10)
For convenience we also introduce the compound channel impulse response that combines
the effect of the multipath channel and of the transmitted pulse
h˜(t) = p(t) ∗ h(t). (2.11)
This allows us to further simplify the expression of the received signal, which is now equal to
r(t) =
Ns−1∑
i=0
ai · h˜(t− iTf − cTHS,iTc − diTf/2 − ν0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
x˜(t−ν0)
+v(t). (2.12)
2.3 Receiver Structures for IR-UWB
Receiver structures for IR-UWB can broadly be classified into correlation or Rake receivers
and autocorrelation receivers (AcR). Rake receivers cross-correlate the received signal with a
locally generated template that is matched to the received signal, while AcR receivers perform
the correlation with a delayed version of the received signal. A special case of an AcR is the
energy-detection receiver which performs a squaring operation instead of the autocorrelation.
Rake receivers usually have a better performance but also a significantly higher complexity
than AcR or energy-detection receivers.
2.3.1 Rake Receivers
The receiver with optimal single user performance, but also with the highest complexity, is
the all-Rake (ARake) receiver using maximum ratio combining (MRC). The ARake needs to
estimate the channel parameters as well as the TOA. We denote these estimates by αˆl, τˆl and νˆ0.
The ARake first correlates the received signal r(t)with a template, g(t), matched to the received
pulse shape. We will here assume for simplicity that r(t) is given by (2.9) with v(t) = 0, Ns = 1
and c0 = 0; i.e., we neglect noise and interference by assuming r(t) = x˜(t), consider detection
of a single symbol only and assume no time-hopping. We further assume no distortion of the
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pulse, such that g(t) = p(t) 1. This yields the following signal at the output of the correlator
y(t) = a0
L−1∑
l=0
αlRp(t− b0Tf/2 − τl − ν0), (2.13)
where
Rp(t) =
∫ ∞
−∞
p(τ )p(τ − t) dτ (2.14)
is the autocorrelation of the pulse waveform p(t).
Two decision variables, Ydˆ0 , are then formed, one for each of the hypotheses, dˆ0 = 0
and dˆ0 = 1. For each of these decision variables, the energy from the different multipath
components is combined by sampling y(t) L times, at time instants tm,dˆ0 = dˆ0Tf/2 + τˆm + νˆ0,
and by combining these samples according to
Ydˆ0 =
L−1∑
m=0
αˆm · y(tm,dˆ0)
= a0
L−1∑
m=0
αˆm
L−1∑
l=0
αlRp((dˆ0 − b0)Tf/2 + τˆm − τl + νˆ0 − ν0) (2.15)
If all of the multipath components are resolvable (i.e., if |τl − τm| ≥ Tp, ∀l 6= m) and if
perfect channel state information is available (i.e., αˆm = αl, τˆm = τl and νˆ0 = ν0), then the
ARake is able to collect the entire energy of the received signal, corresponding to Ep
∑L−1
l=0 α
2
l ,
where Ep = Rp(0) is the transmitted energy per pulse.
Unfortunately, the optimal ARake receiver is hardly feasible in practice because of its high
complexity. First of all, the number of resolvable multipath components that have to be ac-
curately estimated and combined is potentially huge in UWB channels [17, 18]. Several sub-
optimal receivers like the selective Rake (SRake) [19] or partial Rake (PRake) [20] try to cir-
cumvent this problem by only estimating a small subset of multipath components. Further,
sub-optimal combining schemes like non-coherent square-law combining [21] remove the ne-
cessity to estimate αl altogether. However, all of those receivers still share the stringent timing
requirements of the ARake: We can see from (2.15) that even a slight timing offset of τˆm or
νˆ0 can result in a huge energy loss because of the wide bandwidth of the UWB pulse. Rake
receivers thus need highly accurate synchronization, clocks and channel delay estimation to
prevent a performance loss due to timing impairments [22, 23, 24, 25]. All of this is only
1. In practice the received pulse is a distorted version of the transmitted pulse. This distortion either entails a
lowered performance, if it is neglected, or an increased complexity, if it is corrected for.
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possible with high sampling frequencies, thus increasing the complexity of the receiver.
2.3.2 Autocorrelation Receivers
Autocorrelation receivers are a low-complexity alternative to Rake receivers. Compared to
Rake receivers, they do not only have lower sampling frequency requirements, but they also
do not need any knowledge about the shape of the received pulse, nor do they need a down
conversion stage to convert the signal from passband to baseband. Finally, they can operate
with a simplified channel estimation or even completely omit channel estimation altogether.
AcRs correlate the received signal with a delayed version of itself. We distinguish trans-
mitted reference (TR) receivers [26] where this delay is nonzero and energy-detection receivers
where the received signal is simply squared instead of being correlated. 2
In this thesis we only consider energy-detection receivers which are explained in the next
section. The main reason for not considering TR receivers is that TR receivers require a spe-
cially designed transmitted signal: Every pulse that carries information is preceded by a refer-
ence pulses that serves as correlation template. This requirement on the form of the transmitted
signal limits the applicability of TR receivers. In particular, it makes them incompatible with
the IEEE 802.15.4a standard that does not foresee reference pulses. Further, the pulse and its
reference are usually separated by a delay in the order of several tens of nanoseconds to account
for the channel spread. Consequently, an analog delay line of the same length is required on
the receiver side. Low-cost analog delay lines of such a length are in general difficult to realize
[27].
2.3.3 Energy-detection Receivers
Unlike TR receivers, energy-detection receivers [28, 29] have no requirement for a specially
designed transmitted signal. Further, they are explicitly supported by the IEEE 802.15.4a stan-
dard via the non-coherent BPPM modulation format. The decision to support non-coherent
receivers in IEEE 802.15.4a paired with the simplicity of energy-detection receivers makes
them a popular choice for low-complexity applications. The basic architecture of an energy-
detection receiver is shown in Figure 2.1. After the antenna, the received signal is filtered with
a bandpass filter (BPF) of bandwidth B to limit the effect of noise. Throughout this thesis we
assume a perfect bandpass filter with a bandwidth matching the bandwidth of the transmitted
2. Squaring is equivalent to correlation at lag zero, so we can see energy-detection receivers as a special case
of AcRs
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Figure 2.1: Energy-detection receiver architecture.
pulse p(t). After filtering, the signal is squared in a squaring device and the result is integrated,
yielding discrete samples. The duration of the integration, T , is an important system parameter
and called integration time.
For simplicity we assume that T divides Tf and that a total of
Nf = Tf/T (2.16)
samples are taken per frame. The discrete signal at the output of the integrator is then given by
ym,i =
∫ (m+1)T+ψ(i)
mT+ψ(i)
[r(t)]2 dt, (2.17)
where ym,i denotes the m-th sample of the i-th frame, r(t) is given by (2.12) and the starting
point, ψ(i), of the integration for the i-th frame corresponds to
ψ(i) = iTf + cTHS,iTc + ν0. (2.18)
In its simplest form, the energy-detection receiver decides on what BPPM symbol was
transmitted by comparing the received energy in the first and the second half of each BPPM
frame. For the i-th frame, the two decision variables associated with the two hypotheses, dˆ0 = 0
and dˆ0 = 1, are then given by
Yi,dˆ0 =
Nf
2
(dˆ0+1)−1∑
m=dˆ0·Nf2
ym,i =
∫ (dˆ0+1)Tf/2+ψ(i)
dˆ0·Tf/2+ψ(i)
[r(t)]2 dt (2.19)
This receiver thus takes two samples per frame and has an integration time of T = Tf/2. It then
decides according to which part of the frame contains more energy
Yi,0
dˆi=0
≷
dˆi=1
Yi,1 (2.20)
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It can be shown that this simple receiver is the optimal receiver if no channel state information
is available 3 [30, 31]. On the other hand, such a receiver also integrates a lot of noise, especially
if Tf is large compared to the delay spread of the channel. In practice, it is therefore desirable
to estimate the delay spread of the channel and to adapt the integration time appropriately [32].
Noise can be further limited and performance can be increased if partial channel state in-
formation in the form of the channel energy-delay profile is available. In this case, the optimal
receiver estimates the channel energy-delay profile and weights the received signal accord-
ingly; either in the analog domain before the integration [31], or in the digital domain after the
integration [33].
Distribution of Energy-detection Receiver Output in Single User Case
If r(t) does not contain MUI, i.e., w(t) = 0 in (2.12), the probability density function (PDF) of
the receiver output ym,i, given in (2.17), can be closely approximated [28] with
f(ym,i|N0/2, BT, ζm,i) ≈ 1
N0/2
fNCχ2
( ym,i
N0/2
∣∣∣2BT, ζm,i), (2.21)
where
fNCχ2(y|κ, ζ) =
1
2
e−
(y+ζ)
2
(y
ζ
)κ/2−1
2
Iκ/2−1(
√
ζy) (2.22)
is the PDF of a non-central chi-square random variable with κ degrees of freedom and non-
centrality parameter ζ. Iυ(z) is the υ-th order modified Bessel function of the first kind. In
addition, the samples ym,i are assumed to be independent. This is a practical assumption, also
made in the related work [33].
The non-centrality parameters ζm,i are given by
ζm,i =
pm,i
N0/2
with pm,i =
∫ (m+1)T+ψ(i)
mT+ψ(i)
[x˜(t)]2 dt. (2.23)
The coefficients pm,i thus depend on the channel energy-delay profile of the UOI signal.
Accordingly, if the received signal consists purely of AWGN, i.e., r(t) = n(t), we ap-
proximate the PDF of the receiver output ym,i with the commonly made approximation of
3. Or more precisely, if the only channel state information available is that the channel spread is smaller than
Tf/2.
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independent chi-square random variables
f(ym,i|N0/2, BT ) ≈ 1
N0/2
fχ2
( ym,i
N0/2
∣∣∣2BT), (2.24)
where
fχ2(y|κ) = 1
2κ/2Γ(κ/2)
yκ/2−1e−y/2 (2.25)
is the PDF of a chi-square random variable with κ degrees of freedom. The scaled chi-square
distribution in (2.24) is equivalent to a gamma distribution. We can therefore alternatively write
f(ym,i|N0/2, BT ) ≈ fΓ(ym,i|BT,N0), (2.26)
where
fΓ(y|κ, θ) = 1
θκΓ(κ)
yκ−1e−y/θ (2.27)
is the PDF of the gamma distribution with scale parameter κ and shape parameter θ and Γ(z)
denotes the gamma function.
2.4 The IEEE 802.15.4a Standard
IEEE 802.15.4 [4] is a standard for low data rate WPAN. The main emphasis of IEEE 802.15.4
is on networks of low-cost and low-complexity devices with extensive battery life. IEEE
802.15.4 specifies the PHY and MAC layers for such networks. Other specifications, such as
ZigBee [34], exist for the higher communication layers. Several PHYs can be used with IEEE
802.15.4, one of which is based on IR-UWB and specified in the IEEE 802.15.4a amendment
[35] to the IEEE 802.15.4 standard.
In the following, we will introduce the main features of IEEE 802.15.4a that are used
throughout this thesis.
2.4.1 Basic Concepts and Main Differences With Classical PHY
To date, IEEE 802.15.4a is the only standard for IR-UWB networks, and therefore, the IEEE
802.15.4a PHY is also our PHY of choice and predominantly used throughout this thesis. Still,
the IEEE 802.15.4a PHY is sufficiently close to the classical PHY, introduced in Section 2.2,
such that most of the concepts presented in this thesis are easily transferable and applicable
to the classical PHY as well. Indeed, both PHYs share key concepts such as time-hopping to
The IEEE 802.15.4a Standard 19
SYNC SFD
0c0 0 0 0 0c1 0 0 0 0cC-1 0 0 0
Tc = 2ns
Nsync Tpsym
Ls
s0
(sfd) s1
(sfd) s2
(sfd) s3
(sfd) s5
(sfd) s6
(sfd) s7
(sfd)s4
(sfd)s0 s1 s2
Figure 2.2: IEEE 802.15.4a preamble structure.
smooth the spectrum of the signal and to mitigate the possible impact of MUI, or the possibility
for BPPM and/or BPSK modulation. The main difference of the two PHYs lies in the signalling
format of the data frames. With IEEE 802.15.4a, instead of sending a single pulse per frame, a
short, continuous burst of pulses with pseudo-random polarity is sent.
An IEEE 802.15.4a packet consists of a preamble followed by a payload. The preamble is
a sequence derived from a preamble code that is known to the receiver. It is used for packet de-
tection, timing acquisition and channel estimation. The payload carries the actual information
bits to be transmitted. Time-hopping is used in the payload but not in the preamble. However,
the preamble code used to construct the preamble sequence also defines the THS that is to be
used during the payload transmission.
IEEE 802.15.4a operates in a number of 500 MHz channels in the frequency range from
approximately 3 GHz to 10 GHz. Additionally, four channels with a higher bandwidth of
1− 1.3 GHz are also available in the same frequency range. To each channel, a set of preamble
codes is allocated and every pair of a channel and a preamble code forms a logical channel. A
standard compliant device needs to support two logical channels within one of the 500 MHz
physical channels.
2.4.2 Preamble Structure
The structure of the IEEE 802.15.4a preamble is shown in Figure 2.2. The preamble comprises
two parts: the SYNC part used for timing acquisition and channel estimation, followed by the
start frame delimiter (SFD) that indicates the beginning of the payload.
In line with the classical IR-UWB PHY (Section 2.2), the basic time unit is a chip of du-
ration Tc. During the preamble, pulses are sent at regular time intervals, every Ls-th chip. We
make the standard assumption that the spreading factor Ls is large enough to prevent inter-pulse
interference. Blocks of C consecutive pulses form a preamble symbol. Every pulse within a
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cTHS,i ·Tburst Ncpb
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Figure 2.3: IEEE 802.15.4a payload symbol structure.
preamble symbol is modulated according to the ternary preamble code of length C. With the
mandatory modes, there are two distinct preamble codes, forming two logical channels, allo-
cated to each of the physical 500 MHz channels. The preamble codes have a perfect periodic
auto-correlation and good cross-correlation properties, identical to the codes proposed in [36].
The repetition of Nsync preamble symbols builds the SYNC part of the preamble. The SFD
is obtained by spreading a ternary SFD code of length Nsfd with a preamble symbol. The total
length of the preamble thus corresponds to Npre = Nsync +Nsfd preamble symbols.
This results in the following received signal during the preamble:
rpre(t) =
Npre−1∑
i=0
si
C−1∑
j=0
cj · h˜(t− (j + iC)LsTc − ν0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
x˜pre(t−ν0)
+v(t), (2.28)
where x˜pre(t) is the contribution of the UOI and v(t) accounts for noise and MUI. cj ∈
{−1, 0,+1}, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , C − 1} is j-th code symbol of the ternary preamble code. Fur-
ther, every preamble symbol is modulated by si, which is given by
si =
{
1 if i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Nsync − 1}
s
(sfd)
i−Nsync if i ∈ {Nsync, . . . , Npre − 1}
, (2.29)
where s(sfd)i ∈ {−1, 0,+1}, i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Nsfd − 1} is the ternary SFD code.
2.4.3 Payload Structure
The structure of an IEEE 802.15.4a payload symbol is shown in Figure 2.3. In contrast to
the preamble signal, each symbol of an IEEE 802.15.4a payload is composed of a short, con-
tinuous burst of Ncpb pulses with pseudo-random polarity and time-hopping. As explained in
Section 2.4.1, the THS depends on the preamble code that is used in the preamble. The same
holds for the scrambling sequence that defines the pseudo-random polarity of the pulses; it also
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is specific to the chosen preamble code. Further, time-hopping is performed on entire bursts.
The time-hopping offset is thus a multiple of the duration of a burst Tburst = NcpbTc. The num-
ber of available hopping positions is restricted to Nh = Tf/22Tburst , half of the frame serves as guard
interval against ISI.
Before modulation, the data is encoded using a mandatory (55, 63) systematic Reed-Solomon
(RS) code. Additional forward error correction (FEC) is available through a systematic rate 1/2
convolutional code that is applied to the RS encoded data. The resulting encoded data bits are
modulated using a combination of BPPM and BPSK. Information bits are modulated using
BPPM which can be demodulated by both receiver types. Parity bits from the convolutional
code are modulated using BPSK and a coherent receiver can thus take advantage of this addi-
tional information to increase robustness against noise.
The received signal during the payload is given by
rpay(t) =
Npay−1∑
i=0
ai
Ncpb−1∑
j=0
bij · h˜(t− iTf − diTf/2− cTHS,iTburst − jTc − ν0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
x˜pay(t−ν0)
+v(t), (2.30)
where x˜pay(t) is the contribution of the UOI and v(t) accounts for noise and MUI, Npay is the
number of symbols in the payload and Tf is the duration of a frame. As with the classical
PHY, one symbol is sent per frame. ai ∈ {−1, 1} and di ∈ {0, 1} denote the i-th BPSK and
BPPM modulated data bits of the payload, respectively. bij ∈ ±{1} is the pseudo-random
polarity of the j-th pulse of the i-th symbol specified by the scrambling sequence. Finally,
cTHS,i ∈ [0, Nh − 1] denotes the THS.
The first 19 symbols of the payload are protected by a special single error correct double
error detect (SECDED) code and constitute the PHY header (PHR). The PHR contains infor-
mation about, e.g., the length of the packet. For simplicity, we ignore the PHR, thus treating it
like it were part of the regular payload.
2.4.4 Medium Access Control
Medium access to the IR-UWB PHY of IEEE 802.15.4a is governed through a set of clear
channel assessment (CCA) modes. The only mandatory mode is CCA mode 4 corresponding
to pure ALOHA. With pure ALOHA, before sending a packet, the transmitter has to wait until
a backoff timer of random duration expires. If after sending the packet, the transmitter does not
receive an acknowledgement packet (ACK) from the intended receiver within a certain time
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interval, the packet is retransmitted.
Two more sophisticated optional modes, CCA mode 5 and 6 exist, where the transmitter
tries to determine whether the channel is idle before sending a packet. The transmitter decides
on an idle or busy channel depending on whether it is able to detect the presence of a preamble.
CCA mode 5 uses the standard packet structure introduced in Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3. With
CCA mode 6, the payload is modified by multiplexing additional preamble symbols into the
payload part of a packet.
2.5 Assumptions Made in Performance Evaluations
This section summarizes a set of assumptions that is common to most of the performance
evaluations made in this thesis.
2.5.1 Mandatory Modes of the Standard
The IEEE 802.15.4a standard is very flexible in the sense that it allows for many different
configurations that can be tailored to the application at hand. However, only few of the resulting
parameter combinations need to be implemented by a device in order to be standard compliant.
We argue that the majority of devices are likely to only implement the resulting mandatory
modes and we therefore only consider these in our performance evaluations. In what follows,
we introduce the mandatory modes considered and the associated systems parameters.
Even though the supported data rates in IEEE 802.15.4a show a great diversity, covering
the wide range from 0.11 Mb/s up to 27 Mb/s, only a data rate of 0.85 Mb/s is mandatory. With
this mandatory data rate, two transmission modes with different packet structure have to be
supported. These two mandatory modes distinguish themselves in their mean pulse repetition
frequency (PRF). The first one sends pulses at a low mean PRF of 3.9 MHz, the second one
at a high mean PRF of 15.6 MHz. We will therefore denote these two modes as low PRF
(LPRF) and high PRF (HPRF) modes, respectively. The HPRF mode, with a shorter spacing
between successive pulses, is intended for coherent receivers and LOS channels where inter-
pulse interference is less of an issue. The LPRF mode, on the other hand, is intended for
non-coherent receivers and channels with a large delay spread.
Each of these two mandatory modes entails a different set of parameters that are summa-
rized in Table 2.1. The most important differences between LPRF and HPRF are the different
spreading factors used in the preamble and the different number of chips per burst in the pay-
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load. Further, we simulate the 500 MHz physical channel number 3. The two preamble codes,
IEEE 802.15.4a preamble codes 5 and 6, that are allocated to this channel are shown in Ta-
ble 2.2, together with the mandatory SFD code sequence that is common to all channels.
2.5.2 Packet Generation at the Transmitter
In all our simulations we assume that packets at the transmitter are generated according to the
same process that ultimately determines τ (u)pkt,k, the start of the PHY transmission of the k-th
packet of the u-th user.
We assume that every transmitter has a first-in first-out (FIFO) queue of packets to be trans-
mitted. Packets are generated by the upper layers according to a Poisson process with rate
R packets/s and placed in the queue. For the packet at the front of the queue we start a backoff
timer according to, e.g., the IEEE 802.15.4a backoff procedure. Once the timer expires, after
a time Tback, the transmission of the packet on the channel starts. The transmission ends after
a duration of Tpkt. The transmitter then waits for an additional duration Tack, before starting
the backoff timer for the next packet in the queue. This is done in order to leave room for the
reception of an acknowledgement packet (ACK). For complexity reasons, we cannot simulate
the full MAC protocol because this implies to simulate the reception and decoding of every
single packet from any user at its destination, as well as the transmission and reception of the
ACKs. We therefore neither simulate ACKs nor retransmission.
The utilization of the queuing system at the transmitter is
Utx = R ∗ (E[Tback] + Tpkt + Tack) (2.31)
and the resulting peak data rate corresponds to
Rpeak = 1/(E[Tback] + Tpkt + Tack) (2.32)
With IEEE 802.15.4a, Tack is assumed to correspond to the length of the preamble. For the
backoff timer we assume the maximum allowable backoff exponent BE = 8. According to the
IEEE 802.15.4a specification, Tback is then drawn uniformly at random from [0, Tmaxback] where
Tmaxback = (2
BE − 1) · 20 · Tf. (2.33)
The factor 20·Tf is given by the standard. The resulting peak data rates, assuming packets of the
maximum allowable packet size for IEEE 802.15.4a of 1016 information bits (corresponding
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Parameter Description LPRF HPRF
pulse repetition frequency 3.9 MHz 15.6 MHz
transmitter duty cycle ≈ 0.8% ≈ 3%
raw data rate 0.85 Mb/s 0.85 Mb/s
channel number according to [35] 3 3
indices of associated preamble codes [35] 5, 6 5, 6
B bandwidth of channel and bandpass filter 500 MHz 500 MHz
C length of preamble code 31 31
Ls preamble spreading factor 64 16
Ncpb number of chips per burst 4 16
Nh number of time-hopping positions 32 8
Npre number of symbols in preamble 72 72
Nsync number of symbols in SYNC part of preamble 64 64
Nsfd length of SFD in preamble symbols 8 8
Nmaxpay maximum number of payload symbols 1208 1208
corresp. number of information bits per packet 1016 1016
Tc duration of a chip 2 ns 2 ns
Tf duration of a frame 1024 ns 1024 ns
Tpsym duration of preamble symbol 3968 ns 992 ns
Tsync duration of SYNC part 254 µs 63.5 µs
Tsfd duration of SFD 31.8 µs 7.9 µs
Tpre duration of preamble 285.8 µs 71.4 µs
Rpeak peak data rate with Npay = Nmaxpay (Section 2.5.2) 226 pkts/s 250 pkts/s
corresp. peak throughput (information bits only) 230 kb/s 255 kb/s
Table 2.1: System parameters of mandatory IEEE 802.15.4a modes used in all simulations.
Identifier Ternary Code Sequence
Preamble Code 5 −1 0 1 −1 0 0 1 1 1 −1 1 0 0 0 −1 1 0 1 1 1 0 −1 0 1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0
Preamble Code 6 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 0 1 1 −1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 −1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
SFD Code 0 1 0 −1 1 0 0 −1
Table 2.2: Mandatory, ternary code sequences used in all simulations.
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to Npay = 1208), are summarized in Table 2.1 as well.
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Chapter 3
Related Work
The principal part of this thesis is concerned with the design of IR-UWB receivers that are
robust to multi-user interference (MUI). Our main focus is on receivers that are based on the
energy-detection architecture. As explained in Chapter 2, this architecture is becoming in-
creasingly popular since it is supported by the IEEE 802.15.4a standard [35] and because it
offers a great complexity reduction with respect to coherent receiver architectures. Section 3.1
gives an overview of the related work on MUI in IR-UWB networks. Related work on the
energy-detection receiver architecture is discussed separately in Section 3.2.
One aspect of energy-detection receivers that is little explored is their robustness to timing
impairments due to drifting clocks. The second part of this thesis is devoted to this topic and
corresponding related work is discussed in Section 3.2.2.
Finally, the third part of this thesis looks at IR-UWB networks from a completely different
perspective, namely from the viewpoint of security. Related work on security aspects of IR-
UWB networks is treated in Section 3.3.
3.1 Multi-User Interference in IR-UWB Networks
Already the earliest research that proposes IR-UWB for wireless communication [8, 9, 10]
is mainly motivated by the suitability of the IR-UWB PHY for multiple access communi-
cation. Multiple access with concurrent transmissions is possible in IR-UWB thanks to the
time-hopping mechanism. [8, 9, 10] evaluate the IR-UWB system performance under the as-
sumption of perfect LOS channel conditions without multipath fading, and by modeling MUI
as a Gaussian random process. Later work showed that both of these assumptions underesti-
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mate the effect of MUI on system performance: [37] shows that the interference robustness
of IR-UWB due to time-hopping is significantly lowered in a multipath fading channel; The
invalidity of the Gaussian approximation in practical scenarios is first established in [38, 39]
and later confirmed, e.g., in [40, 41]. Due to the signalling structure with short, infrequent
pulses, MUI in IR-UWB is impulsive in nature, rather than following a Gaussian distribution.
In [42], an approximation of the exact distribution of MUI is given for the AWGN channel
without multipath fading and assuming perfect power control, where all users are received with
equal power. [43] shows that the distribution from [42] can be further approximated, yielding
a Middleton Class A (MCA) model [44, 45].
The work discussed so far is concerned with the distribution of MUI in IR-UWB net-
works mainly because an accurate MUI model allows for better system performance evaluation
through more accurate bit-error-rate (BER) calculations. Insight into the nature of MUI can
however also be taken advantage of in order to design receivers that are more robust to MUI.
This is usually achieved by modeling interference and noise terms with a non-Gaussian (im-
pulsive) statistical model and by deriving optimal detection strategies for such impulsive noise
environments. The resulting receiver designs mitigate the effect of interference by passing the
received signal through a non-linearity prior to demodulation or decoding. This was already
realized in [46, 47], where optimal non-linearities for narrowband receivers, detecting signals
in MCA impulsive noise, are derived. Receivers based on this design are shown to outperform
conventional receivers that assume the noise plus interference term to be Gaussian. This work
also recognizes that such non-linearities need to adapt to changing interference conditions and,
consequently, require an estimation of the parameters of the interference model. The MCA
model is a Poisson-weighted mixture model formed by an infinite number of Gaussian compo-
nent densities of increasing variance. [48] shows that truncating this model to its first two terms
yields a simplified non-linearity that induces practically no performance loss. Additionally, the
connection between this two term model and an empirical Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM)
with two terms is made. Finally, suboptimal non-linearities that result in a thresholding struc-
ture are proposed and compared. With a thresholding structure, the receiver simply erases or
limits samples, whose amplitudes lie above a certain threshold.
3.1.1 Thresholding Schemes
Thresholding schemes are simple and easy to implement. Naturally, they were therefore also
among the first schemes that were proposed to mitigate MUI in IR-UWB receivers. A special
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case of a thresholding scheme is hard limiting, which can be seen as equivalent to hard-decision
decoding. Although the decision threshold in hard-decision decoding is usually independent of
MUI, the effect of interference is still limited because individual samples cannot disproportion-
ably contribute to the decision. [49, 50, 51] show that hard-decision decoding can yield good
performance in IR-UWB networks that are subject to MUI.
[52, 53] model interference and noise in an IR-UWB network as a Gaussian-Laplacian
mixture and propose a thresholding scheme, where samples that lie above a certain threshold
are erased. Further, it is found that in an AWGN channel with MUI, this thresholding scheme
outperforms hard limiting and performs close to a scheme with perfect blanking, i.e., where the
receiver knows the time-hopping sequences of all users and erases chips suffering from pulse
collisions.
[54] proposes interference mitigation with an erasure threshold as an enabling building
block of an uncoordinated joint PHY/MAC protocol. A similar erasure thresholding scheme is
later also proposed in [55]. In contrast to [54], not only the signal level of the user of interest,
but also the signal level of the interferers is taken into account when setting the threshold.
Thresholding structures that limit high interference terms to a constant value are proposed
in [51, 56, 57]. The soft-limiting structure in both, [51] and [57] is motivated by assuming that
MUI is distributed according to a Laplace distribution.
3.1.2 Interference Mitigation Based on Non-Gaussian Models
Non-Gaussian models that lead to alternative receiver designs have also been proposed for IR-
UWB. A popular non-Gaussian model for MUI is the aforementioned GMM, see e.g. [58]. In
[59], the GMM is proposed as a model for MUI and noise in IR-UWB and it is shown how
to perform channel and interference statistics estimation based on this model. In Chapter 7
we extend the use of the GMM to interference mitigation during the data decoding phase and
show that the GMM substantially outperforms a thresholding mechanism that is similar to
the one from [54]. Further, our proposal considers a realistic multipath environment, which
is neglected in several of the related work cited hereafter. Following up on our work, [60]
proposes a recursive formulation of the GMM that reduced the receiver complexity. This is
similar to the recursive algorithm that we use for the energy-detection receiver in Chapter 8.
In [61] the performance of an IEEE 802.15.4a compliant Rake receiver in the presence of
MUI is evaluated and a semi-analytical BER model based on the GMM is developed. In [62]
a two-term detector based on the truncated two-term MCA model is proposed. Further, the
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assumption of equal power interferers made in the MCA is relaxed and it is shown that the
resulting detector is equivalent to the one resulting from a two state GMM.
In [63, 64] receivers based on modeling MUI as a generalized Gaussian distribution are
derived and it is explained how the model parameters can be estimated. In addition, [64]
also proposes a receiver based on the Cauchy distribution. In [65] both the GMM and the
generalized Gaussian models are generalized, yielding a generalized Gaussian mixture model.
[66] proposes a Gaussian-Laplacian mixture model for MUI and noise and derives a receiver
with a structure similar to the soft-limiting receiver proposed earlier in [57]. Estimation of the
model parameters of this model is addressed in [67]. Finally, [68] proposes a MUI model based
on the symmetric-alpha-stable distribution and presents a corresponding receiver. In an AWGN
channel without multipath fading, the proposed receiver is shown to outperform receivers such
as the ones based on the generalized Gaussian, Gaussian-Laplacian or Cauchy distributions.
In general, it is an interesting question, how these models compare to each other and
whether some are better suited to model MUI in IR-UWB than others. A first evaluation is
made in [62, 69, 70], where detectors based on the GMM, Laplace, Cauchy and generalized
Gaussian distributions are compared in both AWGN [62, 70] and multipath channels [69] and
for both BPSK and BPPM modulation. In addition, an alternative non-linearity known as the α-
detector [71] is proposed for IR-UWB. All of the resulting receivers are shown to significantly
outperform conventional receivers. The receiver based on the Laplace distribution is shown
to have inferior performance compared to the other receivers that mitigate interference. The
remaining receivers are found to have a similar performance, with a slight advantage for the
receiver based on the GMM. In [72, 73] the ability of the GMM, MCA and Laplace distribution
to characterize MUI in an AWGN channel is evaluated and the GMM is again found to give the
most accurate result.
An interesting observation is made in the recent article [65], where all receivers based
on distributions that can be expressed as a mixture of generalized Gaussian distributions are
compared in an IEEE 802.15.4a setting with combined BPPM/BPSK modulation. It is found
that in a multipath channel with MUI, a GMM based receiver can be outperformed by both a
generalized Gaussian based and a Laplace based receiver if interference mitigation is applied
jointly to demodulation and decoding. This underlines once more the necessity to consider the
effect of the multipath channel when assessing the system performance of IR-UWB networks
that are subject to MUI. Also note that this result is not in contradiction to the results found in
[69], since there interference mitigation was only applied after demodulation, at the output of
the Rake receiver.
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All of the models discussed so far assume that the underlying MUI or noise process is
memoryless. However, because of the multipath channel, it is highly likely that consecutive
samples are affected by MUI, thus leading to errors that occur in bursts. To model this behavior,
we propose to model MUI in IR-UWB with a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) and we derive
a corresponding receiver in Chapter 7. The HMM and in particular its simplest version, the
two state Gilbert-Elliot model, are well-established models for burst-noise channels [74, 75]
but were not proposed before to model MUI in IR-UWB networks. We are not aware of any
other model for MUI in IR-UWB that takes correlation between samples into account.
Our HMM MUI model is extended in [76] to a two-phase two-state Markov model that
better characterizes MUI if BPPM modulation is used. The extended model is then used to es-
tablish a semi-analytical framework allowing to evaluate the performance of an IEEE 802.15.4a
compliant Rake receiver in the presence of MUI. It is shown that this model provides an ex-
cellent characterization of MUI. Further, it is found that the performance of the Rake receiver
considerably degrades in the presence of strong interferers, emphasizing once more the need
for interference mitigation schemes.
[77, 78] propose a receiver performing joint estimation and decoding under the HMM in-
terference model. A similar approach is taken in [79] and it also resembles the algorithm our
receiver for the HMM uses in Chapter 7. The difference to our algorithm is that in [77] all
parameters of the HMM are estimated directly on the data sequence to be decoded, whereas
in Chapter 7 we only estimate the noise state during decoding while the model parameters are
estimated during a training sequence. Further, [77] compares the performance of the HMM
receiver to a receiver using the memoryless GMM. A similar comparison is also done in [80]
where different decoding metrics for coded and interleaved transmissions over HMM channels
are analyzed. Both papers find that a receiver based on the HMM can significantly outperform
a receiver that is based on the GMM. In contrast, we only identify a minor performance dif-
ference in Chapter 7. Note, however, that in [77, 80] interference is generated directly from a
HMM and thus exactly matches the model of the receiver, whereas in Chapter 7 interference
stems from simulated parallel IR-UWB transmissions. Further, [80] finds that the performance
difference increases dramatically with interleaving, which we do not use in Chapter 7.
3.1.3 Interference Mitigation During Synchronization
Interference mitigation techniques are not limited to data decoding but they can also be applied
during synchronization or for time-of-arrival (TOA) estimation in a multi-user environment.
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Thresholding is applied for timing acquisition in IR-UWB with a coherent receiver in [81].
In the presence of near interferers, the proposed scheme is shown to significantly outperform
traditional acquisition schemes that do not use thresholds. The thresholds must be adapted to
varying channel and interference conditions. However, in [81] optimal thresholds are found
through exhaustive simulations and it is left open how to adapt these thresholds in practice.
We build on this work in Chapter 6 and propose a practical timing acquisition algorithm for
energy-detection receivers. Our algorithm not only significantly reduces the impact of MUI,
but it also solves the problem of adapting the involved thresholds. The algorithm from [81]
is validated experimentally on a hardware platform in [82]. This work shows that concurrent
transmissions during IR-UWB acquisition are possible, provided that appropriate interference
mitigation is performed at the PHY.
To suppress MUI during TOA estimation, [83, 84] use non-linear filtering techniques known
from digital image processing. Both works are based on energy-detection and show interesting
parallels to our work. [83], e.g., uses robust statistics in the form of the median to suppress
MUI, similar to what we propose for channel estimation in Chapter 5. Further, both papers
represent the receiver output as an energy matrix that can be considered a digital image onto
which image processing techniques are applied. We also take a similar approach in our clock-
offset tracking algorithm in Chapter 9. Finally, their mechanisms could be combined with our
synchronization algorithms presented in Chapter 6. Both papers only consider TOA estimation,
assuming that packet detection and coarse synchronization on the strongest multipath compo-
nent have already been achieved. Further, also here parameter adaptation, especially of the
involved thresholds, is needed in practical deployments but no online adaptation mechanisms
are proposed.
Statistical interference models can also be used for receiver operations other than data
reception. [85] models MUI with a GMM, yielding a TOA estimator for IR-UWB ranging
systems that operate in a multi-user environment. [86] devises a robust signal acquisition al-
gorithm for transmitted reference IR-UWB receivers assuming impulsive noise modeled with
a GMM. [87] estimates clock drifts and carrier frequency offsets in a coherent IR-UWB re-
ceiver, again under the assumption that MUI is modeled according to a GMM. For narrowband
direct-sequence spread-spectrum systems, [88] proposes a signal acquisition scheme based on
a non-linearity derived under the assumption that MUI follows a symmetric-alpha-stable dis-
tribution.
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3.1.4 Multi-User Detectors
We would like to stress that all the techniques to handle MUI in IR-UWB that we reviewed so
far are different from multi-user detection (MUD). MUD extends or adapts to IR-UWB, classi-
cal, well-established joint decoding techniques [89], which are also used in other systems like
CDMA. They aim at canceling or suppressing interference by jointly estimating and decoding
the signals of a large number of users. For example, a near-far interferer would be jointly re-
ceived instead of being treated as interference. This annihilates the near-far effect and makes
joint decoding potentially attractive. However, an optimal joint processing of all users [90] is
mostly not possible due to its very high complexity. Therefore, suboptimal methods like min-
imum mean-square error MUD or receivers employing successive interference cancelation are
used [91]. All of these methods share the common factor that the receiver has to acquire and
actively decode each of the users. This might be perfectly suited for a centrally coordinated
and synchronized system, where a base station communicates with a large number of users at
the same time. However, with a distributed IR-UWB system, synchronizing the receiver with
all the users is extremely complex and impractical. In addition, the complexity of the decoding
operation is very high. For an overview on MUD in IR-UWB, we refer to [92].
3.1.5 Interference Management on the MAC Layer
MUI can also be managed on the MAC layer, through a mutual exclusion protocol (e.g.,
TDMA) and/or power control. However, neither of these approaches can prevent uncon-
trolled interference from coexisting non-coordinated piconets. Further, it has been shown
that optimal MAC protocols for low data-rate IR-UWB networks explicitly allow concurrent
transmissions without power control, while employing interference mitigation on the PHY
[1, 93, 54, 94, 95, 96]. Many MAC protocols for IR-UWB [54, 97] are therefore uncoordi-
nated, including the MAC protocol of the IEEE 802.15.4a standard [35].
3.1.6 Other Types of Interference in IR-UWB Networks
As already mentioned in Chapter 2, this thesis focuses solely on interference from concurrently
transmitting IR-UWB devices. Coexistence with other systems and in particular narrowband
interference are not considered. For a general survey on UWB coexistence, the reader is re-
ferred to [16] and the references therein. For an overview of recent research efforts on how
to deal with narrowband interference in the case of non-coherent receiver architectures, we
propose [98] as a starting point.
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Throughout this thesis we also assume that the frame structure of IR-UWB PHY packets
is such that intersymbol interference (ISI) does not occur. Relaxing this assumption allows
for higher raw bit rates. However, the resulting ISI is not without impact on the IR-UWB
receiver, especially in the case of non-coherent reception. For an overview on how to deal
with ISI in this case, we also refer to [98]. We also point out [99] that makes use of the
EM-algorithm together with an energy-detection receiver. In [99], the EM-algorithm is used
to perform channel estimation under ISI, whereas we use it to estimate parameters of a MUI
model in Chapter 8.
3.2 Energy-detection Receiver Architectures
The energy-detection architecture recently gained a lot of popularity since it is explicitly sup-
ported by the IEEE 802.15.4a standard [35]. However, this architecture has already been con-
sidered for signal detection at the end of the sixties [28]. In the context of IR-UWB, energy-
detection is first mentioned in [100, 101], also for detecting the presence of a signal. For
communication in IR-UWB, energy-detection is first proposed in [102, 103] in conjunction
with BPPM modulation and it is shown that it can in theory achieve a very good performance
in a fading multipath channel. This work is extended in [50] to a multi-user setting and energy-
detection with OOK modulation. Energy-detection receivers with OOK are also proposed in
[104, 105] where an approximation of the optimal OOK threshold is given. A generalization of
this work to M-ary PAM is later presented in [106].
[107] proposes to use energy-detection receivers in IR-UWB sensor networks because of
their good performance-complexity trade-off and relaxed synchronization requirements. These
claims are verified in [108] where a first system analysis of an IR-UWB energy-detection re-
ceiver, encompassing both synchronization and data reception in a single user setting, is per-
formed. Other papers that also take a similar system level approach in analyzing the perfor-
mance of energy-detection receivers are [30, 109]. Further, [110] compares the data reception
performance of a Rake and an energy-detection receiver in an IEEE 802.15.4a single user set-
ting. [111, 112, 113] consider ranging with an energy-detection receiver in the same setting.
[111] moreover describes a complete synchronization algorithm for an energy-detection re-
ceiver, including timing acquisition and SFD detection.
[32] finds that the integration time of an energy-detection receiver needs to be adapted to
varying channel conditions to prevent excessive integration of too much noise. This is also
recognized by [104, 105, 114, 30, 115, 109]. [114, 115] additionally propose algorithms that
Energy-detection Receiver Architectures 35
allow the determination of the optimal integration time. [30] proofs that the energy-detection
receiver is the optimal detector if no channel state information is available and that the optimal
decision rule for BPPM in this case consists in comparing the energies in the 0-block and
1-block of a BPPM frame. This is also shown in [31]. [31] also derives the optimal ML
receiver for BPPM in the case where partial channel state information, in the form of an average
channel power-delay profile (APDP), is available. It is shown that this receiver corresponds to
an energy-detection receiver where the received signal prior to integration is weighted with
the APDP. [33] shows that such a weighting can also be performed in the digital domain,
with weights corresponding to the estimate of the current channel energy-delay profile, and
results in a performance improvement compared to [31]. [33] also shows how to estimate the
channel energy-delay profile in a single user setting. The resulting energy-detection receiver
architecture is the closest one to the architecture that we use throughout this thesis. What
sets our receiver apart from the work discussed here is that we also address the calculation of
the optimal weighting function in the case where the signaling between preamble and payload
differs, such as it is the case with IEEE 802.15.4a. Further, our receiver addresses MUI, which
is also not done by any of the related work discussed so far. Finally, we take an integral system-
level approach including synchronization, whereas most of the related work solely focuses on
data reception.
[116] and [117] devise weighting schemes similar to [33], but for energy-detection with
OOK modulation. [118] derives the optimal detectors with and without ISI and with various
amounts of channel state information that are available at the receiver. In the absence of ISI,
a detector equivalent to the one from [33] is found if the energy-delay profile of the channel
is available, 1 and the one from [31] is found if only an average in the form of the APDP is
available.
A similar analysis can be made for TOA estimation. [119, 120] show that if no information
about the channel is available, the optimal TOA estimator is an energy-detection receiver with
a sliding integration window; if the APDP is available, the ML TOA estimator is a similar
energy-detection receiver, where the received samples are weighted with a weighting factor
that depends on the APDP.
Examples of hardware structures to implement an energy-detection receiver and evaluations
thereof can be found in [121, 122, 123, 124].
1. Called “instantaneous power delay profile” in [118]. Further, the equivalence between the two detectors can
be shown through our derivation of the optimal decision rule given in Chapter 5 and by noting that cosh(x) =
0F1
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3.2.1 Energy-detection Receivers and Multi-User Interference
Apart from [50, 83, 84], none of the work cited so far considers energy-detection receivers
in a multi-user environment. [50] determines the theoretically achievable rates in networks
of energy-detection receivers that use hard-decision decoding. [83, 84] mitigate interference
during TOA estimation through non-linear filtering. The lack of research on energy-detection
receivers subject to MUI may partly be explained by the fact that early proposals for IR-UWB
networks with energy-detection receivers such as [107] assume a MAC protocol that enforces
mutual exclusion and therefore neglect MUI. However, at the latest since the adoption of a
non-coordinated MAC protocol for IEEE 802.15.4a, this is an assumption that has to be re-
vised. Further, even with a perfectly coordinated MAC protocol, interference from coexisting
networks cannot be entirely prevented. Understanding the impact of MUI on energy-detection
receivers and adapting their architecture such that they are able to cope with MUI is therefore
of practical importance, and was, prior to this thesis, still a largely open problem. Recently,
this has been more widely recognized and lead to several research efforts on energy-detection
receivers in a multi-user environment.
[125] develops a framework to analyze the BER of an energy-detection receiver in the
presence of uncoordinated interferers that are distributed according to a spatial Poisson process.
Further, in their analysis [125] model MUI with a stable distribution.
[126] considers a weighted energy-detection receiver for OOK demodulation similar to
[116] and proposes to mitigate MUI by modifying the likelihood ratio underlying the weighting
function. This scheme has an effect similar to a thresholding scheme where high interference
terms are erased such that they do not contribute to the decision.
[127, 128] propose an alternative modulation scheme where information is carried in the
shift of orthogonal ternary sequences that are similar to those used in the IEEE 802.15.4a
preamble. The scheme is suitable for reception with an energy-detection receiver and different
sequences can be assigned to different users allowing for multiple access. Interestingly, the pro-
posed scheme leads to a receiver architecture that is similar to the one we propose in Chapter 5
because it also tries to account for inter-pulse interference. Unlike in our work, cross-terms
are neglected and consequently their architecture misses the additional branches found in our
architecture.
In [129] the authors devise a methodology to analyze PHY effects on IR-UWB MAC pro-
tocols. They assume an energy-detection receiver and analyze the IEEE 802.15.4a MAC with
various clear channel assessment modes. The authors demonstrate that PHY effects, and in
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particular the possibility to have concurrent transmissions, have a significant impact on the
performance of the MAC protocol.
In [130] an IR-UWB PHY model for network simulations is developed where the receiver
is assumed to follow the energy-detection architecture.
3.2.2 Energy-Detection Receivers and Clock-offset Tracking
Energy-detection receivers with long integration times are robust to timing impairments such
as clock offsets caused by differences between the frequencies of the transmitter and receiver
oscillator. On the other hand, long integration times lead to noise enhancement. Consequently,
the integration time is often shortened to a duration in the order of the channel spread or a
weighting function is applied, as we have seen in Section 3.2. This in turn increases the sen-
sitivity of energy-detection receivers to clock offsets, which was already recognized in [31].
However, to the best of our knowledge, this effect has neither been studied, nor have specific
solutions been proposed.
For narrow-band physical layers, there are two well-established solutions for addressing
clock offsets: the phase-locked loop (PLL) and early-late gate synchronizers [131]. Both solu-
tions allow for continuous tracking of the transmitter clock by the receiver. Although applica-
ble for coherent IR-UWB receivers, both solutions are not suited for IR-UWB energy-detection
receivers. The PLL cannot be used because it either requires a constant carrier and/or the avail-
ability of phase information to create an appropriate error signal. Early-late gate synchronizers
cannot be used because they require sampling of a symmetric correlator output.
For coherent IR-UWB receivers, which are very sensitive to timing impairments, [23, 132,
133, 134, 135, 136] address the issue of clock-offset tracking. In general, they use an adaptation
to IR-UWB of one of the classical solutions for narrowband systems. Further, [87, 137] address
frequency offset estimation with a coherent receiver, but not tracking.
Closest to our work in Part II is probably [138]. [138] describes a maximum likelihood es-
timator for clock-offset estimation that can be used in a coherent or non-coherent IR-UWB re-
ceiver. To estimate the drift, received signals are accumulated and arranged in a trellis. The best
path on the trellis then yields the maximum likelihood estimate. Interestingly, a connection to
our work can be made by noticing that the proposed trellis also yields a sort of two-dimensional
representation of the received signal, similar to the energy matrix in Chapter 9. Contrary to our
work, the estimator assumes perfect synchronization on the strongest multipath component and
it also disregards signal contributions from other multipath components. Further, tracking and
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compensating for the drift are not treated.
3.3 Security of IR-UWB
Security considerations were already made in the very early work on IR-UWB. The first papers
on energy-detection receivers for IR-UWB are essentially security motivated and analyze the
covertness of IR-UWB [100, 101]. Compared to narrowband systems, IR-UWB generally has
a better covertness and a better robustness against jamming. The first is due to the inherently
low signal levels and infrequent transmissions, the second is due to the wide bandwidth. On
both topics there exists a quite large body of research, see e.g., [139, 140, 141, 142, 143].
Other work proposes to take advantage of the reciprocity of the rich UWB channel in order
to establish shared secret keys between two devices communicating over IR-UWB [144, 145,
146].
Security in ranging has mainly focused on cryptographic secure ranging protocols, or distance-
bounding protocols [147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160].
These protocols are not specific to IR-UWB but most of them assume an accurate ranging
mechanism that is based on round-trip-time measurements of radio signals. The secure ranging
protocol then guarantees that the measured distance between two devices is an upper bound
of their actual distance, even in the presence of an adversary that interferes with the ranging
process. Secure ranging protocols thus prevent an adversary from decreasing the estimated
distance.
Its potential for high precision ranging makes IR-UWB an ideal candidate technology to
provide the ranging primitive required by secure ranging protocols. This has also been recog-
nized by several proposals for secure ranging [150] or secure localization [152, 161] protocols.
However, with the exception of [160], none of the protocols makes any specific assumptions
about the IR-UWB PHY apart from assuming that it can provide accurate ranging measure-
ments. [160] proposes a secure ranging protocol and evaluates it on an IR-UWB hardware
platform. Except from interfacing the protocol with the IR-UWB ranging devices, also here the
specific characteristics of the IR-UWB PHY are not taken into account. Consequently, to date
the implications of performing secure ranging over an IR-UWB PHY remain unstudied.
However, the PHY can play an important role when it comes to the security of ranging
mechanisms. This was discovered by [162] which points out attacks on the PHY as a possible
attack vector against secure ranging protocols. These attacks make it possible for an adversary
to decrease the estimated distance without breaking any cryptographic primitives or protocols.
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Subsequently, [163] demonstrated with a proof-of-concept narrowband implementation that
some of these attacks are indeed feasible for the ISO 14443 PHY and a compliant RFID re-
ceiver, as well as for 433MHz ASK/FSK modulation and a super-heterodyne receiver, common
in wireless sensor networks. PHY attacks are by nature PHY-specific. Therefore, the results of
[162, 163] cannot be mapped easily to other PHYs, including the IR-UWB PHY. We are not
aware of any work, except for what we present in Chapter III, that addresses PHY attacks on
IR-UWB ranging. Further, none of the attacks of the related work addresses synchronization.
Another aspect of security in ranging is location privacy. [156] analyzes location privacy of
distance bounding protocols. It is found that an adversary overhearing the exchange of ranging
messages may be able to infer information about the location of ranging devices that is not
acceptable in certain security-sensitive applications. Again, this protocol is not specific to any
particular PHY technology.
The need for location privacy and security was also recognized in the development of the
IEEE 802.15.4a standard and led to the inclusion of an optional private ranging mode [35, 164].
The private ranging mode attempts to make overhearing harder by essentially letting devices
choose at random, which of the proposed preamble codes they use in a ranging message ex-
change. Further, the private ranging mode gives devices the possibility for message authentica-
tion, thus preventing the injection of bogus messages.
The growing importance of security has also been recognized in a recent survey article
on IR-UWB ranging, where security in IR-UWB ranging is mentioned as a future research
direction needed in order for IR-UWB ranging to become widely accepted [165].
40 3. Related Work
Part I
Robust IR-UWB Receiver Design
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Chapter 4
Performance Evaluation of the IEEE
802.15.4a Physical Layer with Energy
Detection and Multi-User Interference
One of the main goals of this thesis is to understand how an IR-UWB receiver performs in the
presence of multi-user interference (MUI). Thanks to its wide bandwidth, combined with a low
duty cycle time-hopping mechanism on the physical layer (see Section 2.2), IR-UWB should
show a good robustness against MUI and thus allow for parallel transmissions of concurrent
users.
This possibility to have parallel transmissions is appealing because of several reasons. First
of all, it allows for the operation of several networks in close vicinity without coordination.
Coordination of a large number of co-existing networks that are potentially being managed
by different entities is difficult if not impossible in practice. Second, inside a single network,
it allows for simple MAC protocols, such as ALOHA that is used in IEEE 802.15.4a. Finally,
parallel transmissions increase spatial reuse and it can be shown that an optimal IR-UWB MAC
protocol, achieving the highest network throughput, allows parallel transmissions [1].
In this chapter, we evaluate the performance of a complete IEEE 802.15.4a IR-UWB phys-
ical layer implementation with an energy-detection receiver and in the presence of MUI. Our
goal is to assess whether such a standard compliant low-complexity receiver is robust enough
to contain MUI at a level allowing for parallel transmissions.
In our evaluation we take all the specifics of IEEE 802.15.4a into account and we consider
a complete system, covering all major operations needed at the receiver in order to receive an
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IEEE 802.15.4a packet. We account for packet detection and timing acquisition, as well as
detection of the start frame delimiter (SFD) and decoding of the payload. We further try to
understand how each of these individual operations are affected by MUI.
We find that the performance of the energy-detection receiver is significantly reduced if
the receiver is subject to MUI, even at low data rates. Further, the energy-detection receiver
only shows a very limited capture effect, i.e., the ability to correctly receive a packet despite
the presence of a concurrent transmission. Even with a single interferer, it performs close to a
narrowband-like model of destructive collisions, where a packet is lost if another transmission
is active at the same time. We conclude that using an energy-detection receiver in combination
with IEEE 802.15.4a significantly diminishes one of the most appealing benefits of UWB,
namely its robustness to MUI and thus the possibility to allow parallel transmissions.
Finally, we analyze the impact of MUI on the different receiver operations. This allows us
to identify the main effects causing the above mentioned performance degradation. The insight
gained can serve as a guideline for the design of more robust receivers.
This chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.1 we describe the architecture of the
energy-detection receiver that we use in our performance evaluation. The specific algorithms
used to perform main receiver operations such as packet detection and timing acquisition are
given in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 constitutes the performance evaluation of the complete system
with the IEEE 802.15.4a PHY and in the presence of uncontrolled MUI. Conclusions of this
evaluation are drawn in Section 4.4.
4.1 Receiver Architecture: Energy-detection Receiver with
Adaptive Channel Mask
Throughout this performance evaluation we use the classical energy-detection receiver archi-
tecture introduced in Section 2.3.3. In addition to what was introduced in Section 2.3.3, the
receiver considered here adapts the total integration time per symbol to varying channel condi-
tions. Adaptation of the integration time is important because it ensures that only parts of the
received signal containing useful information contribute to the decision, whereas parts consist-
ing purely of noise are ignored [32].
The architecture of this energy-detection receiver is depicted in Figure 4.1. We assume that
the receiver takes M samples per BPPM block. It adapts to varying channel conditions by
weighting these received samples with a channel mask. The channel mask is a binary vector
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∑M−1
m=0 ym,i · qm
Figure 4.1: Architecture of the energy receiver. The antenna is followed by a bandpass filter, a
squaring device, and the integrator. The signal at the output of the integrator is sampled every
T seconds. Finally, for the i-th symbol, a scalar product is computed between a block of M
samples (y0,i, . . . , yM−1,i) and the channel mask (q0, . . . , qM−1).
of length M , (q0, q1, . . . , qM−1), qm ∈ {0, 1}, indicating which samples of the received signal
contain useful information and which samples do not. The i-th symbol, di, of the payload is
then demodulated according to the following decision rule:
M−1∑
m=0
ym,i · qm
dˆi=0
≷
dˆi=1
M−1∑
m=0
ym+Nf/2,i · qm (4.1)
ym,i is given by (2.17), i.e.,
ym,i =
∫ (m+1)T+ψ(i)
mT+ψ(i)
[rpay(t)]
2 dt (4.2)
with
ψ(i) = iTf + cTHS,iTburst + νˆ0. (4.3)
and rpay(t) is given by (2.30). The receiver thus compares the energies in the first and second
half of the BPPM frame after applying the channel mask. The binary output of the comparison
in (4.1) is then fed to the Reed-Solomon decoder for error correction. Both, the channel mask
and the TOA are estimated during the reception of the IEEE 802.15.4a preamble as we will see
in the following. The length of the channel mask M is dictated by the minimum inter-pulse
spacing in the preamble which equals LsTc. We assume that the maximum delay spread of any
channel realization is shorter than LsTc to prevent ISI. We therefore choose M = LsTcT and we
assume that the integration time T is such that M is an integer.
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4.2 Main Receiver Operations
In order to receive and demodulate the information that is contained in the payload of the
packet, the receiver first has to detect the presence of the packet on the wireless channel. Fur-
ther, it has to determine the beginning of the packet, or in other words estimate its TOA, ν0. This
process is commonly referred to as synchronization. Infrastructure-less packet based wireless
networks typically lack global synchronization and synchronization has thus to be performed
on a packet-per-packet basis. In IEEE 802.15.4a, this is done with the help of the known
preamble sequence whose structure we have described in Section 2.4.2.
The receiver performs synchronization in two phases: packet detection and timing acqui-
sition and SFD detection. In addition, in between these two phases, it performs estimation of
the channel mask. In the following, we will discuss each of these receiver operations indepen-
dently.
4.2.1 Packet Detection and Timing Acquisition
There are two steps for packet detection and timing acquisition: coarse timing acquisition and
fine timing acquisition. The coarse timing acquisition algorithm tries to locate the starting time
of one of the Nsync preamble symbols. It usually synchronizes on the strongest multipath com-
ponent, which is not always the first in time. Coarse timing acquisition is therefore followed
by a fine timing acquisition phase in order to improve the timing accuracy.
Coarse Timing Acquisition
The coarse synchronization algorithm is a classic timing acquisition algorithm using a correla-
tion of the receiver output with a template derived from the known preamble code sequence of
the UOI. The discrete time signal during the reception of the preamble is given by
yprem =
∫ (m+1)T
mT
[rpre(t)]
2 dt, (4.4)
where rpre(t) is given by (2.28).
A template tl of length MT = NG · C ·M is formed by repeating the preamble code NG
times to obtain processing gain. The code symbols forming the template are squared due to
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non-coherent reception. Hence
tl =
NG−1∑
k=0
C−1∑
j=0
c2j · δl−(j+kC)M (4.5)
where δm denotes the Kronecker delta.
The (discrete) correlation output that follows is
zm =
MT−1∑
l=0
tl · yprem−(MT−1)+l (4.6)
The preamble of the UOI is LsTc · C-periodic. Consequently, zm is M · C-periodic if the
UOI signal is present. Therefore, the algorithm processes the correlation output by blocks of
MC consecutive samples. The i-th block is
zi = {ziMC , ziMC+1, . . . , z(i+1)MC−1} (4.7)
Further, the algorithm has two steps: detection and verification. During detection, the
presence of a signal is declared if at least one of the correlation output samples of the current
block exceeds the detection threshold ηdetect. The statistics of the receiver output are known
if the received signal is AWGN only (see Section 2.3.3). Hence, we can set the threshold
according to
ηdetect =
N0
2
F−1χ2 (1− P FAAWGN|2BT · CNZ ·NG). (4.8)
where CNZ =
∑C−1
j=0 c
2
j denotes the number of nonzero code symbols of the UOI preamble code
and Fχ2(x|κ) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a chi-square random variable
with κ degrees of freedom. The product CNZ · NG corresponds to the number of samples that
are combined due to the template. The threshold is set by fixing the design parameter P FAAWGN,
which is the probability that AWGN only can exceed the threshold. When setting the threshold
we assume that the noise PSD, N0/2, is known. This assumption is made because thermal
noise is generated by the receiver circuitry and can thus be calibrated. Further, we will show in
Chapter 5 how it can also be estimated in a robust fashion.
If the presence of a signal is detected in the i-th block, we declare initial timing acquisi-
tion on the sample with i-th block index jmaxm , having the highest correlation output value, i.e.
ziMC+jmaxm ≥ ziMC+j, ∀j ∈ {0, . . . ,MC−1}. This selection criterion corresponds to the hybrid
maximum selection and threshold crossing criterion that was proposed in [166].
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M
W
zm∗
ηdetect
(A)
(B)
Figure 4.2: Illustration of the jump-back-and-search-forward algorithm. Starting from the re-
sult of the coarse synchronization zm∗ , a window of length W is searched. Although both (A)
and (B) are above the threshold ηdetect, only (A) fulfils the second condition given by equation
(4.9) and is thus selected as first path.
In the verification phase, we require that for every block i + k, k = 1, . . . , NV, the max-
imum value z(i+k)MC+jmaxi+k > ηdetect and that its index j
max
i+k does not differ by more than the
minimum inter-pulse distance M from the current synchronization point jmaxi+k−1 of the preced-
ing block. This ensures that both maxima stem from the same preamble pulse, the receiver thus
verifies that the correlation output has the expected periodicity. If verification is fulfilled for
NV consecutive blocks, the verification phase succeeds and synchronization is declared. If one
verification fails, synchronization starts anew with the detection phase.
Fine Timing Acquisition
After coarse timing acquisition we are synchronized on one of the multipath components of
the first pulse of one of the preamble code repetitions. Usually, this will correspond to the
strongest multipath component rather than the first in time. During fine timing acquisition
we therefore perform a jump-back-and-search-forward algorithm to find the first sample with
significant energy belonging to the same pulse. Our jump-back-and-search-forward algorithm
is illustrated in Figure 4.2 and explained in what follows.
We limit our search-back window to W = M/2 samples, thus assuming that the first and
the strongest path are not separated by more than the minimum inter-pulse distance. Assume
that during coarse timing acquisition we synchronized on sample zm∗ . I.e., the synchronization
point m∗ = (i + NV)MC + jmaxi+NV if the signal was first detected in the i-th block and all of
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the NV following verifications succeeded. The set of candidates for fine timing acquisition is
then {zm∗−W , . . . , zm∗−2, zm∗−1, zm∗}. Evidently, to be accepted, a candidate should be above
the AWGN threshold ηdetect. This is the standard criterion for jump-back-and-search-forward
algorithms proposed in the literature (see, e.g., [167]). However, this condition is not sufficient
because with non-coherent reception, the minimum of the autocorrelation of each preamble
code is nonzero and equal to half its maximum value. The result is that even if the template is
misaligned, it is still aligned with half of the pulses of the preamble code and the correlation
is thus likely to exceed the AWGN threshold. We therefore use an additional heuristic to make
sure that when searching back we do not choose samples that stem from the last pulse of the
preceding preamble symbol. The heuristic adds the constraint that a candidate zm∗−k needs to
fulfil the condition
zm∗−k ≥ zm∗−k+M (4.9)
in order to be accepted. The idea here is that a correlation peak that stems from a fully aligned
template will always be higher than a secondary peak that occurs with a misaligned template.
This is illustrated in Figure 4.2. In fine synchronization we thus choose from the candidate
set the sample with the lowest index that lies above the detection threshold ηdetect and fulfils
condition (4.9).
4.2.2 Estimation of the Channel Mask
Between fine synchronization and SFD detection, we estimate the channel mask. The channel
mask is essentially a quantized version of the channel energy-delay profile: portions of the
channel energy-delay profile that consist of noise only, will have a corresponding zero-valued
entry in the channel mask; the other entries will be equal to one.
At this point, the receiver knows the starting point of a preamble symbol. Since it also
knows the preamble code, it can deduct at what time instances pulses are being received. The
received signal corresponding to a single pulse is sampled M times. To estimate the channel
mask, the receiver can therefore accumulate blocks of M samples over several preamble sym-
bols. A threshold similar to (4.8) is then applied to quantize the channel mask and distinguish
between signal and noise. Assuming that ymfine is the sample onto which we synchronized in
the fine timing acquisition, this results in the following channel mask
qm =
{
1 if y¯m ≥ ηmask
0 otherwise.
,m = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1 (4.10)
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where
y¯m =
NCH−1∑
i=0
C−1∑
j=0
c2j · ypremfine+(j+iC)M+m (4.11)
The preamble code symbols cj are squared here because we only want to take into account the
CNZ code symbols for which the preamble code is nonzero. NCH are the number of preamble
symbols over which we accumulate the received signal in order to get some processing gain.
The threshold to distinguish signal from AWGN only is obtained the same way as (4.8) and
equals
ηmask =
N0
2
F−1χ2 (1− P FAAWGN|2BT · CNZ ·NCH). (4.12)
4.2.3 Detection of the Start Frame Delimiter
After estimation of the channel mask, the receiver begins to look for the SFD sequence. SFD
detection works according to a correlation procedure where the received signal is correlated
with a template that is derived from the SFD code. During SFD detection the energy of samples
belonging to the same preamble symbol is combined. This yields the sequence y˜ = (y˜0, y˜1, . . .)
where each element contains the energy accumulated during one preamble symbol. When
combining, both the preamble code and the channel mask are taken into account, i.e., we only
combine samples where both the preamble code and the channel mask are nonzero. The i-th
element of this sequence is then given by
y˜i =
C−1∑
j=0
c2j
M−1∑
m=0
ypremfine+(j+iC+NCHC)M+m · qm (4.13)
The offset mfine + NCHCM accounts for the samples of the received signal ym that were used
up during timing acquisition and channel mask estimation.
During the SYNC part of the preamble, the expected received signal energy of an element
is
ES = E[y˜i] =
M−1∑
m=0
qmE
[
C−1∑
j=0
c2j · ypremfine+(j+iC+NCHC)M+m
]
=
1
NCH
M−1∑
m=0
qm · y¯m (4.14)
where y¯m is given by (4.11) and obtained during channel mask estimation. During reception of
the SFD, some preamble symbols are absent due to the modulation with a zero-valued symbol
of the ternary SFD code (Section 2.4.2). For these preamble symbols, y˜i consists of noise only
and the expected noise level corresponds to the expected value of a chi-square random variable
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Figure 4.3: Expected value of the correlation between the bipolar SFD template and the re-
ceived signal during an IEEE 802.15.4a preamble. ES is the expected energy of preamble sym-
bols containing a signal contribution, EN of preamble symbols consisting of noise only. Detec-
tion of the SFD is declared if the correlation exceeds the SFD threshold ηsfd = 2.5 · (ES −EN).
(Section 2.3.3) and is given by
EN = E[y˜i] = 2BT ·MNZ · CNZ · N0
2
(4.15)
where MNZ =
∑M−1
m=0 qm is the number of nonzero elements of the channel mask. For preamble
symbols during the SFD where the SFD code is nonzero, the expected signal level is given by
(4.14) like in the SYNC part.
With the mandatory IEEE 802.15.4a SFD code
s(sfd) = (0, 1, 0,−1, 1, 0, 0,−1), (4.16)
the expected received sequence is then
E[y˜] = (E[y˜0],E[y˜1], . . .) = (ES, ES, . . . , ES︸ ︷︷ ︸
SYNCpart
, EN, ES, EN, ES, ES, EN, EN, ES︸ ︷︷ ︸
SFD
), (4.17)
where the length of the SYNC part is unknown.
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To detect the SFD, the receiver correlates y˜ with the bipolar template sequence
t(sfd) = (−1, 1,−1, 1, 1,−1,−1, 1) (4.18)
t(sfd) is obtained from (4.16) by setting nonzero elements of the SFD to 1 and zero valued
elements to −1. The advantage of this bipolar sequence is that its correlation with the received
signal is zero during the SYNC part. The entire correlation is shown in Figure 4.3. We observe
that its expected maximum, corresponding to a perfect alignement with the SFD, has a value
of 4(ES − EN). The highest secondary peak of the correlation is at ES − EN. The receiver
therefore declares detection of the SFD, if the output of the correlation exceeds the optimal
threshold, ηSFD, that lies in the middle between these two values
ηsfd = 2.5 · (ES − EN) (4.19)
4.3 Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of the energy-detection receiver, we focus on the mandatory data
rate of 0.85 Mbit/s with the LPRF mode and on the mandatory channel number 3 with preamble
codes 5 and 6 (see Section 2.5.1).
The main parameters of the receiver are summarized in Table 4.1. The integration time
is T = 8 ns, which corresponds to the length of a burst in the IEEE 802.15.4a LPRF mode.
The parameters for synchronization and channel mask estimation were determined through
extensive simulations and chosen such that the receiver has a good performance in a single user
scenario. Further, the degrees of freedom when choosing these parameters are limited by the
default length of the preamble, which is 64 preamble symbols.
We perform a packet-based simulation, assuming that a total of Nu users are transmitting
packets. TheNu−1 interferers have the same PHY as the UOI. Every receiver generates packets
according to the procedure described in Section 2.5.2. We further assume that every transmitter
sends packets of the maximum allowable size of 1016 information bits, corresponding to 1208
transmitted bits after RS encoding.
For the simulations with MUI, we consider two different scenarios. In scenario A, all the
devices use the same preamble code. In scenario B, the user of interest uses preamble code 5
and the other users use preamble code 6. In both scenarios, all users generate packets at the
same rate R. We distinguish a high traffic case where R = 200 packets/s, and a low traffic case
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T M B NG NV NCH P
FA
AWGN
8 ns 16 500 MHz 10 16 16 10−4
Table 4.1: Main parameters of the energy-detection receiver
where R = 10 packets/s. Note that even in the high traffic case the network is not yet saturated 1
and that R = 200 packet/s (R = 10 packet/s, resp.) corresponds to an effective uncoded data
rate of 241.6 kb/s (12.1 kb/s).
We use different metrics to assess the performance of the receiver, mainly the packet er-
ror rate (PER), the synchronization error rate (SER) and the bit error rate (BER). We assume
a packet to be in error if it is missed during synchronization or if at least one bit is in error
after RS decoding. The SER denotes the percentage of packets that are missed during synchro-
nization. To calculate the BER, we only consider packets that were correctly acquired during
synchronization. All confidence intervals shown are at the 95% level.
In all our simulations, we use the IEEE 802.15.4a residential non-line-of-sight (NLOS)
channel model (CM2) [14]. Further, we define the signal to noise ratio (SNR) as SNR = Ep
N0
where Ep is the received energy per pulse (after the convolution of the pulse with the impulse
response of the channel), and N0/2 is the PSD of a zero mean, Gaussian noise process bandlim-
ited to B. The PHY is simulated with an accuracy of 100 ps resulting in a simulation sampling
frequency of 10 GHz. As the simulation sampling frequency is larger than 2B, the Gaussian
noise samples are correlated. We use the algorithm in [168] to generate the correlated noise
samples.
4.3.1 Without MUI the Receiver is Well-balanced
In Figure 4.4, we show the PER and the BER obtained for a single user, without MUI. We
also plot the percentage of packets that are missed by the synchronization procedure (SER).
These curves will on the one hand serve as reference curves for the simulations with MUI. On
the other hand, they also show that the synchronization procedure as well as the parameters
given in Table 4.1 are appropriately chosen such that the receiver performance is well balanced
between synchronization and the decoding of the data bits.
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Figure 4.4: PER, BER, and percentage of packets missed (SER) due to synchronization for a
single user, on a multipath channel, without MUI.
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Collision, packet lost Single user performance
t
Figure 4.5: Illustration of the “Destructive Collisions” model. Packets experience single user
performance if the channel is free from interference for the entire packet duration, otherwise
packets are lost.
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Figure 4.6: PER with MUI and different preamble codes (scenario B) in a low traffic case
(R = 10 packet/s). Dashed lines from top to bottom: simulation results for two users, where
the received power of the interferer is +10dB (near-far setting) or 0dB (equal power) with
respect to the power of the UOI; four users where the received power of the interferers is -3
dB. Dotted lines from top to bottom: “Destructive Collisions” models for 4 and 2 users; single
user performance. The performance in the near-far and equal power setting is close to the worst
case given by the “Destructive Collisions” model.
4.3.2 Assessing Robustness to MUI: The “Destructive Collisions” Model
To assess the robustness of a receiver with respect to MUI, we compare its performance under
MUI with the performance of a hypothetical model of destructive collisions. The “Destructive
Collisions” model represents the worst case performance of a receiver that shows no capture
effect at all. It thus corresponds to a typical model of the behavior of a narrowband network.
The “Destructive Collisions” model is illustrated in Figure 4.5. Under this model, a packet is
lost whenever there is more than one active transmission at the same time. If there is only one
active transmission, the corresponding packet experiences single user performance.
4.3.3 With MUI Performance Approaches the Worst Case
Figure 4.6 shows the PER with MUI in scenario B (different preamble codes) with the low
traffic rate of R = 10 packet/s. With R = 200 packets/s results are similar and therefore
1. Saturation occurs at R = 226 packets/s, see Section 2.5.2.
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not shown. The single user performance from Figure 4.4 serves as a reference. We show the
performance with one single interferer (Nu = 2), once having a received power level equal to
the UOI, once in a near-far setting where the power level of the interferer exceeds the power
level of the UOI by 10 dB. Comparing these two curves with the corresponding curve obtained
from the “Destructive Collisions” model shows that the energy-detection receiver is not robust
against MUI. Indeed, in the near-far setting, the obtained performance is within the confidence
interval of the worst case performance given by the “Destructive Collisions” model. In this case
the receiver shows no capture effect at all. Even in the case of a single interferer with a power
equal to the UOI, the capture effect is very limited, and performance is close to the worst case.
We also show results with three interferers (Nu = 4) with a received power level 3 dB lower
than the UOI. With this lower interference level, the receiver is finally able to handle concurrent
transmissions, performing significantly better than the corresponding “Destructive Collisions”
model.
Still, the analysis of the results with a single interferer demonstrate that with a conventional
energy-detection receiver, concurrent transmissions in IEEE 802.15.4a are hardly possible and
one of the main benefits of UWB over narrowband systems is therefore completely lost. To
make things worse, this is the case even though the UOI and the interferers use different pream-
ble codes that were meant to provide two separate logical channels.
In the following, we will try to understand what the reasons for this bad performance are.
In particular, we hope to gain some insight into where the main weaknesses of the energy-
detection receiver are and how it could be improved in order to make it more robust to MUI.
4.3.4 Taxonomy of Packet Errors and Interference Types
In a first step towards understanding the impact of MUI on the energy-detection receiver, we
establish a taxonomy of all possible reasons for packet errors due to MUI. We find that every
packet error must occur because of one of the following reasons:
1. synchronization error: the packet is missed during the synchronization phase.
(a) missed detection (MD) during timing acquisition: the receiver tries to acquire tim-
ing of the packet but fails to do so.
(b) false alarm (FA) during timing acquisition: the receiver is not trying to acquire tim-
ing because it wrongly assumes that timing has already successfully been acquired.
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(c) MD in the SFD detection phase: the receiver acquires timing correctly but never
detects the SFD.
(d) FA in the SFD detection phase: the receiver acquires timing correctly but declares
detection of the SFD at the wrong time instant.
2. decoding error: the packet is received with more errors than the RS code is able to correct.
Further, the signalling format in IEEE 802.15.4a changes between the preamble and the
payload (see Section 2.4). We can therefore additionally distinguish between the following
interference types:
1. interference from an interfering preamble
2. interference from an interfering payload
4.3.5 Influence of the Preamble Code
Until now we have assumed that the interferers and the UOI use different preamble codes
(scenario B). Now, if the interferers and the UOI were to use the same preamble code (scenario
A), we would expect a much lower performance because of two reasons:
1. the preambles of the UOI and the interferers are indistinguishable. The receiver will
therefore often synchronize on an interferer, leading to a lot of missed packets because
of FAs.
2. the preamble in IEEE 802.15.4a determines the time-hopping sequence (THS) used in
the payload. Identical preambles thus lead to an identical THS, which can lead to catas-
trophic collisions in the payload.
On the other hand, we have already seen that even in scenario B, the energy-detection receiver
approaches worst case performance in terms of PER in the presence of a single interferer with
a power level equal or higher than the UOI. Comparing the PER in scenarios A and B can
therefore only lead to minor differences, which is verified in Figure 4.7 for an equal power
interferer and both the low and high traffic case. Looking at the corresponding SER curves
shown in Figure 4.8 reveals that indeed many more packets are misses during synchronization
in scenario A than in scenario B. Not surprisingly, in scenario A, 98.4% of these packets are
missed due to FAs, which is shown in Table 4.2. Why a lower rate of missed packets does not
translate into a major performance improvement in terms of PER in scenario B can be seen
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of the PER when two users use the same preamble code or different
preamble codes. The two users have equal power at the receiver. We show a high (R = 200
packet/s) and a low traffic case (R = 10 packet/s). There is a negligible difference whether we
use the same preamble code or a different preamble code.
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Figure 4.8: SER and BER (dashed lines) when two users use the same or a different preamble
code. We consider the high traffic case (R = 200 packets/s). If different codes are being used,
there are less packets missed. However, the packets additionally acquired, have generally more
interference, which translates into a higher BER. The effect leading to the unusual trend of a
slightly degrading BER performance with increasing SNR is explained in Section 4.3.7.
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Equal power Near-far
Same Code Diff. Code Same Code Diff. Code
Percentage of missed packets 25.6% 4.0% 34.6% 33.3%
Out of which missed due to FA 98.4% 63.8% 94.0% 19.1%
Table 4.2: Percentage of packets missed due to synchronization errors at a packet arrival rate
of R = 200 packet/s, an SNR of 16 dB and one single interferer in the equal power or near-far
setting. We compare scenario A where the interferer and the UOI share the same preamble
code with scenario B where the preamble codes differ.
from the BER of packets that are correctly acquired, which is also shown in Figure 4.8. We
notice that the acquired packets generally have more errors in scenario B than scenario A. We
conclude that the packets additionally acquired by the receiver in scenario B are packets with
interference and most of them are lost due to decoding errors.
We could therefore be tempted to conclude that the main reason for packet errors are de-
coding errors in the payload. However, a similar analysis for a near-far setting in scenario B
shows that this is not true. With one strong interferer, the percentage of packets lost due to
synchronization increases from 4% to 33.3% (Table 4.2). This leads us to our first insight:
Insight 1. Both synchronization and payload decoding are significantly affected by MUI.
A robust receiver will therefore have to address synchronization as well as payload decoding
in order to achieve a noticeable performance gain with respect to the receiver presented here.
4.3.6 Synchronization Errors in Scenario With Different Preamble Codes
Although the origin of synchronization errors in scenario A may seem obvious, the situation is
less clear in scenario B and further analysis is required. Figure 4.9 shows the classification of
packet errors in scenario B according to the taxonomy introduced in Section 4.3.4. The numbers
shown are for the interference limited case at an SNR of 16 dB with one equal power interferer
and at a rate of R = 200 packets/s. The corresponding near-far setting is shown in Figure 4.10.
We have already seen in the last section that both synchronization and decoding contribute
substantially to packet errors. Looking at synchronization errors alone, we immediately see
that the same is true for errors due to timing acquisition and SFD detection:
Insight 2. Both timing acquisition and SFD detection are significantly affected by MUI.
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Figure 4.9: Classification of packet errors for one equal power interferer with different pream-
ble code, at rate R = 200 packets/s and at an SNR of 16 dB. In parentheses, main interference
type causing the error.
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Figure 4.10: Same classification as in Figure 4.9 but for a strong near-far interferer.
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We also see that in the equal power setting more errors occur during SFD detection, whereas
in the near-far setting it is the other way round. Due to the stronger interference in the near-far
setting, errors occur earlier in the packet reception process, already during packet detection
and timing acquisition. We explain this by the fact that a strong interfering signal has a high
likelihood of exceeding the detection threshold (that is solely based on the noise level, see
Section 4.2.1), even if it is not perfectly aligned with the correlation template. This can generate
MDs if the interfering signal introduces spurious maxima in the correlation output that make
the verification fail. It can also lead to a FA with synchronization on an interfering signal if
NV+1 consecutive maxima that are due to interference align such that the verification succeeds.
Obviously, one would expect the former to be much more likely than the latter because it only
requires producing one maximum in the correlation output at an arbitrary position.
We can observe this in the near-far setting where over 90% of timing acquisition errors
(corresponding to over 60% of total synchronization errors) are due to MDs. We further find
that 74.4% of these packets that are missed because of MDs in the timing acquisition phase
have an overlap of more than 90% with an interfering payload. Due to the IEEE 802.15.4a
signalling structure, an interfering payload burst in the simulated LPRF mode carries roughly
four times the energy of an interfering preamble pulse. It is therefore highly likely that a small
number of these high energy bursts is able to dominate the result of the correlation and make
detection and verification of the periodic pattern induced by the UOI impossible. This is the
major cause for timing acquisition errors in the near-far setting.
In the equal power setting, however, only relatively few packets (below 5% of total synchro-
nization errors) are missed because of MDs in the timing acquisition phase. Further, the packets
missed have only little overlap with interfering payloads, but surprisingly, 80.2% of them have
an overlap of more than 90% with an interfering preamble. We conclude that unlike in the
near-far setting, the interference level is not high enough for a few aligned bursts to change the
result of the correlation. Another effect must play here because interfering preambles of lower
energy cause most of the MDs.
What comes as an even bigger surprise is however the fact that almost 90% of timing ac-
quisition errors are due to FAs in the equal power setting. Hence, it seems that even with
different preamble codes, the receiver still synchronizes with the interferer often. A reason for
this behavior becomes apparent if we look at the correlation between preamble codes shown in
Figure 4.11(a). The figure shows the autocorrelation and cross-correlation properties of pream-
ble codes 5 and 6 in the non-coherent case. Non-coherent here means that the code symbols
are squared because of energy-detection, transforming the ternary preamble codes into binary
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Figure 4.11: (a, top) Correlation of preamble code 5 with a periodic repetition of itself and with
a periodic repetition of preamble code 6. (b, bottom) Classification of wrong timing acquisi-
tions according to the offset with respect to the closest packet of an interferer. Correspondence
of peaks in (a) and (b) suggests that wrong timing acquisitions are due to the correlation prop-
erties of the preamble codes.
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ones. The autocorrelation is perfect in the sense that it only has a single peak per period of
the code (of length C = 31. The peak occurs at offset 0, where all of the CNZ = 16 nonzero
code symbols of the preamble code are aligned. The cross-correlation of codes 5 and 6 on the
other hand shows 10 peaks per period of the code. Each of the peaks corresponds to 10 code
symbols that are aligned despite the fact that the codes differ. As a result, with non-coherent
energy-detection, distinct peaks can be observed in the correlation output between the receiver
template and an interfering preamble, even if different preamble codes are employed 2. Fur-
ther, these peaks are very likely to exceed the detection threshold and they occur at the same
periodicity as the peaks in the autocorrelation. They are therefore the likely cause of the ob-
served FAs. To verify this hypothesis, we classify FAs during timing acquisition according to
whether they occur in the presence of an interfering preamble or an interfering payload. In the
former case we further classify them according to the offset with respect to the beginning of the
interfering preamble symbol closest in time. The result is shown in Figure 4.11(b). We have
a perfect correspondence between the offsets of the cross-correlation peaks and the offsets of
FAs, which verifies our hypothesis. We verified that the same is also true for the FAs during
timing acquisition in the near-far setting. Further, this imperfect cross-correlation pattern also
explains why an interfering preamble is able to cause MDs in the equal power setting whereas
an interfering payload is not.
Insight 3. During timing acquisition, we have two different effects. First, interfering pream-
bles cause a lot of FAs and MDs because of the imperfect cross-correlation properties of the
preamble codes with non-coherent reception. Second, interfering payloads may cause a lot of
MDs if a few bursts dominate the output of the correlation.
For SFD detection we see from Figure 4.9 that FA’s and MD’s roughly contribute equally
to the errors in the equal power setting. The bipolar SFD detection template (4.18) has an equal
number of +1s and −1s. Large interference terms are therefore equally likely to increase the
correlation with the template leading to FAs or decreasing it leading to MDs.
Most of the FAs, namely 74.7%, occur because the SFD is declared 6 preamble symbols
too early. This corresponds exactly to the position of the secondary peak of the SFD correlation
(see Figure 4.3). Further, we confirm that FAs and MDs happen under strong interference: for
MDs, 95% of the packets suffer from interference from a payload during more than 90% of the
SFD part; for FAs this is the case for 93.9% of the packets.
2. Note that these peaks are not an anomaly of the IEEE 802.15.4a codes per se, but rather inherent to such
sequences. See also Section 6.2.3
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In the near-far setting, the situation is slightly different. Now, only 12.6% of FAs occur at
the secondary peak of the SFD correlation. The others occur at arbitrary positions. We attribute
this to the fact that due to the higher interference level, the SFD threshold can be exceeded
even if the SFD sequence of the UOI is not present at all. 45.4% of the FA packets have an
overlap of more than 90% with an interfering preamble, 48.6% with an interfering payload. In
the near-far setting, we can thus attribute FAs during SFD detection to both interference types.
Insight 4. Large interference terms can dominate the correlation with the bipolar SFD tem-
plate causing both FAs and MAs. Many of the FAs occur at the secondary peak of the SFD
correlation.
For MDs during SFD detection, 41.5% of the packets suffer from interference from a pay-
load during more than 90% of the SFD part, 16.5% of the packets suffer from interference
from a preamble during more than 90% of the SFD part. The remaining packets suffer from
interference with a payload during channel mask estimation. We conclude that in the near-far
setting, roughly 40% of the MDs during SFD detection occur because the SFD threshold is
overestimated because of interference with a payload.
Insight 5. The estimation of the SFD threshold is not robust to strong MUI, leading to MDs.
4.3.7 Analysis of Payload Decoding Errors
In this last section of the performance evaluation, we analyze errors that are due to decoding
of the payload. We can see from Figures 4.9 and 4.10 that this corresponds to a significant
percentage of the erroneous packets.
First, we want to understand to what extent decoding errors are due to interference during
decoding itself, and to what extent they occur because of interference during channel mask
estimation. To this end we ran simulations where we switched off MUI during channel mask
estimation. Moreover, for these simulations we assumed a hypothetical receiver with perfect
synchronization, i.e., where an oracle returns the exact beginning of the payload. Figure 4.12
shows the PER obtained in the equal power setting; in the near-far setting the results are sim-
ilar. As a reference, the corresponding curves of the full simulation are shown as well. We
can see that perfect synchronization and channel mask estimation without MUI only yield a
small improvement in PER. We conclude that the main source of errors in payload decoding is
interference during the payload and not an inaccurately estimated channel mask.
It can be observed in Figure 4.12 (and also in some of the performance figures we showed
earlier) that the error-floor of the PER (and also of the BER, e.g., in Figure 4.8) shows an
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Figure 4.12: Comparison of the PER with a hypothetical receiver performing perfect synchro-
nization and experiencing no MUI during channel mask estimation. The hypothetical receiver
only shows a slight performance improvement. The curves shown are for the equal power
setting.
Avg. number of ones in channel mask
6 dB 8 dB 10 dB 12 dB 14 dB 16 dB
Correct packets 1.00 3.21 4.43 5.11 5.85 6.56
Erroneous packets 2.65 3.69 4.43 5.50 6.34 7.03
Table 4.3: Average number of ones in channel mask. Numbers shown are for the hypothet-
ical receiver without MUI during channel mask estimation and with perfect synchronization.
Simulations were performed with one equal power interferer and a rate of R = 200 packet/s)
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increasing trend at high SNR when the signal becomes interference limited. This can be ex-
plained by Table 4.3 where the average number of ones in the channel mask is shown for
different SNRs. The numbers shown are for the hypothetical receiver and for the high traffic
case. The number of ones in the channel mask increases proportionally with the SNR. A large
number of ones in the channel mask implies a higher likelihood of suffering from MUI as we
integrate a larger amount of the received signal, which explains the increasing PER at higher
SNRs. We can also see that packets with decoding errors are generally those that have a longer
overall integration time.
Insight 6. Limiting the integration time to signal parts containing UOI contributions and em-
ploying a time-hopping sequence are not sufficient to prevent a performance degradation due
to MUI.
In IEEE 802.15.4a, the RS code operates on blocks of 378 bits. Further, no interleaving
is used. A packet is therefore in error if one of the RS blocks of 378 consecutive bits has
more errors than the code can correct. One block corresponds to roughly 30% of the maximum
payload size we simulated and, indeed, we find that 98.6% of the erroneous packets in the equal
power setting are subject to interference during at least 30% of the payload. Further, 100% of
these packets have some overlap with an interfering payload and in 91.8% this overlap exceeds
30%. 43.3% have no interference with an interfering preamble at all. In the near-far setting,
interference from interfering preambles starts to get strong enough to provoke errors on its own:
roughly 10% of decoding errors are solely due to interfering preambles. Still, the above results
suggest that most of the packet errors are due to an interfering payload. This also makes sense
from the perspective that a burst in the payload contains four times more energy than a pulse
of the preamble. Furthermore, the payload is also about four times longer than the preamble,
making a collision with a payload more likely.
4.4 Conclusion
We have evaluated and analyzed the effect of MUI on a complete IEEE 802.15.4a system
that uses an energy-detection receiver. Although some papers hint at the fact that an energy-
detection receiver with a long integration time might be vulnerable to MUI, we are not aware
of any work prior to this one that evaluates and quantifies this effect. Our analysis shows
that a simple energy-detection receiver is not only vulnerable to MUI, but that already at low
traffic, it even exhibits close to worst case performance if its subject to uncontrolled MUI. This
68 4. Performance Evaluation of IEEE 802.15.4a with Energy Detection and MUI
makes one of the most appealing benefits of IR-UWB, namely its ability to support concurrent
transmissions completely void. Further, we show that all receiver operations needed to receive
a packet are severely affected by MUI.
Although this may seem to be a rather dim prospect for energy-detection in the scope of
IEEE 802.15.4a, we also compile a catalog of insights into the main reasons for this bad per-
formance. These insights show where there is room for improvement and they will serve as a
guideline for the design of more robust receivers in the subsequent chapters.
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Chapter 5
Robust IEEE 802.15.4a Energy-Detection
Receiver Architecture With Adaptive
Thresholding
In the previous chapter we have seen that the performance of an IEEE 802.15.4a compliant
energy-detection receiver is severely degraded in the presence of MUI, resulting in a perfor-
mance that is close to the worst case. We have also seen that both synchronization and data
decoding are equally affected. In this chapter we focus on data decoding and try to answer the
question of whether there are ways to improve upon the discouraging results found in Chapter 4.
As we have seen, limiting the total integration time and employing time-hopping are not
enough to contain the effect of MUI at reasonable levels, even though such a receiver shows a
good performance if no MUI is present. This also indicates that the situation may be similar
to coherent reception, where receivers that were designed for the Gaussian single user case are
known to perform badly in an impulsive, non-Gaussian multi-user environment (see Section 3.1
in the related work). Among the simplest interference mitigation techniques known to mitigate
impulsive interference in coherent receivers are thresholding schemes (Section 3.1.1) that limit
the contribution of high interference terms. If such a scheme could be adapted to energy-
detection receivers, it could prove to be a viable solution because thresholding usually has a
low implementation complexity.
We will see in this chapter that such an adaptation of thresholding to energy-detection re-
ceivers is indeed feasible at a moderate complexity increase. Our solution is fully adaptive to
different channel conditions and results in a novel receiver architecture that takes the specific
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signalling structure of IEEE 802.15.4a signals into account. In certain scenarios with MUI
we find the packet error rate to be up to two orders of magnitude lower when compared to a
classical energy-detection receiver designed without accounting for MUI.
This chapter is organized as follows: The architecture of the robust receiver is derived in
Section 5.1. The adaptive thresholding scheme to mitigate MUI, as well as algorithms for
robust parameter estimation are introduced in Section 5.2. The performance of the complete
receiver is evaluated in Section 5.3. We conclude the chapter in Section 5.4.
5.1 Architecture of the Robust Receiver
The baseline receiver model used throughout this chapter is the same as in Chapter 4, i.e., we
assume an IEEE 802.15.4a PHY and an energy-detection receiver with a sampling rate 1/T .
Further, the receiver produces M = LsTc/T discrete samples per preamble code symbol. In
contrast to Chapter 4, we assume perfect synchronization, i.e., the TOA as well as its estimate
are assumed to be zero (ν0 = νˆ0 = 0) throughout this chapter. Robust synchronization and
timing acquisition are explained separately in Chapter 6.
For convenience, we write the received signal during the preamble as
yprem,j+iC = y
pre
m+(j+iC)M =
∫ (m+1)T+(j+iC)LsTc
mT+(j+iC)LsTc
[rpre(t)]
2 dt, (5.1)
where we introduced yprem,j+iC to denote the m-th sample of the j-th code symbol of the i-th
preamble symbol. Further, rpre(t) is given by (2.28) and m = 0, . . . ,M − 1.
To ease notation, but without loss of generality, we only consider the reception of the first
payload symbol. For the same reason we also assume that the time-hopping index of the first
payload symbol is equal to cTHS,0 = 0 and we neglect the BPSK modulation a0 that does not
matter in non-coherent reception. The received signal given by (2.30), and where we dropped
index i that refers to the payload symbol, is then
rpay(t) =
Ncpb−1∑
j=0
bj · h˜(t− d0Tf/2 − jTc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
x˜pay(t)
+v(t) (5.2)
where d0 is the BPPM data bit of the first symbol and bj are the elements of the scrambling
sequence during the first symbol.
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As was the case in Chapter 4, the receiver obtains M samples per BPPM block of the
frame, yielding the signal vector y = (y0,y1) = (y0, . . . , yM−1, yNf/2, . . . , yNf/2+M−1). The
m-th received sample of the first symbol of the payload is given by (2.17), i.e.,
ym =
∫ (m+1)T
mT
[rpay(t)]
2 dt (5.3)
5.1.1 Optimal Decision Rule for Burst Transmissions
In the last chapter we have seen that in order to be robust to MUI, it is not enough for an
IEEE 802.15.4a compliant energy-detection receiver to limit the integration time through, e.g.,
a binary channel mask (Chapter 4, Insight 6). In a first step towards a more robust receiver
architecture, we derive the optimum decision rule for the energy-detection receiver in the case
where the noise term v(t) in (5.2) consists of AWGN only. We will later see that the optimal
decision rule leads to a robust receiver that uses an adaptive thresholding mechanism to mitigate
the effect of MUI.
According to Section 2.3.3, the samples ym can be assumed to be distributed independently
and according to a scaled noncentral chi-square distribution with 2BT degrees of freedom and
non-centrality parameter ζm,d0 =
pm,d0
N0/2
(2.22), where we explicitly stated the dependence of the
non-centrality parameter on d0. Plugging x˜pay(t) from (5.2) into (2.23) and assuming no ISI
yields
pm,d0 =
∫ (m+1)T
mT

Ncpb−1∑
j=0
bj · h˜(t− d0Tf/2− jTc)

2 dt (5.4)
Since pm,1 = pm−Nf/2,0, we can simplify the notation by introducing qm
.
= pm,0.
We observe that with Tf large enough to prevent ISI (in IEEE 802.15.4a this is achieved with
proper guard intervals), the contribution of the UOI is confined to the first half of the samples
of y if d0 = 0 and to the second half if d0 = 1. It follows that if d0 = 0, y0 is distributed
according to the non-central chi-square distribution and y1 according to a central chi-square
distribution with 2BT degrees of freedom (2.24) (and vice versa if d0 = 1). Consequently, the
optimal decision rule according to the maximum likelihood criterion is found as
M−1∑
m=0
LLR(ym|N0/2, 2BT, qm)
d0=0
≷
d0=1
M−1∑
m=0
LLR(ym+Nf/2|N0/2, 2BT, qm) (5.5)
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with the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) given by
LLR(ym|N0/2, 2BT, qm) = ln

fNCχ2
(
ym
N0/2
∣∣∣2BT, qmN0/2)
fχ2
(
ym
N0/2
∣∣∣2BT)


= ln
[
0F1
(
;BT ;
qmym
N20
)]
− qm
N0
(5.6)
The confluent hypergeometric limit function 0F1
(
;BT ; qmym
N20
)
is given by
0F1
(
;BT ;
qmym
N20
)
= 2BT−1Γ(BT )
( N0/2√
ymqm
)BT−1
IBT−1(
√
qmym
N0/2
) (5.7)
where Iυ(z) is the υ-th order modified Bessel function of the first kind.
Plugging (5.6) and (5.7) into (5.5) yields
M−1∑
m=0
ln

IBT−1
(√
ymqm
N0/2
)
√
yBT−1m

 d0=0≷
d0=1
M−1∑
m=0
ln


IBT−1
(√
ym+Nf/2qm
N0/2
)
√
yBT−1m

 (5.8)
Finally, (5.8) can be linearly approximated [33] resulting in a simpler decision rule
M−1∑
m=0
ym · qm
d0=0
≷
d0=1
M−1∑
m=0
ym+Nf/2 · qm (5.9)
Hence, the optimal detector applies a weighting function with coefficients qm prior to compar-
ing the energies in the 0-block and the 1-block of a BPPM frame. With Ncpb > 1, (5.4)-(5.9)
give us a generalization of the result found in [33]. With Ncpb = 1 the weighting function
reduces to the one found in [33]. How to estimate the weights qm is shown in the next section.
5.1.2 Estimation of Weighting Coefficients and Noise Power Spectral Density
We have seen in the previous section that in order to optimally demodulate the received symbol,
the receiver needs to estimate the weights qm. We shall see later, that estimates of qm are also
needed in order to effectively mitigate the impact of MUI. Further, mitigation of MUI also
requires an estimate of the noise PSD N0/2.
To show how the weighting coefficients qm can be estimated from the preamble during a
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channel estimation phase, we rewrite (5.4)
qm =
Ncpb−1∑
j=0
b2j
∫ (m+1)T
mT
h˜2(t− jTc)dt
+ 2
Ncpb−1∑
j=0
Ncpb−1∑
k=j+1
bjbk
∫ (m+1)T
mT
h˜(t− jTc)h˜(t− kTc)dt. (5.10)
By applying the change of variables s .= t− jTc and introducing K .= Tc/T , we obtain
qm =
Ncpb−1∑
j=0
∫ (m−jK+1)T
(m−jK)T
h˜2(s)ds
+ 2
Ncpb−1∑
j=0
Ncpb−1∑
k=j+1
bjbk
∫ (m−jK+1)T
(m−jK)T
h˜(s)h˜(s− (k − j)Tc)ds
=
Ncpb−1∑
j=0
w
(0)
m−jK + 2 ·
Ncpb−1∑
j=0
Ncpb−1∑
k=j+1
bjbk · w(k−j)m−jK (5.11)
where w(l)m , l = 1, . . . , Ncpb − 1 is given by
w(l)m =
∫ (m+1)T
mT
h˜(t)h˜(t− l · Tc)dt (5.12)
To estimate qm, we thus have to estimate the parameters w(l)m . Note that w(0)m represents the
energy-delay profile of the channel and corresponds to the weight applied in [33].
Assuming v(t) is AWGN only, the expected value of a discrete preamble sample is given
by
E[yprem,j+iC] = E
[∫ (m+1)T+(j+iC)LsTc
mT+(j+iC)LsTc
[
Npre−1∑
i=0
si
C−1∑
j=0
cj · h˜(t− (j + iC)LsTc) + v(t)]2 dt
]
= s2i c
2
j
∫ (m+1)T
mT
h˜2(t)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
w
(0)
m
+E
[∫ T
0
v2(t)dt
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
v¯
(5.13)
where the first equality is obtained by plugging (2.28) into (5.1). In the second equality we
used the fact that v(t) is stationary and zero-mean if it consists of AWGN only. Further, we
assumed that there is no inter-pulse interference between consecutive pulses of the preamble
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signal.
Because both sequences, si and cj, are known, equation (5.13) suggests that we can get an
estimate ˆ¯v of the noise energy v¯ by averaging samples yprem,j+iC for which cj = 0:
ˆ¯v =
1
NCH(C − CNZ)M
NCH−1∑
i=0
C−1∑
j=0
M−1∑
m=0
δcj · yprem,j+iC (5.14)
NCH are number of preamble symbols that are used for channel estimation, CNZ are the number
of nonzero code symbols of the preamble code and δm denotes the Kronecker delta.
The PSD N0/2 of the noise process can then be estimated from ˆ¯v. Given, that for cj = 0,
yprem,j+iC is distributed according to the chi-square distribution with 2BT degrees of freedom
(see equation (2.24)), we have that
Nˆ0
2
=
ˆ¯v
2BT
(5.15)
Further, an estimate wˆ(0)m of w(0)m can be obtained by averaging over samples yprem,j+iC of the
SYNC part of the preamble for which cj 6= 0 1 and by subtracting ˆ¯v from the result:
wˆ(0)m =
1
NCHCNZ
[
NCH−1∑
i=0
C−1∑
j=0
c2j · yprem,j+iC
]
− ˆ¯v (5.16)
Estimating w(0)m as well as the noise PSD N0/2 is all that has to be done during the channel
estimation phase if there are no bursts, i.e., Ncpb = 1. However, if Ncpb > 1 we additionally
need to estimate the parameters w(l)m , with l ∈ {1, . . . , Ncpb−1}, in order to calculate the optimal
weights given by (5.11). Unfortunately, there is no way for w(l)m , l 6= 0, to be estimated by a
classical energy-detection receiver architecture. Consequently, equations (5.11) and (5.12) not
only define a new weighting function but also show the necessity for a new receiver structure
that allows for the estimation of the parameters w(l)m .
A possible receiver structure that overcomes the limitations of the classical energy-detection
receiver is depicted in Figure 5.1. With respect to a classical energy-detection receiver, this new
receiver employs Ncpb − 1 additional branches. The l-th additional branch delays the received
signal by lTc and multiplies the received signal with this delayed version. The resulting signal
is then integrated and sampled to yield the samples ypre,(l)m,j+iC . However, the additional branches
are only needed during channel estimation in the preamble, in order to estimate the parameters
w
(l)
m . During the other phases of packet reception, synchronization and decoding, the additional
1. Remember that for all preamble symbols of the SYNC part we have si = 1, see Section 2.4.2.
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Figure 5.1: Proposed receiver structure in the case of payload signaling with bursts of four
pulses (Ncpb = 4) and with an integration time of T ≤ Tc. The additional branches are needed
only during estimation of the parameters w(l)m given in (5.12). They are not needed for data
decoding where only the upper branch is required. Hence, their impact on power consumption
is minimal.
circuitry is not used. The added complexity and power consumption should thus be moderate.
This also limits the additional memory requirements of this more sophisticated receiver.
In an analogous manner to the classical receiver architecture, wˆ(0)m can be obtained from
the branch with no delay, ypre,(0)m,j+iC , according to (5.16). The same is true for the noise PSD.
wˆ
(l)
m , l ∈ {1, . . . , Ncpb − 1} can be obtained in a similar way from the l-th branch, thanks to the
observation that
E[y
pre,(l)
m,j+iC ] = s
2
i c
2
j
∫ (m+1)T
mT
h˜(t)h˜(t− l · Tc)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
w
(l)
m
, l ∈ {1, . . . , Ncpb − 1} (5.17)
resulting in
wˆ(l)m =
1
NCHCNZ
NCH−1∑
i=0
C−1∑
j=0
c2j · ypre,(l)m,j+iC , l ∈ {1, . . . , Ncpb − 1} (5.18)
From the parameters wˆ(l)m , l ∈ {0, . . . , Ncpb − 1}, an estimate qˆm of the weights qm can be
directly calculated using (5.11) under the condition that K = Tc/T is an integer greater than or
equal to one, or in other words that T ≤ Tc.
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Figure 5.2: Receiver structure allowing to calculate the optimal weights qm in the case of
payload signaling with bursts of four pulses (Ncpb = 4) and with an integration time of T = 2Tc.
As this integration time exceeds the duration of a chip Tc, three additional branches are needed
with respect to Figure 5.1 in order to be able to estimate all of the needed parameters.
Trade-off Between Sampling Frequency and Hardware Complexity
For integration times that exceed the duration of a chip we cannot obtain all of the required pa-
rameter estimates from the receiver structure introduced above and shown in Figure 5.1. This
is because with K < 1, some of the parameter estimates wˆ(l)m−jK , for which jK becomes a frac-
tion rather than an integer, cannot be expressed through any of the parameter estimates given
by (5.18). Nevertheless, a receiver structure that allows us to obtain all of the parameter esti-
mates wˆ(l)m−jK required to calculate qm also exists in this case. It can be obtained from the new
receiver structure introduced so far, by adding a maximum of Ncpb(Ncpb−1)
2
additional branches
to calculate the missing parameter estimates. The resulting optimal structure for Ncpb = 4 and
T = 2Tc is shown in Figure 5.2 and its derivation is given as an example in the following.
With an integration time of T = 2Tc, we have K = 1/2. We see from (5.11) that in this
case we need to estimate the following parameters in order to calculate qm: w(0)m , w(0)m− 1
2
, w
(0)
m−1,
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w
(0)
m− 3
2
, w
(1)
m , w
(1)
m− 1
2
, w
(1)
m−1, w
(2)
m , w
(2)
m− 1
2
, w
(3)
m . Out of these ten parameters, six can be readily
estimated according to (5.18), namely w(0)m , w(0)m−1, w(1)m , w(1)m−1, w(2)m and w(3)m . The remaining
four parameters w(0)
m− 1
2
, w
(0)
m− 3
2
, w
(1)
m− 1
2
and w(2)
m− 1
2
cannot be estimated by the receiver structure
in Figure 5.1. However, we can see that an estimate of w(0)
m− 3
2
= w
(0)
(m−1)− 1
2
can be obtained
from the estimate of w(0)
m− 1
2
. We therefore need to add three additional branches to the receiver
structure of Figure 5.1 in order to estimate the three remaining parameters w(0)
m− 1
2
, w
(1)
m− 1
2
and
w
(2)
m− 1
2
, which leads to the optimal receiver structure shown in Figure 5.2.
For receivers that calculate the optimal weights qm, there is thus a tradeoff between a lower
sampling frequency and the additional circuitry that is needed if the sampling frequency is
decreased.
5.2 Mitigation of MUI with an Adaptive Thresholding
Mechanism
The decision rule derived in Section 5.1.1 is optimal if the weights qm are known and if the
interference and noise term v(t) is AWGN. In the last section we have seen that the first con-
dition can be fulfilled since the weights qm can be estimated. However, it is well-known that
in the presence of MUI, the Gaussian assumption for v(t) does generally not hold ([39] or see
Section 3.1). Rather, MUI tends to be impulsive with a few strong interference terms of high
energy. With the decision rule in (5.9) it could therefore happen that few samples ym suffering
from high interference dominate the decision leading to a decoding error, even though they may
have a low associated weight qm.
On the other hand, the estimated weights qˆm, combined with the knowledge about the dis-
tribution of the receiver output under AWGN, give us a statistical model for the distribution of
samples ym if no MUI is present. A large deviation of ym from the model suggests that it is
subject to MUI, and its contribution to the decision should be limited.
To detect a deviation from the AWGN model, the receiver can calculate the threshold
ηm =
Nˆ0
2
F−1NCχ2(1− P FAMUI|2BT,
qˆm
Nˆ0/2
) (5.19)
by inverting the CDF of the non-central chi-square distribution defining the AWGN model.
The sensitivity of the threshold can be adjusted via the small false alarm probability P FAMUI. The
threshold adapts to different channel conditions through the associated estimated weights qˆm.
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In order to limit the contribution of high interference terms, the receiver applies a non-
linearity governed by ηm to the received samples prior to the decision process. Different non-
linear operations are possible. The one we found to work best is to set samples, above the
threshold, to the value of the corresponding weight qˆm
g(ym|qˆm, Nˆ0/2) =
{
ym ∀m : ym ≤ ηm
qˆm ∀m : ym > ηm
(5.20)
The resulting decision rule, including the adaptive threshold is given by
M−1∑
m=0
g(ym|qˆm, Nˆ0/2) · qˆm
d0=0
≷
d0=1
M−1∑
m=0
g(ym+Nf/2|qˆm, Nˆ0/2) · qˆm (5.21)
Through the threshold ηm, the non-linearity g(ym|qˆm, Nˆ0/2) depends on the weights qˆm as
well as on the estimated thermal noise level. We have seen in Section 5.1.2 how to estimate
these quantities in AWGN. In the next section, we will show how to estimate them in a robust
fashion under MUI.
5.2.1 Robust Parameter Estimation Using Order Statistics
Estimation of the parameters wˆ(l)m and N0/2 using sample averages according to (5.14), (5.15),
(5.16) and (5.18) is not robust to MUI. The reason is similar to what we have observed in the
previous section where we treated payload decoding: a few samples yprem,j+iC suffering from
high interference may dominate the sample average and lead to a biased estimation. Unlike in
payload decoding, during the estimation phase we do in general not yet have any knowledge
about the expected signal level available. It is therefore not possible to devise a thresholding
scheme to mitigate interference similar to the one proposed in the last section. Instead we will
resort to order statistics. It is well-known that the median, e.g., is more robust to outliers than
the mean. We propose to replace the sample mean in (5.14), (5.16) and (5.18) with the sample
median, yielding e.g.,
wˆ(0)m = median
{
yprem,j+iC : (i, j) ∈ {0, . . . , NCH − 1} × {0, . . . , C − 1}, cj 6= 0
}− ˆ¯v (5.22)
The median of a chi-square distribution with κ degrees of freedom can be approximated by
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κ− 2/3. Consequently, we calculate the estimate of the noise PSD according to
Nˆ0
2
=
ˆ¯v
2BT − 2/3 (5.23)
if the sample median is used instead of the sample mean.
Performing parameter estimation with the sample median as explained above can still be
vulnerable to interference from an interfering preamble. The reason is the imperfect cross-
correlation of the preamble codes in IEEE 802.15.4a if non-coherent reception is used (see
Insight 3 of Chapter 4 and the corresponding Figure 4.11). From Figure 4.11 it becomes ap-
parent that even if an interfering preamble is constructed from a different preamble code than
the one used by the UOI, on average half of the pulses (eight out of sixteen) are still aligned;
in the worst case even ten out of sixteen. For channel estimation, this means that with a single
interfering preamble, more than half of the code symbols used in the averaging process may
have a (potentially strong) contribution from the interferer. Consequently, the median will not
be able to provide a robust estimate in this case.
To overcome this problem we propose to trade processing gain for robustness against inter-
ference. Due to the squaring operation in the energy-detection receiver, interference is mainly
additive. Therefore, the more energy a code symbol contains, the more likely it is that interfer-
ence is present. We therefore propose to only consider half of the code symbols in the averaging
process, namely those that have the lowest received energy.
The received energy during the j-th code symbol of the i-th preamble symbol is given by
Ei,j =
M−1∑
m=0
yprem,j+iC (5.24)
Further, we treat code symbols for which cj = 0 separately from code symbols for which
cj 6= 0, yielding two sets of energy values. We then sort each of these two sets. Prior to
calculating the median, we discard all samples yprem,j+iC that belong to a code symbol whose
corresponding energy value ends up in the upper half of one of the sorted sets.
Note that the receiver can only start to partition code symbols into a set of code symbols
with low energy (to be kept) and a set of code symbols with high energy (to be discarded) after
at least half of the NCHC code symbols used in channel estimation have been received. This is
impractical as it requires a lot of samples to be stored before they can be processed and thus
entails a large cost in terms of memory. To circumvent this problem we can resort to a simple
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Algorithm 1: Heuristic for online calculation of the partition of set S into disjoint subsets
S1 and S2, where S1 contains the |S|2 smallest elements of S and S2 the
|S|
2
largest elements
of S
Input: Set S = {s0, s1, . . . , sn−1} of n observations.
Output: Partition of S into S1 and S2, where |S1| ≈ n2 and S1 contains the majority of
elements si of S for which si ≤ median{S}.
begin
S1 ← s0;
S2 ← ∅;
V ← s0;
for i← 1 to n− 1 do
m← median{V };
if si ≤ m then
S1 ← S1 ∪ si
else
S2 ← S2 ∪ si
end
V ← V ∪ si
end
end
heuristic algorithm (shown in Algorithm 1) that calculates an approximate partition into high
and low energy code symbols in an online fashion.
Similar considerations can be made for the median that does not lend itself as well to online
updating as the mean. Still, there exist online algorithms, such as the remedian [169], for
calculating estimates of the median. Such algorithms can be used in order to cut down on
memory consumption and yield a computational complexity in the same order as the mean.
5.3 Performance Evaluation
The setup to evaluate the performance of the robust receiver is roughly the same we used to
evaluate the impact of MUI on the simple energy-detection receiver in Chapter 4. We again
assume the LPRF mode with the mandatory channel number 3. Further, we simulate a high
and a low traffic case, where Nu users generate packets at rates R = 20 packets/s and R =
100 packets/s, according to the procedure in Section 2.5.2. The transmitted packets are assumed
to be of the maximum allowable length of 1208 bits/packet.
We already mentioned that, in contrast to Chapter 4, we here assume perfect synchroniza-
tion and SFD detection, and consequently, only channel estimation and payload decoding are
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simulated. Since synchronization is not performed, we also concentrate on the scenario where
the UOI and the interferers use different preamble codes. We again assign preamble code 5 to
the UOI, and preamble code 6 to all interferers.
Remember that in our simulations, the signal to noise ratio (SNR) is defined as SNR = Ep
N0
where Ep is the received energy per pulse (after the convolution of the pulse with the impulse
response of the channel) and where N0/2 is the PSD of the AWGN noise process that is as-
sumed to be bandlimited to B = 500 MHz. To model the wireless channel, we again use the
IEEE 802.15.4a residential non line of sight (NLOS) channel model (CM2) [14] and the length
of the channel estimation phase corresponds to NCH = 16 preamble symbols.
All confidence intervals shown are at the 95% level.
Throughout performance evaluation, we will denote an energy-detection receiver with a
structure consisting of a single branch as conventional receiver orEDCONV. An energy-detection
receiver that adapts to the IEEE 802.15.4a burst transmissions by calculating the optimal weights
according to (5.11), is denoted as EDOPT. EDOPT thus has a structure like it is depicted in Fig-
ures 5.1 or 5.2. If in addition EDOPT employs a mechanism to mitigate interference, we call it
robust energy-detection receiver or EDROB.
5.3.1 Enhanced Robustness Against MUI
Compared to the receiver considered in Chapter 4, the robust receiver, EDROB, proposed here
shows a significantly increased robustness against MUI. This becomes evident in Figure 5.3,
where we show the PER for the robust receiver in the same scenarios considered in Figure 4.6
of Chapter 4. Note, however, that the rate shown here (R = 20 packets/s) is twice as high as in
the previous chapter.
Three different interference settings are shown for the robust receiver EDROB: a near-far
setting with one interferer that has a power level exceeding the one of the UOI by 10 dB, an
equal power setting with one interferer having the same received power as the UOI, and a setting
with three weak interferers that are received with a power level of −3 dB with respect to the
UOI. In each of these settings, we simulateEDROB using the thresholding mechanism described
in Section 5.2, with P FAMUI = 0.01, and the robust parameter estimation of Section 5.2.1. Further,
we for now restrict ourselves to the simplest receiver architecture in Figure 5.1, thus implying
an integration time of T = Tc = 2 ns (or equivalently a sampling frequency of 500 MHz.
For comparison we also show the performance of the optimal receiver EDOPT (also with
integration time T = Tc = 2 ns) if no MUI is present. Finally, we show the corresponding
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Figure 5.3: PER with MUI in a low traffic case (R = 20 packet/s) for the robust receiver EDROB
with T = Tc = 2 ns. With equal or lower power interferers, performance is close to single user.
Even in a harsh near-far scenario the receiver shows some capture effect when compared to the
worst-case “Destructive Collisions” model.
curve of the “Destructive Collisions” model (see Section 4.3.2) that allows us to assess whether
the receiver shows any capture effect and thus robustness to MUI.
For both, the weak and the equal power interference setting, performance of EDROB is close
to the optimal single user performance. Even in the near-far setting, there is still a significant
performance increase compared to the worst case “Destructive Collisions” curve. Performance
of the receiver from Chapter 4 on the other hand was close to or even coincided with the
“Destructive Collisions” for both the equal power and the near-far setting. We can thus already
see that the mechanisms proposed in the current chapter, result in a significantly enhanced
robustness of energy-detection receivers against MUI.
5.3.2 Limits of Conventional Energy-Detection Architectures and Impact of Robust
Parameter Estimation
We have seen in Section 5.1.2 that a conventional energy-detection receiver structure consisting
of a single branch cannot estimate the optimal weights. These weights are, however, required to
optimally demodulate the bursts that are sent during an IEEE 802.15.4a payload. Further, they
are essential for the MUI mitigation technique proposed here, because they form the basis for
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Figure 5.4: PER in the presence of a single interferer with power equal to the UOI. Packets are
generated at rate R = 100 packet/s. Suboptimal receivers based on the conventional energy-
detection architecture with a single branch perform worse than EDOPT that calculates the op-
timal weights but does not mitigate MUI. Using thresholding and robust parameter estimation
improves the PER by up to two orders of magnitude with respect to EDOPT.
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calculating the threshold used to reject strong interference terms. One option for a conventional
receiver is to not adapt to burst transmissions at all, thus assuming that the signalling structure
does not change between an IEEE 802.15.4a preamble and an IEEE 802.15.4a payload. Such
a receiver would result in the use of a set of suboptimal weights qm = w(0)m . Another option for
a conventional receiver, EDCONV, is to calculate the optimal weights according to (5.11), but
to set parameters that it cannot calculate to zero. For a receiver with T = Tc this would result
in omitting the cross-terms that require additional branches, yielding qm =
∑Ncpb−1
j=0 w
(0)
m−jK . A
threshold to reject MUI can then be calculated according to (5.19) based on these suboptimal
weights. Unfortunately, none of these strategies yields a performance that is close to EDROB.
This can be seen in Figure 5.4 where we show the performance of different receivers in an
equal power setting with one interferer and for a rate of R = 100 packets/s. All of the receivers
compared have an integration time of T = Tc = 2 ns.
Figure 5.4 shows that a conventional receiver that calculates the suboptimal weights as ex-
plained above and that employs a threshold as well as robust parameter estimation (EDCONV,
Subopt., P FAMUI = 0.01), performs significantly better than the worst case given by the “De-
structive Collisions” model 2. However it only improves little over a conventional receiver that
calculates suboptimal weights and does not use any form of interference mitigation (EDCONV,
Subopt., No Mitigation) or over a conventional receiver that does not adapt to the bursts of the
payload (EDCONV, No Burst Adapt.). Finally it even performs a little bit worse than EDOPT
that calculates the optimal weights but employs no interference mitigation.
Using EDROB on the other hand, can yield a PER up to two orders of magnitude lower,
compared to EDOPT. This is equivalent to an improvement of four orders of magnitude with
respect to the worst case.
The PER in the corresponding near-far setting with a single strong interferer and a rate
of R = 100 packets/s is shown in Figure 5.5. Due to the stronger interference all receivers
that do not mitigate MUI perform close to or equal to the worst case. The PERs for EDCONV
being worse, we only show the curve for EDOPT. In the near-far case, EDROB achieves an
improvement of up to one order of magnitude with respect to EDOPT. Figure 5.5 also illustrates
that robust parameter estimation is needed. To this end we show two additional curves: the
PER if EDROB only employs thresholding but parameter estimation is based on the sample
mean and thus not robust (EDROB, Thld Only); and the PER if robust parameter estimation
2. Note that the “Destructive Collisions” model is based on the single user performance of the optimal re-
ceiver EDOPT. Receivers with an inferior single user performance may thus perform worse than the “Destructive
collisions” model at low SNR
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Figure 5.5: PER in the near-far setting with one interferer. Packets are generated at rate R =
100 packet/s. EDOPT performs close to the worst case. Using the robust receiver can yield a
gain of up to one order of magnitude. EDROB is not too sensitive to the choice of threshold.
However, if parameter estimation is not performed in a robust fashion (EDROB, Thld. Only;
EDROB, No Sorting), the full performance gain cannot be realized.
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Figure 5.6: Performance without MUI. Decreasing the sampling rate leads to a moderate per-
formance degradation because it leads to more noise being integrated. Performance is also
degraded if thresholding is used, because the threshold also rejects some useful signal contri-
butions.
uses the median but sorting of code symbols to reject those with high energy does not take
place (EDROB, No Sorting). These curves clearly indicate that robust parameter estimation
based on the median as well as rejection of high energy samples in the estimation process are
required to get the optimal performance in terms of PER. However, using the online algorithm
in Algorithm 1 or sorting code symbols only once all samples needed for parameter estimation
are received, does not result in any noticeable performance difference and we therefore only
show one curve for the full receiver. Finally, for the full receiver, we compare different values
of the probability P FAMUI that governs the threshold. In general the receiver is not too sensitive to
the choice of threshold. A more aggressive threshold of P FAMUI = 0.1 yields a slightly improved
PER at high SNRs where the signal is interference limited. At low SNRs the opposite is true,
a more aggressive threshold leads to a slight performance decrease because it discards useful
signal information.
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Figure 5.7: Reducing the sampling rate also decreases the robustness against MUI. While still
moderate at T = 4 ns, the performance degradation starts to become significant at T = 8 ns.
5.3.3 Single User Performance and Impact of Increasing the Integration Time
We now evaluate the impact of the integration time on the performance of the receiver. It was
shown in Section 5.1.2 that a longer integration time reduces the sampling rate, but necessitates
additional branches and thus leads to a more complex hardware implementation of the receiver.
We compare receivers with different integration times of T = Tc = 2 ns, T = 4 ns and
T = 8 ns. For T = 2 ns, calculating the optimal weights requires an architecture with 4
branches during channel estimation (shown in Figure 5.1). For T = 4 ns, 6 branches are
needed (shown in Figure 5.2) and finally, T = 8 ns requires the maximum of Ncpb(Ncpb+1)
2
= 10
branches.
Figure 5.6 shows the performance without MUI for EDOPT. We see that increasing the
integration time, decreases the performance. We attribute this to the fact that with longer inte-
gration times, more noise is integrated. However, the performance difference is not striking, it
amounts to approximatively 0.5 dB between T = 2 ns and T = 8 ns.
A similar performance decrease can also be observed between EDOPT and the robust re-
ceiver EDROB with T = 2 ns. Increasing the robustness against MUI thus comes at the cost
of a slight degradation of the single user performance. This is due to the fact that both, robust
parameter estimation using the median and demodulation using the thresholding non-linearity
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are not optimal under AWGN only.
Figure 5.7 shows the performance of EDROB with different integration times in the near-
far and equal power settings with one interferer and a rate of R = 100 packets/s. Also here,
increasing the integration time results in a worse performance. Especially an integration time of
T = 8 ns yields significantly worse performance than T = 2 ns. Due to the coarser estimate of
the UOI channel energy-delay profile, mitigation of MUI is less effective for longer integration
times.
5.4 Conclusion
We have shown that the performance of an energy-detection receiver can be dramatically im-
proved in the presence of MUI through a simple, yet effective thresholding mechanism. Our
thresholding scheme necessitates estimation of the channel energy-delay profile, which is al-
ready an integral part of many energy-detection receiver architectures (see Section 3.2 or, e.g.,
[33]). We can therefore consider the required additional complexity with respect to such re-
ceivers to be minimal: It consists in applying a non-linearity such as (5.20) during demodula-
tion. This non-linearity depends on a threshold that can be tabulated. Further, we proposed a
method based on order statistics to estimate the channel energy-delay profile in a manner that is
robust to MUI. Our method only entails a slight increase in complexity with respect to classic
energy-delay profile estimation that uses simple averaging with the mean.
Apart from energy-detection receivers that weight the received signal with the estimated
energy-delay profile, it is also possible to design very simple energy-detection receivers, em-
ploying a long, fixed integration window. These simple receivers can perform most operations
entirely in the analog domain, which is favorable in terms of complexity. However, they are
very vulnerable to both noise and interference. Receivers that use a weighting function have a
higher complexity, but as we have seen in this chapter, they allow for designs that are robust
to MUI. With respect to complex Rake receivers, they still share many of the advantages of
simple energy-detection receivers, such as lower sampling frequencies, less stringent timing
requirements or no need for down conversion (see also Section 2.3 in Chapter 2), allowing for
implementations of lower complexity.
Finally, we have shown in this chapter that in the case of signalling structures with scram-
bled bursts of pulses, like they are employed in IEEE 802.15.4a, estimation of the channel
energy-delay profile requires a novel receiver architecture, resulting in an additional moderate
increase in complexity. In the analog domain, this manifests itself in the need for additional
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branches, mixing the received signal with a delayed version of itself; in the digital domain, the
outputs of these branches need to be combined to yield the appropriate weighting function. In
terms of complexity compared to sophisticated Rake receivers, also this receiver retains the ad-
vantages of an energy-detection receiver described above. Moreover, the additional complexity
compared to a receiver that does not adapt to burst transmissions is only needed during chan-
nel estimation. Further, this new architecture allows for new trade-offs between interference
robustness, hardware complexity and sampling rate requirements.
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Chapter 6
Robust Non-Coherent Synchronization
Algorithms for IEEE 802.15.4a IR-UWB
Networks
IEEE 802.15.4a networks are packet-based and lack global synchronization. The first step to-
wards the correct reception of a packet is therefore synchronization. It consists in detecting the
presence of the packet on the channel and in finding the time reference of the source. Such
a timing acquisition generally comprises a first coarse acquisition followed by a finer acquisi-
tion [170]. Only then can the destination begin to look for the start frame delimiter (SFD). The
SFD is a specifically crafted data sequence that marks the end of the synchronization header
and the beginning of the payload. Once the SFD is detected, the destination can finally recover
the payload data by demodulating and decoding the received signal.
In the previous chapter we proposed a thresholding scheme for an IEEE 802.15.4a energy-
detection receiver in order to mitigate impulsive interference during decoding of the payload
data. Although the proposed receiver drastically improves the performance, our results from
Chapter 4 indicate that such an improvement is not enough for an energy-detection receiver
to reach reasonable performance levels in the presence of MUI. The reason is that not only
payload decoding but also the synchronization phase are significantly affected by MUI. To
have a system that is robust to MUI, we therefore also need to address synchronization, which
is what we will do in this chapter.
Chapter 4 also indicates that interference is a serious issue for both timing acquisition and
SFD detection (Insight 2 of Chapter 4). Here again, we thus have to address both mecha-
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nisms for the system to become robust against MUI. In this chapter we propose PICNIC, a
suite of robust and low-complexity algorithms tailored to IEEE 802.15.4a that allow for reli-
able synchronization with an IR-UWB energy-detection receiver in the presence of multi-user
interference (MUI), even in near-far scenarios. For robust timing-acquisition, PICNIC employs
an adaptive thresholding scheme, similar to what was proposed in [81] for coherent receivers. It
further uses a simplified interference cancelation algorithm to alleviate cross-code interference
between different IEEE 802.15.4a preamble codes. For robust SFD detection, we propose a
novel algorithm that we call DESSERT. This algorithm transforms SFD detection into a decod-
ing problem, allowing us to use thresholding techniques to mitigate interference.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.1 reviews parts of the system model that
are essential to understand this chapter. Packet detection and timing acquisition algorithms are
presented in Section 6.2, while SFD detection is addressed in Section 6.3. The performance
of our algorithms is assessed and compared to other solutions in Section 6.4. Section 6.5
concludes the chapter.
6.1 System Model and Assumptions
In this chapter, we again assume that the receiver front-end corresponds to the classical energy-
detection receiver architecture introduced in Section 2.3.3 of Chapter 2. Like in the previous
chapters, we focus on the IEEE 802.15.4a PHY described in Section 2.4.
With this receiver and PHY, the discrete time signal at the output of the energy-detection
receiver during the reception of the preamble is
yprem =
∫ (m+1)T
mT
[rpre(t)]
2 dt, (6.1)
Like before, we assume that the integration time T is such that M = LsTc/T discrete samples
are produced per preamble code symbol.
As a reminder, the received signal during the preamble of the UOI, rpre(t), equals
rpre(t) =
Npre−1∑
i=0
si
C−1∑
j=0
cj · h˜(t− (j + iC)LsTc − ν0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
x˜pre(t−ν0)
+v(t), (6.2)
where x˜pre(t) is the contribution of the UOI and v(t) accounts for noise and MUI. cj is the
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ternary preamble code sequence of length C. Further, every preamble symbol is modulated by
si, which is given by
si =
{
1 if i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Nsync − 1}
s
(sfd)
i−Nsync if i ∈ {Nsync, . . . , Npre − 1}
, (6.3)
where s(sfd)i ∈ {−1, 0,+1}, i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Nsfd − 1} is the ternary SFD code of length Nsfd that
marks the end of the preamble and the beginning of the payload. For additional details, please
refer to Chapter 2.
6.2 Packet Detection and Timing Acquisition Algorithms
We compare three packet detection and timing acquisition algorithms with increasing degree
of robustness to MUI. The “baseline” algorithm uses correlation with a known template. This
algorithm corresponds to the algorithm that we introduced in the performance evaluation of the
energy-detection receiver in Chapter 4. We have already seen that this approach is vulnera-
ble to MUI. The “power-independent detection” (PID) enhances the baseline algorithm using
thresholding (PID was developed in [81] for coherent reception). Finally, “power-independent
detection and preamble code interference cancelation” (PICNIC) adds an interference cancela-
tion (IC) scheme tailored to IEEE 802.15.4a.
All three algorithms proceed in two phases, coarse timing acquisition and fine timing acqui-
sition. During coarse timing acquisition, they usually synchronize on the strongest multipath
component, which is not always the first in time. Coarse timing acquisition is then followed by
a fine timing acquisition to improve the timing accuracy. Note that in principle, our coarse tim-
ing acquisition algorithms can be combined with any fine timing acquisition algorithms and has
not exclusively to be used in conjunction with the fine timing acquisition algorithms proposed
here.
6.2.1 Baseline Algorithm
The baseline algorithm is a classic timing acquisition using a correlation of the receiver output
with a template derived from the known preamble code sequence of the UOI. The full algorithm
is explained in Section 4.2.1 of Chapter 4. The reader is referred there for a detailed description
of the algorithm, here we merely give a short reminder, outlining its main principles.
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The received signal given by (6.1) is correlated with the following template sequence
tl =
NG−1∑
k=0
C−1∑
j=0
c2j · δl−(j+kC)M (6.4)
where δm denotes the Kronecker delta, cj is the preamble code sequence of length C and NG is
the number of preamble code symbols that are repeated in the template for processing gain.
The resulting discrete correlation output sequence zm is M ·C-periodic if the UOI signal is
present. Therefore, the algorithm processes the correlation output by blocks ofMC consecutive
samples, the i-th block being
zi = {ziMC , ziMC+1, . . . , z(i+1)MC−1} (6.5)
Coarse Timing Acquisition
The baseline algorithm starts with coarse timing acquisition which involves two steps: detection
and verification. During detection, the presence of a signal is declared if at least one of the
correlation output samples of the current block exceeds the threshold ηdetect given by (4.8).
If a signal is detected, verification starts. During verification, the receiver verifies that the
correlation output has the expected periodicity. It does so by checking that the maxima of
two consecutive blocks are both well-aligned and above the threshold. If this holds for NV
consecutive blocks, coarse timing acquisition succeeds.
We saw in Chapter 4, that the baseline method works well in a single user scenario but
that it does not take MUI into account. A strong interfering signal has a high likelihood of
exceeding the threshold (that is solely based on the noise level), even if not perfectly aligned
with the template. This can generate missed detections (MD) if the interfering signal introduces
spurious maxima in the correlation output that make the verification fail. It can lead to a false
alarm (FA) with synchronization on an interfering signal if NV + 1 interfering maxima are
aligned.
Fine Timing Acquisition
Coarse timing acquisition is then followed by fine timing acquisition. During fine timing ac-
quisition the jump-back-and-search-forward algorithm of Section 4.2.1 is applied in order to
improve the TOA estimate. With this algorithm, a search-back window of W = M/2 samples
preceding the sample found during coarse timing acquisition is searched. Fine timing acqui-
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sition selects the first sample in time that is within the search-back window, lies above the
threshold ηdetect and exceeds the secondary correlation peaks that are due to the periodicity of
the signal.
6.2.2 Power-Independent Detection Using Thresholding
The general concept of the PID was introduced for coherent receivers in [81]. We here show
how it can be practically applied to IEEE 802.15.4a with energy-detection or more precisely to
the baseline timing acquisition algorithm described in Sections 6.2.1 and 4.2.1.
Coarse Timing Acquisition
The PID prevents large interference terms in (6.1) from dominating the result of the correlation.
This is achieved by applying a threshold check to the received signal at the input of the cor-
relation (in contrast to the the baseline method where it is performed on the output). Samples
above the threshold are set to 1, samples below are set to 0. The template corresponds to the
one in the baseline algorithm and is given by (6.4). The correlation output becomes
zm =
MT−1∑
l=0
tl · 1[ypre
m−(MT−1)+l
>ηpid
] (6.6)
where 1[·] denotes the indicator function. The threshold ηpid is given by
ηpid =
N0
2
F−1χ2 (1− P FA,PIDAWGN |2BT ) (6.7)
and parameterized by P FA,PIDAWGN , the desired probability of a pure noise signal exceeding the
threshold ηpid.
Except for the threshold check against ηdetect, which is omitted, the remaining steps of the
baseline method are unchanged. In contrast to the original PID description in [81], where
the involved thresholds were obtained through extensive simulations, our algorithm uses the
explicit threshold computation of equation (6.7) 1.
1. The so-called elementary threshold from [81] corresponds to ηpid and the main threshold is omitted as we
simply track the maximum over blocks of the correlation output.
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Figure 6.1: Auto-correlation and cross-correlation of the two IEEE 802.15.4a preamble codes
5 and 6 of length C = 31 when non-coherent reception is used. The cross-correlation shows 10
peaks per period that may cause false alarms.
Fine Timing Acquisition
Fine synchronization is identical to the one for the baseline method (Sections 6.2.1 and 4.2.1)
with the only difference that a different threshold check needs to be applied. The output of the
correlation (6.6) is now distributed according to a binomial distribution with parameters CNZ ·
NG and P FA,PIDAWGN , yielding the following threshold that replaces ηdetect during fine synchronization
ηfinepid =
N0
2
F−1BIN(1− P FA,PID,fineAWGN |CNZNG, P FA,PIDAWGN ). (6.8)
P FA,PID,fineAWGN is the probability that a pure noise signal exceeds the fine timing acquisition thresh-
old ηfinepid , CNZ are the number of nonzero code symbols in the preamble code and F−1BIN(x|n, p)
is the inverse of the CDF of a binomial distribution with parameters n and p.
6.2.3 Preamble Code Interference Cancelation
The two IEEE 802.15.4a preamble codes used per frequency band do not have a perfect cross-
correlation as we have shown in Chapter 4 (see Insight 3 of Chapter 4). This is shown once more
in Figure 6.1 for the code sequences 5 and 6, of length C = 31. While code 5 has a periodic
auto-correlation with only one peak per period, its cross-correlation with code 6 shows 10 peaks
per period. These cross-correlation peaks can generate FAs or MDs for a receiver using code
5. The resulting performance loss is significant, as we will see in Section 6.4.
Note that such cross-correlation peaks are not an anomaly of the IEEE 802.15.4a preamble
codes per se, but rather inherent to any pseudo-random binary sequences with perfect autocor-
relation. Although the design of optimal code sequences is a vast research area on its own and
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therefore out of the scope of this thesis (and the codes of the standard have anyway already
been fixed), we note that the cross-correlation of, e.g., codes 5 and 6, is already optimal in the
sense that it is only three-valued and that the correlation peaks are of minimal value. For an
in-depth introduction to pseudo-random sequences and their properties, we refer the reader to
[171].
The PICNIC algorithm attempts to detect and cancel out interference that is due to these
cross-correlation peaks by looking for the pattern of the cross-correlation and subtracting it
from the correlation output if it is found present. PICNIC essentially pre-processes each block
zi, obtained from the PID correlation output in (6.6), before handing it over to the coarse
synchronization. For convenience, we omit the index i from here on. If interference is present,
z contains Cpeak sub-blocks of length M with high energy, corresponding to the Cpeak peaks in
the cross-correlation. It also contains Ctrough sub-blocks with low energy, corresponding to the
Ctrough troughs in the cross-correlation. The remaining Cmid = C − Cpeak − Ctrough blocks have
a medium energy level. The algorithm proceeds in three steps: 1) compare the positions of
the high-, medium- and low-energy sub-blocks with the cross-correlation and decide whether
interference is present 2) if present, find the exact beginning of the sub-blocks such that 3) sub-
blocks with similar energy levels can be averaged yielding an estimate of the channel-energy
delay profile that can be subtracted. These steps are detailed in the following and illustrated
in Figure 6.2. In what follows, the mandatory frequency band 3 with codes 5 and 6 serves
as an example. However, the method equally applies to the other frequency bands with other
codes. Also, as IEEE 802.15.4a allows two codes per frequency band, the knowledge of a
single cross-correlation per band is sufficient.
Detecting the Presence of an Interfering Preamble Code
PICNIC tries to identify sub-blocks with energy levels corresponding to the cross-correlation
pattern. Two ternary vectors of lengthC, xterncross and ztern are correlated, representing the different
energy levels of the cross-correlation and of the C sub-blocks of z, respectively.
ztern is constructed from z (see Figure 6.2-1 for an illustration) by first determining the
maximum over every sub-block of length M yielding vector zmax with elements
zmaxj = max(zjM , zjM+1, . . . , z(j+1)M−1), j ∈ {0, . . . , C − 1}
Second, zmax is converted to the ternary vector ztern by replacing its Cpeak highest values with
“+1”, its Ctrough lowest values with “-1” and the rest with “0”. The cross-correlation (shown in
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Figure 6.2: Three steps of the PICNIC algorithm to cancel the effect of interfering code: 1)
Interference is detected by matching cross-correlation pattern to high-, mid- and low-energy
blocks in the correlation output. (2) Time-base is aligned on the interferer to find beginning
of blocks via a search-back algorithm. 3) Channel energy-delay profile to be subtracted is
calculated separately for high-, mid- and low-energy blocks via robust method based on order
statistics.
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Figure 6.1 for codes 5 and 6) is mapped to a ternary vector xterncross following the same procedure.
To detect interference, ztern is correlated with xterncross and the maximum of the correlation is
compared with the interference detection threshold
ηpicnic = ⌊Cpeak + Ctrough
2
⌋+ 1
i.e., we test that more than half of the peaks and troughs of the cross-correlation correspond
to the peaks and troughs of the sample vector. If the maximum is above ηpicnic, we assume
that interference is present and continue the algorithm. Otherwise, we continue the timing
acquisition according to the PID method.
Note that all of the IEEE 802.15.4a preamble codes have a structure similar to codes 5 and
6 whose cross-correlation is shown in Figure 6.1. The same holds for the respective cross-
correlations. For every preamble code pair that is assigned to the same frequency band, we can
thus identify Cpeak peaks and Ctrough troughs. The method described here thus not only applies
to the mandatory codes 5 and 6 but can directly be applied to other IEEE 802.15.4a codes as
well.
Determination of the First Multipath Component
If interference is present, it needs to be subtracted from the vector z. Hence, a rough estimate
of the channel energy-delay profile of the interfering signal must be obtained. This implies that
the first multipath component of the interfering signal must be found. We use a jump-back-
and-search-forward procedure similar to the one used in the fine timing acquisition algorithm
of the PID (Section 6.2.2).
First, using a majority vote on the indices of the samples zmaxj of the Cpeak high energy
sub-blocks corresponding to a “+1” in ztern, the index of the strongest path into a sub-block
of size M is determined. Second, for each of the Cpeak high-energy sub-blocks, we start from
the strongest path and search in a window of length W = M/2 the first path above the noise
threshold given by
ηjumppicnic =
N0
2
F−1BIN(1− P FA,PICNICAWGN |CNZNG, P FA,PIDAWGN ). (6.9)
The binomial distribution with parameters CNZ · NG and P FA,PIDAWGN corresponds to the distribu-
tion of the correlation output (6.6) if only AWGN is present. The threshold is set by fixing
P FA,PICNICAWGN , the probability that AWGN can exceed the threshold. Finally, the first path index is
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the lowest one found by more than half of the Cpeak individual search procedures.
Interference Cancelation by Subtraction of the Estimated Channel Energy Delay Profile
When aligned with the interfering signal, z is split up into Cpeak high-energy sub-blocks, Ctrough
low-energy sub-blocks and Cmid medium-energy sub-blocks. The signal is wrapped around
if needed (see Figure 6.2 for the first low-energy sub-block). Then, the energy-delay pro-
file qhigh = {qhigh0 , qhigh1 , . . . , qhighM−1} is estimated for the high-energy sub-blocks, similar to the
robust channel estimation algorithm using the median that was presented in Section 5.2.1 of
Chapter 5.
Let zhighj,m denote the m-th sample of the j-th high-energy sub-block. We find qhigh according
to
qhighm = median
{
zhighj,m : j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Cpeak − 1}
}
− v¯PICNICAWGN (6.10)
where the median is used instead of the mean to be robust to outliers (which might include
e.g. the signal of the UOI that we do not want to subtract) and v¯PICNICAWGN = CNZ · NG · P FA,PIDAWGN is
the expected noise level at the output of the correlation (6.6). To cancel interference, we can
now subtract qhigh from all the high-energy sub-blocks in z. We then proceed similarly for the
medium- and low-energy sub-blocks.
6.3 Start Frame Delimiter Detection Algorithms
After timing acquisition, the receiver knows the beginning of a preamble symbol. It may then
perform channel estimation, e.g., according to the robust procedure that we introduced in Sec-
tion 5.2.1 of Chapter 5. Still, the receiver does not know exactly how many preamble symbols
where used up during timing acquisition 2. Assuming that packet detection and timing acqui-
sition were performed perfectly, the TOA is now of the form ν0 = N∆ · CLsTc, i.e., the only
uncertainty on the TOA is the number of preamble symbols N∆ used during timing acquisition.
To simplify notation we will in what follows make the equivalent assumption that ν0 = 0 but
that the number of preamble symbols Nsync sent in the SYNC part of the preamble is unknown.
To provide the receiver with a means to detect the end of the preamble and the beginning of
the payload, the end of the preamble is marked with the special SFD sequence (see Section 2.4.2
or the system model in this chapter). After channel estimation, the receiver starts to look for
2. Due to changing channel conditions or interference, the number of preamble symbols required to acquire
timing may differ significantly.
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the SFD. Once the SFD has been detected, decoding of the data bits of the payload can start.
In the following, we will introduce different SFD detection algorithms, that we will later
compare in both a single user and in a multi user setting.
6.3.1 Algorithm Based on Correlation with Bipolar Template
In Chapter 4 we introduced an SFD detection method that is based on correlation of the received
signal ypremm with a bipolar template that is derived from the SFD code s
(sfd)
i . Although this
algorithm yields an acceptable performance if no MUI is present (Section 4.3.1) it is not robust
to MUI due to multiple reasons (Insight 2, Insight 4 and Insight 5 of Section 4.3).
In the following, we will see that even in a single user setting without MUI, there are several
algorithms that significantly outperform the correlation based algorithm. We will therefore not
revisit this algorithm here, but rather refer the interested reader to Section 4.2.3 of Chapter 4
for a detailed description of the correlation based SFD detection method.
6.3.2 Algorithms Based on Sequential Decoding of Preamble Symbols
An alternative to detecting the SFD through a correlation procedure is to look at SFD detec-
tion as a decoding problem. With this approach, the receiver decodes Nsfd consecutive received
preamble symbols and tries to determine whether they correspond to the squared SFD sequence
s2(sfd) = (s
2(sfd)
0 , . . . , s
2(sfd)
Nsfd−1). The square operation occurs because we have a non-coherent re-
ceiver. Further, we know from Chapter 5 that thresholding can effectively mitigate interference
during data decoding and we can therefore hope to reuse similar concepts for robust SFD de-
tection.
Online Algorithm
We propose an online algorithm that sequentially processes preamble symbols as they are re-
ceived. For each received preamble symbol, the algorithm calculates a series of likelihood-ratio
tests. Based on the results of these tests, it decides whether to stop (if it estimates that it de-
tected the SFD) or whether to continue receiving preamble symbols (if it estimates that the SFD
is still to come). Because of the way our algorithm works we call it DESSERT for "detection
of SFD through sequential ratio tests".
The DESSERT algorithm proceeds by sequentially considering blocks of Nsfd preamble
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symbols. The k-th block can be represented as a vector of consecutive samples
yk = (y
pre
kCM , y
pre
kCM+1 . . . , y
pre
(k+Nsfd)CM−1) (6.11)
Every sample of the energy-detection receiver output is distributed according to a scaled
non-central chi-square distribution with 2BT degrees of freedom and non-centrality parameter
pm
N0/2
(see Section 2.3.3 in the system model chapter) with pm given by
pm =
∫ (m+1)T
mT
[x˜pre(t)]
2 dt. (6.12)
Plugging (6.2) into (6.12) and assuming no inter-pulse interference (i.e., h˜(t) = 0, ∀t <
0, ∀t > LsTc), we obtain
pm = s
2
⌊ m
CM
⌋ · c2⌊m
M
⌋ mod C · qm mod M (6.13)
with
qm =
∫ (m+1)T
mT
[h˜(t)]2 dt, m ∈ {0, 1 . . . ,M − 1}. (6.14)
The coefficient qm represents the energy-delay profile of the channel and can be estimated in a
robust fashion following the procedure proposed in Chapter 5 3.
Assuming independence between samples yprem , it follows that for the k-th block of Nsfd
consecutive preamble symbols
f(yk|Θ, s2k) =
∏
i,j,m
1
N0/2
fNCχ2
(y(k+i)CM+jM+m
N0/2
∣∣∣2BT, s2k+ic2jqm
N0/2
)
, (6.15)
where i ∈ {0, . . . , Nsfd−1}, j ∈ {0, . . . , C−1} andm ∈ {0, . . . ,M−1}. Θ = (N0/2, BT, qm)
contains only quantities that are either known or can be estimated robustly. Finally, s2
k
is defined
as
s2
k
= (s2k, . . . , s
2
k+Nsfd−1) (6.16)
Due to the structure of the preamble given by (6.3), only Nsfd + 1 sequences are possibly
3. During the preamble we are in the case Ncpb = 1 and qm thus corresponds to the coefficient w(0)m . This
coefficient can be estimated in an interference robust way from the energy-detection receiver output according to
equation (5.22)
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observable for s2
k
, namely
s2
k
=


s2(sfd) if k = Nsync
(1, s
2(sfd)
0 , . . . , s
2(sfd)
Nsfd−2) if k = Nsync − 1
(1, 1, s
2(sfd)
0 , . . . , s
2(sfd)
Nsfd−3) if k = Nsync − 2
. . . . . .
(1, 1, . . . , 1, s
2(sfd)
0 ) if k = Nsync −Nsfd + 1
(1, 1, . . . , 1) otherwise.
(6.17)
Further, Nsfd is usually small (Nsfd = 8 for the mandatory mode of the IEEE 802.15.4a stan-
dard). For every block yk the DESSERT algorithm calculates the likelihood of each of the
Nsfd + 1 possible sequences according to (6.15) and declares presence of the SFD if the se-
quence with maximum likelihood is s2(sfd). In other words, the SFD is detected if
s2(sfd) = argmax
s2
k
f(yk|Θ, s2k) (6.18)
which is equivalent to
ln(f(yk|Θ, s2(sfd))) ≥ ln(f(yk|Θ, s2k)), ∀s2k (6.19)
Combining (6.15) and (6.19), this can be expressed as the following log-likelihood ratio
LLRsfd(yk|Θ, s2k) = ln(f(yk|Θ, s2(sfd)))− ln(f(yk|Θ, s2k))
=
∑
j,m
∑
i
s
2(sfd)
i 6=s2k+i
(2s
2(sfd)
i − 1) · LLR(y(k+i)CM+jM+m|N0/2, 2BT, c2jqm)
≥ 0, ∀s2
k
(6.20)
where
LLR(ym|N0/2, 2BT, qm) = ln

fNCχ2
(
ym
N0/2
∣∣∣2BT, qmN0/2)
fχ2
(
ym
N0/2
∣∣∣2BT)


= ln
[
0F1
(
;BT ;
qmym
N20
)]
− qm
N0
(6.21)
corresponds to the log-likelihood ratio leading to the optimal decision rule for payload demod-
104 6. Robust Synchronization Algorithms for IEEE 802.15.4a
ulation, which we already encountered in Equation (5.6) of Chapter 5. For a fast and efficient
evaluation, a tabulated version of the logarithm of the confluent hypergeometric limit function
ln [0F1 (;BT ; x)] would have to be stored in a practical receiver.
If the SFD is found present, the algorithm stops and payload decoding can begin. Otherwise
the algorithm continues by receiving the next preamble symbol. If the SFD is not found during
a maximum of Nsync preamble symbols, the algorithm can safely assume that it must have
missed the SFD. In this case reception of the packet is abandoned and the receiver goes back to
packet detection and timing acquisition mode.
Note that due to the independence assumption, the contribution of every sample to the
likelihood (6.15) can be computed individually, sample by sample.
The algorithm explained so far uses soft-decision decoding. It compares the soft log-
likelihood ratios of the possible observable sequences s2
k
and tests whether the sequence corre-
sponding to the SFD is the one with the highest log-likelihood. Evidently it is also possible to
adapt the algorithm such that is uses hard-decision decoding when testing for the most likely se-
quence. In the case of hard-decision decoding, every preamble symbol is decoded individually,
yielding the sequence of blocks of decoded preamble symbols sˆ2k
sˆ2
k
= (sˆ2k, . . . , sˆ
2
k+Nsfd−1) (6.22)
The preamble symbols are decoded according to the optimal OOK decision rule
∑
j,m
LLR(ykCM+jM+m|N0/2, 2BT, c2jqm)
sˆ2k=1
≷
sˆ2k=0
0 (6.23)
With hard-decision decoding, the DESSERT algorithm calculates the Hamming distance be-
tween the decoded sequence sˆ2
k
and each of the possible sequences given by (6.17). If the
sequence closest to sˆ2
k
is s2(sfd) and no other sequence is equally close, detection of the SFD is
declared and the algorithm stops.
Offline Algorithm
An offline algorithm to detect the SFD was proposed in [111]. The algorithm is similar in
nature to our DESSERT algorithm with hard-decision decoding. The algorithm from [111]
also decodes preamble symbols according to the decision rule in (6.23). However, it does not
decide on the presence of the SFD in an online fashion. Rather, it stores decoded preamble
symbols sˆ2k in memory. It does so until it has received Nmem preamble symbols. Nmem is
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chosen such that it is ensured that the Nmem preamble symbols contain the SFD. The algorithm
then goes through the stored decoded preamble symbols and calculates the Hamming distance
between every block sˆ2
k
, k ∈ {0, . . . , Nmem −Nsfd}, and the SFD sequence s2(sfd). Detection of
the SFD is declared at the position k where the Hamming distance is minimal. [111] does not
specify what happens if we encounter several minima. In our implementation we in this case
declare the SFD at the earliest (in time) position with minimal Hamming distance.
The drawback of such an offline algorithm is that the SFD is not detected instantly but
only after an important part of the payload has already been received. This is because Nmem
has to be chosen large enough such that it for sure contains the SFD. This in turn makes the
search window within which the algorithm looks for the SFD extend into the payload part of the
packet. Consequently, this leaves the receiver with two options, both of which are suboptimal:
1. Received samples are stored in memory until the SFD is detected which is impractical
if not infeasible. The portion of stored samples that eventually turn out to belong to the
payload can only be processed for payload decoding once the position of the SFD is
known
2. Payload decoding is performed in parallel to SFD detection, putting additional stress on
the receiver. Decoded symbols that turn out to belong to the preamble once the SFD is
detected, are discarded. The receiver thus also performs part of the work in vain.
For the offline algorithm it is also possible to define a detection criterion that is based
on a soft metric instead of the Hamming distance. We propose to use the following metric,
borrowing from the soft metric (6.20) used in the DESSERT algorithm
LLRoffsfd(yk|Θ) =
∑
i,j,m
(2s
2(sfd)
i − 1) · LLR(y(k+i)CM+jM+m|N0/2, 2BT, c2jqm) (6.24)
With the soft metric, the offline algorithm decides on the index k for which (6.24) is maximal.
An alternative would be to directly use the absolute log-likelihood function of the SFD se-
quence, ln(f(yk|Θ, s2(sfd))), as a metric for the soft version of the offline algorithm. However,
this approach does not work well as we will see in Section 6.4.
6.3.3 Improving Robustness to MUI
None of the algorithms presented so far is a priori robust to MUI. However, for algorithms
that are based on decoding we may be able to reuse ideas that proved to successfully mitigate
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interference during payload decoding. Since SFD detection according to both the DESSERT
and the offline algorithm requires the estimation of the same parameters as payload decoding,
it seems only natural to adopt the robust parameter estimation using order statistics that we
described in Section 5.2.1 of Chapter 5.
In addition, the adaptive thresholding scheme to reject strong interference terms proposed
in Section 5.2 can also be employed. The receiver can calculate the adaptive threshold
ηsfdm =
Nˆ0
2
F−1NCχ2(1− P FA,SFDMUI |2BT,
qˆm
Nˆ0/2
) (6.25)
that governs the non-linearity
g(yprem |qˆm, Nˆ0/2) =
{
yprem ∀m : yprem ≤ ηsfdm
qˆm ∀m : yprem > ηsfdm
(6.26)
In the DESSERT and in the offline algorithm, g(yprem |qˆm, Nˆ0/2) can then be used in place of yprem .
Other non-linear operations are of course also possible. We also considered erasing samples
that exceed the threshold such that they do not contribute to the decision. However, since we
could not find any noticeable performance difference between different schemes, we adopted
the same scheme that we already used for decoding and that is given in (6.26).
6.4 Performance Evaluation
Like in the chapters before, we use packet-based IEEE 802.15.4a system simulations to eval-
uate the performance. We simulate one receiver and Nu transmitters. Each of the transmitters
generates packets according to a Poisson process with rate R = 100 packets/s. At the maxi-
mum allowed packet size with a payload of 1016 information bits, this corresponds to roughly
half the peak rate (see Section 2.5.2). Two types of interfering users are simulated: Near-far
interferers with a power level 10 dB higher than the UOI and equal power interferers with a
power level equal to the UOI.
We consider the mandatory LPRF mode of IEEE 802.15.4a with channel number 3. The
corresponding preamble codes 5 and 6 have a length of C = 31 and the cross-correlation pattern
shown in Figure 6.1. The preamble has the default length of Nsync = 64 code repetitions during
the SYNC part, followed by the Nsfd = 8 symbols forming the SFD. Our receiver has an
integration time of T = Tc, but all algorithms would also allow for longer integration times.
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The propagation channel is modeled according to the IEEE 802.15.4a residential NLOS
(CM2) and the office LOS (CM3) channel models [14]. However, the results of NLOS and
LOS being very similar, we mostly only show the results for NLOS.
The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is defined as SNR = Ep
N0
where Ep is the received energy per
pulse (after the convolution of the pulse with the impulse response of the channel). Confidence
intervals shown are at the 95% level.
6.4.1 Performance of Packet Detection and Timing Acquisition
For packet detection and timing acquisition, the receiver uses a template with NG = 10 rep-
etitions of the code and performs NV = 16 verification steps. This set of parameters, found
through simulations, keeps timing acquisition fast enough such that other tasks, e.g., channel
estimation, can still be performed on the preamble. Channel estimation is performed according
to the methods explained in Chapter 5 and lasts for NCH = 16 preamble symbols.
The probabilities that set the sensitivity of the various thresholds during timing acquisition
correspond to P FAAWGN = 1e − 3, P FA,PIDAWGN = 0.2, P FA,PID,fineAWGN = 1e − 4. Extensive simulations
showed that a wide range of values gives similar performance, as long as P FA,PIDAWGN is not set too
low.
Our main performance metric is the packet acquisition error rate (ACQER) which includes
FAs and MDs. A packet is correctly acquired if the receiver synchronizes on a multipath
component of the correct preamble code symbol.
Coarse Timing Acquisition
Figure 6.3 shows the performance of the different algorithms in a near-far scenario with two
near interferers (Nu = 3). The two interferers use preamble code 6, the UOI uses code 5. The
baseline method is not robust: More than 10% of the packets are lost due to interference. On the
other hand, the PID method is able to reduce the impact of large interference terms generated
by interfering preambles or payloads of the near interferers. The ACQER is improved by about
one order of magnitude at high SNR. Still, even with the PID and the use of different preamble
codes, FAs occur due to the imperfect cross-correlation. The PICNIC algorithm reduces this
type of interference, we gain another order of magnitude. For reference, we show the single
user performance of both the baseline and the PICNIC method. Single user performance of the
PID method is identical to PICNIC. In this case, the PICNIC algorithm performs slightly worse
than the baseline method, which is due to the fact that the threshold ηpid here also removes some
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Figure 6.3: ACQER for the different algorithms with two interferers in a near-far configuration.
Preamble codes of interferes differ from the one of the UOI. The baseline method is not robust.
PID is able to reduce strong interference. Interference due to imperfect cross-correlation is only
reduced by the PICNIC method, yielding a gain of up to two orders of magnitude.
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Figure 6.4: ACQER for the different algorithms with two interferers in an equal power config-
uration. Preamble codes of interferes differ from the one of the UOI. PID and baseline method
perform the same since all of the errors are caused by interference due to imperfect cross-
correlation. This type of interference is only reduced by the PICNIC method, yielding again a
significant improvement.
useful signal information.
Figure 6.4 shows performance for two interferers with different codes, but with power lev-
els equal to the UOI. In the interference limited SNR regions, the PID and the baseline methods
have equal performance and show an error floor due to the imperfect cross-correlation. In this
case interference is not high enough to dominate the output of the correlation. Consequently,
the PID does not improve the performance since all of the acquisition errors are due to the
imperfect cross-correlation. The PICNIC method again significantly reduces this type of inter-
ference.
If all transmitters use the same preamble codes, lots of FAs occur because the receiver can-
not distinguishing an interfering signal from the signal of the UOI (see also Section 4.3.5).
Independently of the algorithms used, the ACQER is consequently very high (around 15%).
A more meaningful metric is needed that allows for the quantification of the capture effect
capabilities of the receiver. We define the capture error rate (CER) as the probability that a
UOI packet is lost and the receiver does not correctly acquire an interfering packet either. Our
simulation results show that if two packets arrive at the receiver at about the same time, the one
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Figure 6.5: Worst case scenario to assess capture effect: One equal power interferer using the
same code as the UOI. Further, the interferer is always present and starts its transmission at
about the same time as the UOI. Still, the probability that we acquire neither of the two is
below 5%.
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Figure 6.6: Probability of neither acquiring the UOI nor an interferer for two interferers with
same code and same power level as the UOI. All algorithms show a good capture effect.
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Figure 6.7: Empirical PDF of synchronization error after fine timing acquisition with the base-
line algorithm. Results shown are for the near-far configuration at SNR = 10 dB. FAs occur
at the beginning of the search-back window of size W =M/2 = 64 ns.
with higher power is usually acquired. The hardest case is when these two packets have similar
power levels. The verification phase may then never succeeds because the receiver switches
back and forth between the two packets. To evaluate this scenario we simulate an equal-power
interferer that is always present and always starts at about the same time as the UOI. The results
are shown in Figure 6.5. For both baseline and PID (PICNIC is not shown because it coincides
with PID if identical preamble codes are used), capture is above 95% at high SNR. One effect
that helps here is that even though the two users have the same power level, the received ener-
gies are distributed differently because of the different propagation channels. Further, we see
that baseline performs even a bit better than PID. We attribute this to the fact that the PID, to
some extent, levels out different power levels through the thresholding operation on the corre-
lation input. Figure 6.6 also shows the equal power scenario with identical preamble codes but
here again with three users that generate packets according to a Poisson process and use the
IEEE 802.15.4a Aloha back-off procedure.
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Figure 6.8: Empirical PDF of synchronization error after fine timing acquisition with the PIC-
NIC algorithm (near-far configuration at SNR = 10 dB). PICNIC prevents FAs, resulting in
more accurate synchronization.
Fine Timing Acquisition
Figures 6.7 and 6.8 show the empirical PDF of the fine timing acquisition error after the jump-
back-and-search-forward algorithm for the baseline and PICNIC algorithm, respectively. The
PDFs shown are for packets that were correctly acquired during coarse acquisition in the near-
far scenario with different codes and at an SNR of 10 dB. The search-back window that we
fixed to W = M/2 = 64 ns in our simulations, results in the tail at the left of the distribution.
We can clearly see in Figure 6.7 that the baseline algorithm is vulnerable to FAs during fine
timing acquisition. These FAs are caused by high interference terms and lead the receiver
to synchronize to early. Using the PICNIC algorithm clearly limits these FAs, which can be
observed in Figure 6.8. We can also see in both cases that synchronization accuracy is better
with the LOS channel, which of course is to be expected.
Please note that our algorithm and especially the choice of W is optimized for communi-
cation rather than ranging. Still, we get a rather good synchronization accuracy even under
severe interference as can be seen from the values summarized in Table 6.1. The values shown
in the table are again for the near-far case with different codes at 10 dB. Further, they were
obtained with the NLOS channel model. Here we see again that the baseline method performs
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Algorithm RMSE Mean 50% 75% 90%
Baseline 22.8ns 11.0ns < 1.1 ns < 5.5 ns < 52.6 ns
PID 9.2ns 3.7ns < 0.9 ns < 2.9 ns < 9.1 ns
PICNIC 10.0ns 4.0ns < 0.9 ns < 2.9 ns < 9.5 ns
Table 6.1: Precision of the synchronization for NLOS and two near interferers.
worse because a lot of FAs occur inside window W due to large interfering terms that exceed
the threshold. Remember that all the values are calculated over all correctly acquired packets.
In the case of PICNIC this includes more packets with interference than in the case of the PID,
which explains why PID here seemingly has a slightly better accuracy.
6.4.2 SFD Detection and Overall Synchronization Performance
In the following, we will evaluate the performance of the different SFD detection algorithms.
All of the following results include packet detection and timing acquisition, which is done ac-
cording to either the baseline or the PICNIC algorithm. Therefore, the following results show
the overall synchronization performance, which we measure in terms of the synchronization
error rate (SER). The SER is the percentage of packets that were missed because of synchro-
nization errors. It includes both, FAs and MDs.
Single User Performance
Figure 6.9 shows the performance of the different SFD detection algorithms if no MUI is
present. Timing acquisition is performed according to the baseline algorithm which has the
best single user performance.
Interestingly, the performance of the online DESSERT algorithm is almost undistinguish-
able from the offline algorithm. For both the DESSERT and the offline algorithm, the versions
using the soft metric perform slightly better than the hard ones. However, this difference is
negligible.
As already pointed out shortly, the offline algorithm using the log-likelihood directly as a
metric does not work very well. This is the case because if only the absolute log-likelihood
function is considered, a few samples that fit, e.g., the noise-only hypothesis very well are able
to dominate the likelihood function leading to detection of the SFD at the wrong position.
Finally, we observe that the algorithms based on sequential decoding outperform the cor-
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Figure 6.9: Single user performance of different SFD detection algorithms. The online
DESSERT algorithms perform very close to their more complicated offline counterparts.
relation based algorithm from Chapter 4. Due to the fact that there is already a considerable
performance difference of roughly 2.5 dB in the single user case, we will in the following no
longer consider the correlation based algorithm.
Performance under Multi-User Interference
To assess the performance with MUI, we again consider a near-far and an equal power setting
with Nu = 3 users. We here only consider the four algorithms based on decoding that had
similar single user performance. As a reference we also show the performance of a receiver
that does not perform any form of interference mitigation. The reference receiver uses the
baseline algorithm for timing acquisition and estimates the channel parameters according to
Section 5.1.2 which is not robust to MUI. Finally, it performs SFD detection with the DESSERT
algorithm using soft decoding but no thresholding.
Figure 6.10 shows the SER for the four algorithms in the near-far setting if no thresholding
is used to reject interference during SFD detection. Channel estimation, however, is performed
in a robust fashion and so is timing acquisition which is performed according to the PICNIC
algorithm. The online algorithms show similar performance and they are not robust to MUI.
Robust channel estimation alone gives only a minor performance improvement compared to
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Figure 6.10: Performance of online DESSERT algorithms and their offline counterparts in
a near-far setting with 3 users. None of the algorithms uses thresholding to mitigate high
interference terms. The only algorithm that is robust to MUI is the offline algorithm using the
soft metric.
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Figure 6.11: Scenario of Figure 6.10 but now all of the algorithms apply a threshold to mitigate
interference. They all show a good robustness against MUI but the soft offline algorithm again
has a performance advantage throughout the whole SNR range.
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Figure 6.12: Performance of online DESSERT algorithms and their offline counterparts in an
equal power setting with 3 users. None of the algorithms uses thresholding to mitigate high
interference terms. Still, interference is not high enough to significantly affect SFD detection
with any of the four algorithms considered.
the reference receiver, making any gain achieved during timing acquisition void. The offline
algorithm based on hard decoding shows a slight gain but is not very robust to MUI either.
The offline algorithm using soft decoding on the other hand clearly outperforms all of the other
algorithms. It already shows a decent robustness against MUI. At high SNR, it achieves an
SER improvement of more than one order of magnitude with respect to the reference receiver.
At low SNRs it outperforms the other algorithms by 2 dB.
Figure 6.11 shows again the same near-far settings but this time all of the receivers except
for the reference receiver employ a threshold to reject high interference terms during SFD
detection. The probability that governs the adaptive threshold is set to P FA,SFDMUI = 0.01. This
value was found through simulations and shows a good performance over various interference
scenarios.
The online algorithms profit the most from the use of the threshold. They now also perform
over one order of magnitude better than the reference receiver. The offline algorithms also
improve. The one using hard decoding performs similar to the online algorithms. The one
using soft decoding is now even two orders of magnitude better than the reference receiver in
the interference limited SNR region.
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Figure 6.13: Scenario of Figure 6.12 but now all of the algorithms apply a threshold to mitigate
interference. With respect to Figure 6.12, a minor improvement for the online algorithms can
be observed.
None of the algorithms is severely affected by the weaker interference in the equal power
setting. This can be seen in Figure 6.12 where all the algorithms have a decent performance
despite the fact that no threshold is used during SFD detection. Further they all perform simi-
larly with the exception of the soft online algorithm that again shows a 2 dB gain at low SNR.
Also note that at high SNR at least the offline algorithms already have an SER that is close to
the corresponding ACQER of PICNIC shown in Figure 6.4. There are thus hardly any errors
due to SFD detection, but most of the remaining errors are due to timing acquisition. Conse-
quently, thresholding does not really improve the performance as can be seen in Figure 6.13.
The only slight improvement we see is for the online algorithms. All algorithms achieve a SER
improvement of just under two orders of magnitude with respect to the reference receiver that
does not use any form of interference mitigation.
As a conclusion, all of the four algorithms considered for robust SFD detection achieve
their goal of providing robustness against MUI. However, using the offline algorithm based
on hard decoding is not advisable since it performs the same as the online algorithms but at
a higher complexity. The two online algorithms are very similar, both in terms of complexity
and performance. The reason for similar complexity lies in the fact that both algorithms act on
the (soft) receiver output samples and require evaluation of the log-likelihood given by (6.21).
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The soft version is in this case preferable since it has a slightly better single user performance.
Finally, the soft version of the offline algorithm gives the best performance in every scenario
considered. We recommend using this algorithm if the 2 dB gain at low SNR is needed and if
the additional complexity with respect to the online algorithms is not an issue.
6.5 Conclusion and Possible Directions for Future Work
We presented PICNIC, a low-complexity algorithm for timing acquisition with an IR-UWB
energy-detection receiver in the presence of MUI. PICNIC uses a mixture of thresholding and
interference cancelation and outperforms classic timing acquisition algorithms by up to two
orders of magnitude if MUI is present. Furthermore, PICNIC exhibits a near perfect capture
property: if several transmitters compete for timing acquisition at the receiver, one signal will
be acquired with practically no missed detections. Such a property is very desirable in a net-
work where devices transmit concurrently without coordination.
We have also compared different SFD detection algorithms in both single and multi-user
settings. SFD detection is often neglected in the related work and we are not aware of any
other work comparing different strategies. We proposed a robust online algorithm based on
sequential decoding and showed that it can perform close to a more complicated offline version.
The only other interference robust synchronization algorithms for energy-detection receivers
that we are aware of are the non-linear filtering techniques used for TOA estimation in [83, 84].
It is easy to see that PICNIC could be combined with these techniques by filtering the signal at
the input or output of the correlation. Extending PICNIC in this fashion could be interesting to
further increase its robustness against MUI and is a possible direction for future work.
Chapter 7
Interference Mitigation by Statistical
Interference Modeling in an Impulse
Radio UWB Receiver
IR-UWB networks may be subject to concurrent transmissions without power control, e.g.,
due to MAC protocols that do not use power control, or coexisiting, non-coordinated piconets.
If uncontrolled, impulsive interference stemming from these concurrent transmissions is not
properly handled on the physical layer, receiver performance is severely hurt. We have seen
this in the case of the energy-detection receiver in Chapter 4. One option to prevent such
a performance loss is to mitigate interference through an adaptive thresholding mechanism.
With thresholding, the receiver defines a threshold that is based on the estimated power of the
signal of interest and the estimated level of the background noise. It then considers samples that
lie above the threshold as interference and limits their contribution. Chapter 5 shows that such
a mechanism is an effective means to mitigate MUI, even in the case of an energy-detection
receiver. Thresholding has also been shown to mitigate interference in coherent receivers [52,
54].
In this chapter we push a little bit further and explore whether interference mitigation can
be improved by assuming that MUI follows a given statistical model. It is known that due to
its impulsive nature, MUI in an IR-UWB system is not accurately modeled through a Gaussian
approximation [39, 41]. A Gaussian model is thus not well suited for our purpose. A popular
non-Gaussian model for MUI is the Gaussian mixture model (GMM), see, e.g., [58]. The GMM
assumes that the interference has an underlying probability distribution formed by a mixture
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of Gaussian distributions with different variances. Each interference term is then assumed
to be generated by one of these mixture components. The GMM thus seeks to classify each
sample and typically attributes samples with high interference to mixture components with high
variances. In [59], the GMM has been proposed as MUI model for IR-UWB and it has been
shown how to do channel and interference statistics estimation based on this model. We take
the approach taken in [59] one step further and propose a receiver that employs a GMM to
mitigate MUI in the decoding phase.
The GMM is a non-Gaussian model without memory. It assumes that the mixture compo-
nents are independently chosen. However, due to the multipath nature of the channel this is
not necessarily true because samples with a high interference level are likely to occur in bursts.
Therefore, we propose to introduce correlation by modeling the sequence of mixture compo-
nents with a homogeneous Markov chain. The resulting MUI model is a hidden Markov model
(HMM) where each state is associated with a Gaussian output distribution. The GMM is just a
special case of the more general HMM where the choice of the next state is independent of the
current state.
We derive the optimal receiver under both models and show that it has the structure of a
Rake receiver that penalizes interference terms through an appropriate weighting function. We
also show that in packet based systems, mitigation through interference modeling alone is not
always sufficient and that some kind of thresholding may still be needed. The resulting receiver
employs a combination of statistical interference modeling and thresholding and outperforms
solutions that do not mitigate interference or that only rely on a simple threshold. Finally, we
find that the HMM is indeed better suited than the GMM to model interference in IR-UWB.
However, the resulting performance difference is not huge and comes at the cost of increased
receiver complexity.
This chapter is organized as follows: In Section 7.1 we shortly review the system model
of the classical IR-UWB PHY that is used in this chapter. In Section 7.2 we introduce the
different non-Gaussian MUI models and derive the optimal receiver. Section 7.3 contains the
performance evaluation where the different methods and models are compared and their ability
to mitigate MUI in a realistic multipath environment is assessed. A conclusion is reached in
Section 7.4.
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7.1 System Model and Assumptions
In this chapter we are studying a classical IR-UWB PHY with time-hopping and BPSK mod-
ulation. We have seen in Section 2.2 that for such a system comprising Nu users, the received
signal can be written as
r(t) =
Ns−1∑
i=0
aih˜(t− cTHS,iTc − iTf − ν0) + v(t) (7.1)
where h˜(t) is the compound channel impulse response of the UOI and v(t) accounts for both,
MUI from the Nu − 1 interferers and AWGN background noise. PHY transmissions occur in
packets of Ns data symbols and ai ∈ {±1} is the ith symbol of the BPSK modulated data
sequence of the UOI. cTHS,i is the time-hopping sequence (THS) of the UOI. We assume that
each user has its own pseudo-random THS that is known at the receiver. We further require the
THS to be constrained such that no inter-symbol interference (ISI) occurs. The THS is integer
valued and uniformly distributed on [0, Nh − 1], where Nh is the number of chips of duration
Tc available for time-hopping. The length of a frame equals Tf = Nh ·Tc +Tg = (Nh +Ng) ·Tc
where Ng is the number of guard slots preventing ISI and Tg is the length of the guard interval.
Further, we will in the following assume that synchronization has been achieved by some means
and we therefore set ν0 = 0.
The coherent receiver filters the received signal with a bandlimiting filter of bandwidth B
and samples the resulting signal at the Nyquist frequency 1/T = 2B, yielding the discrete
signal
yn =
Ns−1∑
i=0
aih˜(nT − cTHS,iTc − iTf) + vn (7.2)
where vn = wn+nn with nn ∼ N (0, N0B) and wn denoting the contribution of the interferers.
Assuming that the guard interval is properly designed to prevent ISI and that Tc is an integer
multiple of T , with Tc = K · T , (7.2) can be written as
yn =
Ns−1∑
i=0
ai
M−1∑
m=0
qm · δn−K(cTHS,i+i(Nh+Ng))−m + vn (7.3)
where δn is the Kronecker delta and qm = h˜(mT ) is the discrete channel impulse response.
With this definition, M =
⌈
Tch
Tc
⌉
where Tch denotes the spread of the compound channel impulse
response. Equation (7.3) is the discrete time representation of our system and will be used
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throughout the rest of this paper.
7.2 Interference Mitigation
We are now going to introduce our solution to interference mitigation at the receiver. We are
following a data-aided approach, meaning that part of the data sequence, the training sequence,
is known to the receiver. The Ns data symbols of a physical layer packet are thus divided into
two parts: The first NCH symbols constitute the above mentioned training sequence (which is
typically short in comparison to the length of the packet), the remaining Npay samples contain
the information to be transmitted, the payload 1. Accordingly, our receiver proceeds in two
phases: A training phase and a data reception phase. In the training phase, the channel coeffi-
cients qm as well as the statistics of vn are estimated based on the known training sequence. In
the data reception phase, these estimates are then used to mitigate the effect of interference and
to recover the unknown data sequence.
7.2.1 Taxonomy of interference types
Before going into details of our receiver design, we analyze the different interference scenar-
ios we are facing. This gives us a better understanding of what can happen and where the
challenges are.
If interference occurs during packet reception, it must fall into one of the following three
categories:
1. Interference is present during both training and data reception (called interference of type
1 from here on)
2. Interference is present during training only (type 2)
3. Interference present during data reception only (type 3)
If the system we are going to design works perfectly, interference of type 1 should not pose
too big of a problem. Ideally we would estimate the interference during the training phase and
then deal with it during data reception. Interference of type 2 should do even less harm: we
1. We have seen in the previous chapters that in a complete system, there is at least a third part preceding the
training sequence. This part, the synchronization preamble, is used for signal acquisition and synchronization.
For simplicity, we here assume that synchronization has already been achieved perfectly and we therefore neglect
this part of the packet in the following. However, we still account for the presence of a synchronization preamble
in our performance evaluation, see section 7.3.
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have estimated it and are thus prepared to face it, but finally it is not even present during data
reception. Interference of type 3 however is more difficult to tackle. It is not present during
the training phase and we have thus no means to gather any knowledge about it whatsoever.
We will thus need some additional mechanism to take care of type 3 interference. We will
address estimation and mitigation of interference types 1 and 2 in subsections 7.2.3 and 7.2.4.
A possible solution to mitigate interference of type 3 is presented in Section 7.2.4.
7.2.2 Interference Models
We consider two ways of increasing complexity to model interference: the Gaussian mixture
model (GMM) and the hidden Markov model (HMM).
In the case of the GMM we assume that the interference and noise samples vn are i.i.d
random variables and that the vector v = (v0, . . . , vN−1) has underlying probability distribution
fGMM(v|Θv) =
N−1∏
n=0
P−1∑
p=0
λp · fN (vn|σ2p) (7.4)
where Θv is the vector of model parameters, Θv = (Λ,Σ) = (λ0, . . . , λP−1, σ20 , . . . , σ2P−1), P
is the model order specifying the number of mixture components, λp is the prior probability of
component p and fN (vn|σ2p) is the pth component density assumed to be zero-mean Gaussian
with variance σ2p, i.e. fN (vn|σ2p) = 1√2πσ2p exp(−v
2
n/2σ
2
p). The choice of a Gaussian with zero
mean is motivated by the fact the we are considering BPSK modulation. However even with a
modulation of nonzero mean, a random phase of the channel coefficients leads to samples of
zero-mean.
The HMM introduces correlation, the samples vn are no longer required to be indepen-
dent. In addition to the sample vector v, we now also have a hidden vector of states, x =
(x0, . . . , xN−1), with xn ∈ {0, . . . , P − 1}. To each state xn is associated a Gaussian compo-
nent density fN (vn|σ2xn) defined as in the GMM case. Each state xn determines which of the P
component densities generates the sample vn. The initial state is x0. It is described by the vec-
tor of initial state probabilitiesΠ with entries of the form πj = Pr(x0 = j), j ∈ {0, . . . , P −1}.
Transitions among the states occur according to a matrix of transition probabilitiesΨ. An entry
ψj,k = Pr(xn = k|xn−1 = j) of Ψ with j, k ∈ {0, . . . , P − 1} is the probability that sample vn
is generated by component density k, knowing that vn−1 was generated by component density
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j. The vector v then has the following probability distribution
fHMM(v|Θv) =
∑
x∈X
πx0fN (v0|σ2x0)
N−1∏
n=1
ψxn−1xnfN (vn|σ2xn) (7.5)
where X is the space of all possible state vectors and the vector of model parameters is now
Θv = (Π,Ψ,Σ). Note that the GMM is only a special case of the HMM with πj = λj and
ψj,k = λk.
7.2.3 Training phase
Here we show how to estimate the statistics of interference that is present during the training
phase (interference of types 1 and 2). In addition, we also estimate the channel. We thus want to
find the maximum-likelihood estimate ofΘ = (Θv,Θc) from the training sequence, whereΘv
stands for the parameters of the Interference model and Θc = (q0, . . . , qM−1) the parameters
of the channel 2. The discrete time received signal is given by (7.3) and we find the sequence
vn during the training phase as
vn = yn −
NCH−1∑
i=0
ai
M−1∑
m=0
qm · δn−K(cTHS,i+i(Nh+Ng))−m (7.6)
with n = 0, . . . , Ntrain − 1 and Ntrain = NCH · K · (Nh + Ng) the number of samples during
the training phase. Note that vn depends on the channel parameters. However, to ease notation,
we will write vn instead of vn(Θc) whenever possible. We can now formulate the maximum-
likelihood estimation problem as
Θˆ = argmax
Θ
ln(f(v|Θ)) (7.7)
where we chose to maximize the log-likelihood rather than the likelihood because it simplifies
expressions and where f is replaced by (7.4) or (7.5) depending on the interference model.
In general, direct maximization of (7.7) is difficult and the classical method of choice is the
EM-algorithm [172]. The EM-algorithm is an iterative algorithm used to find the maximum-
likelihood parameter estimate in situations where optimization of the likelihood function is
simplified by assuming the existence of hidden data x in addition to the observation v. The
2. In practice, the number of channel parameters can be significant. We will therefore not be able to estimate
all of them, and accept to only estimate the first few ones.
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complete-data log-likelihood is then defined as ln(f(v,x|Θ)).
In what follows we will denote current parameter estimates with a prime, e.g., λˆ′p denotes
the currently available estimate of λˆp.
The EM-algorithm loops over the following steps:
1. E-Step: calculate the conditional expectation of the complete-data log-likelihood with
respect to the hidden data x given the observed data v and the current parameter estimate
Θˆ′
Q(Θ, Θˆ′) = E
[
ln(f(v,x|Θ))∣∣v, Θˆ′] (7.8)
2. M-Step: find the new parameter estimate as
Θˆ = argmax
Θ
Q(Θ, Θˆ′) (7.9)
The parameter estimate found with the EM-algorithm is the solution of (7.7). Parameter Es-
timation for GMM and HMM by EM is a well-known and widely used procedure (see e.g.
[173]). We now give the resulting algorithms for the two models under consideration.
EM-algorithm for the GMM
The hidden data sequence is x = (x0, . . . , xNtrain−1) where xn ∈ {0, . . . , P −1} indicates which
component density generated generated sample vn. The random variables xn are thus i.i.d.
with Pr(xn = p) = λp. Following similar procedures as the ones described in [59, 173], the
algorithm looping over the following steps results
1. E-Step 1: calculate γp(n) = Pr(xn = p|vn, Θˆ′v, Θˆ′c)
2. M-Step 1: find the new parameter estimate Θˆv as
Θˆv = argmax
Θv
Q((Θv, Θˆ
′
c
), (Θˆ′
v
, Θˆ′
c
))
resulting in
λˆp =
1
N
Ntrain−1∑
n=0
γp(n), σˆ
2
p =
∑Ntrain−1
n=0 vn(Θˆc)
2 · γp(n)∑Ntrain−1
n=0 γp(n)
(7.10)
3. E-Step 2: calculate γp(n) = Pr(xn = p|vn, Θˆv, Θˆ′c)
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4. M-Step 2: compute qˆ0, . . . , qˆM−1 sequentially by
qˆ0 = argmax
q0
Q((Θˆv, (q0, qˆ
′
1, . . . , qˆ
′
M−1)), (Θˆv, Θˆ
′
c
))
qˆ1 = argmax
q1
Q((Θˆv, (qˆ0, q1, . . . , qˆ
′
M−1)), (Θˆv, Θˆ
′
c
))
and so on, resulting in
qˆm =
∑Ntrain−1
n=0 rn,msn,m
∑P−1
p=0
γp(n)
σˆ2p∑Ntrain−1
n=0 s
2
n,m
∑P−1
p=0
γp(n)
σˆ2p
(7.11)
In the above equations, γp(n) can be interpreted as the posterior probability that the interference
and noise sample vn was drawn from the Gaussian mixture with variance σ2p . It is given by
γp(n) = Pr(xn = p|vn, Θˆ′) =
λ′p · fN (vn(Θˆ′c)|σ2 ′p )∑P
p˜=0 λ
′
p˜ · fN (vn(Θˆ′c)|σ2 ′p˜ )
(7.12)
Finally, it can be shown that the two remaining quantities are given by
rn,m = yn −
NCH−1∑
i=0
ai
M−1∑
m˜=0
m˜6=m
qˆm˜ · δn−K(cTHS,i+i(Nh+Ng))−m˜ (7.13)
and
sn,m =
NCH−1∑
i=0
ai · δn−K(cTHS,i+i(Nh+Ng))−m. (7.14)
Note that this is a modified version of the EM-algorithm that alternates between updating
the interference model parameters Θˆv and updating the channel parameters Θˆc. This simplifies
the joint maximization of the parameters and is known as the space-alternating generalized
EM-algorithm (SAGE) [174]. Also note that for the same reason the joint maximization of the
channel parameters was replaced by a sequentially updating heuristic.
EM-algorithm for the HMM
In case of the HMM the hidden data sequence x = (x0, . . . , xNtrain−1) corresponds to the hidden
sequence of states. The random variables xn ∈ {0, . . . , P − 1} thus form a homogeneous
Markov chain with initial state probabilitiesΠ and transition matrixΨ. The resulting algorithm
turns out to have the same structure as in the case of the GMM. For a derivation of the update
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equations, the reader is referred to [173]. The update equations are
πˆp = γp(0), ψˆj,k =
∑Ntrain−1
n=0 ξj,k(n)∑Ntrain−1
n=0 γp(n)
(7.15)
σˆ2p and qˆm are found to be given again by (7.10) and (7.11). As opposed to the GMM we now
have to calculate two quantities, γp(n) = Pr(xn = p|vn, Θˆ′) and ξj,k(n) = Pr(xn−1 = j, xn =
k|vn, Θˆ′), during the E-step. Further there exists no closed form expression for the above
quantities. However they can be determined via an iterative method known as the forward-
backward or Baum-Welch algorithm [175].
7.2.4 Data Reception Phase
After having estimated the parameters of the interference model and the channel parameters,
we can now use these estimates to recover the data sequence. In the following we are first
going to show how interference of types 1 and 2 can be mitigated. This is done by using a
decoder that takes advantage of the estimated interference model. We will then explain why
this interference mitigation procedure is not effective against interference of type 3 and propose
a possible solution. At the end of this subsection we will finally give the complete algorithm
for the data reception phase.
Decoding using statistical interference modeling
Similar to the training phase, the sequence of the noise and interference terms during data
reception is given by
vn = yn+Ntrain −
Ns−1∑
i=NCH
ai
M−1∑
m=0
qm · δn+Ntrain−K(cTHS,i+i(Nh+Ng))−m (7.16)
with n = 0, . . . , Ndata−1 where Ndata = Npay ·K ·(Nh+Ng) is the number of samples during the
data reception phase. Assuming that the information symbols are equiprobable, the optimum
decoding rule to recover the data sequence a = (aNCH , . . . , aNs−1) is the maximum likelihood
criterion. We thus want to find the data sequence aˆ = (aˆNCH, . . . , aˆNs−1) that maximizes the
likelihood of observing the sequence v = (v0, . . . , vNdata−1)
aˆ = argmax
a
ln(f(v|a)) (7.17)
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Since the distribution of v is given by (7.4) or (7.5), depending on the model, this places us
again in the framework of the EM-algorithm, which has been shown in [79] for a general
context. Combining (7.8) and (7.16) and dropping all the terms not depending on a, we obtain
for both models
Q˜(a, aˆ′) =
Ns−1∑
i=NCH
M−1∑
m=0
P−1∑
p=0
qm · yti,m · ai ·
γp(ti,m)
σ2p
(7.18)
where γp(n) = Pr(xn = p|vn, aˆ′) can again be calculated according to (7.12) and ti,m =
K(cTHS,i + i(Nh + Ng)) +m. Note that for the GMM the E-step remains exactly the same as
in the training phase, only that the parameter to estimate is now a instead of Θ. For the case
of the HMM the E-step is also similar to the training phase but we no longer have to calculate
ξj,k(n). The M-step is the same for both models, but different from the training phase as we are
now maximizing (7.18) with respect to a. We see from (7.18) that the maximization reduces
to a classical max-sum problem, that can be solved by the Viterbi algorithm [176] with branch
metric
m(ai) =
M−1∑
m=0
P−1∑
p=0
qm · yti,m · ai ·
γp(ti,m)
σ2p
(7.19)
Note that the receiver discussed here implicitly has the structure of a Rake receiver perform-
ing maximum-ratio combining. This can be seen from (7.19): All of the estimated components
of the multipath channel contribute to the detection of the symbol. Further they are weighted
according to their path gain, qm, and an additional factor, γp(ti,m)/σ2p , accounting for interfer-
ence. From this observation we can get a good intuition on how the algorithm actually miti-
gates interference. Recall that γp(ti,m) is the posterior probability that the sample yti,m has an
interference and noise term drawn from a zero-mean Gaussian with variance σ2p . In the above
metric, samples with noise terms that stem with high probability from a distribution with high
variance consequently get penalized through the factor γp(ti,m)/σ2p . This factor plays the role
of a weighting function: Samples with low interference level get a larger weight than samples
that are likely to be polluted by a high interference and noise term. The functioning of this
interference mitigation technique is illustrated in Figure 7.1.
A similar principle applies to the estimation of the channel coefficients during the training
phase. The same weighting factor appears in (7.11). Therefore we will also have a more reliable
channel estimate when interference mitigation is performed, which has been shown in [59] for
the case of the GMM. Interference of type 1 thus gets mitigated through the weighting function
in (7.19) as well as indirectly through the better channel estimate. When facing interference
of type 2, the weighting factor has less impact. In this case we mostly benefit from the better
Interference Mitigation 129
1.8286 1.8293 1.83
x 105
−2
−1
0
1
2
En
er
gy
Time (ns)
 
 
(a)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
γ 0
Prob. of Low Interf. State
RX Signal
RX Signal UOI
1.8286 1.8293 1.83
x 105
−2
−1
0
1
2
En
er
gy
Time (ns)
 
 
(b)
−237
−119
0
119
237
En
er
gy
 (s
ca
led
 by
 w
eig
hti
ng
 ve
cto
r)
Weighted RX Signal
RX Signal
RX Signal UOI
Figure 7.1: Here we show how an algorithm based on interference modeling performs in-
terference mitigation. A two-state hidden Markov model is assumed for the MUI. In Figure
(a), one pulse of the received signal and its component corresponding to the user of interest is
shown. For each sample, the receiver estimates the probability that it has a low contribution
from interfering users (low interference state) or that it is polluted with a high interference term
(high interference state). The estimated probability of being in the low interference state is also
shown in Figure (a). We can see that the algorithm nicely identifies the part that suffers from a
high interference term. Based on this estimation, the receiver designs a weighting vector that
is applied to the received signal. Figure (b) additionally shows the received signal after it has
been multiplied with the weighting vector, and we can see that the MUI has been successfully
removed.
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channel estimate.
A final remark is needed for the GMM. Due to the GMM having independent samples, the
above iterative decoding procedure is not necessarily required. The reason is that in this case a
direct, independent evaluation of the decision rule
ln(fGMM(v|aˆi = +1))
aˆi=+1
≷
aˆi=−1
ln(fGMM(v|aˆi = −1)) (7.20)
is possible for every symbol ai. This yields the following decision rule
M−1∑
m=0
ln
[
P−1∑
p=0
λpfN (yti,m − qm|σ2p)
]
aˆi=+1
≷
aˆi=−1
M−1∑
m=0
ln
[
P−1∑
p=0
λpfN (yti,m + qm|σ2p)
]
(7.21)
that may be used in place of the EM algorithm during data decoding.
Thresholding to mitigate interference type 3
As already mentioned, the situation is different for interference of type 3. It is not present
during training and therefore the estimated variances of the interference and noise term will be
rather small (in the order of the background noise variance). Samples with a lot of interference
will thus still get a relatively high weight. This observation is the key to our solution to mitigate
interference of type 3. After the training phase we determine the largest of the estimated vari-
ances. Assume this is σ2p∗. We then determine a threshold ηp∗, such that Pr(X ≥ ηp∗) ≤ P FAMUI,
where X ∼ N (0, σ2p∗) and P FAMUI is some predetermined small probability. After each E-step
we set
γp(n) = 0; ∀p, n such that vn > ηp∗
This ensures that samples, that with high probability cannot be explained by the estimated
interference model, do not contribute to the branch metric. As this is likely to affect predomi-
nantly samples polluted by interference of type 3, we have found a way to mitigate this type of
interference.
To summarize 1) and 2), this results in the following algorithm for the data reception phase:
1. Initialization: Determine the threshold ηp∗. Take an initial guess, aˆ(0), for a
2. E-Step: calculate γp(n) in the same way as in the training phase (i.e. using (7.12) in the
case of the GMM, using the forward-backward algorithm in the case of the HMM).
3. Thresholding: set γp(n) to zero for any sample vn that lies above the threshold ηp∗.
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4. M-Step: find the new parameter estimate aˆ by means of the Viterbi algorithm with metric
given by (7.19).
5. Repeat steps 2 to 4 until convergence
7.3 Performance Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the performance of a receiver using statistical interference modeling
to mitigate interference. Through simulations, we compare four different receiver types. Two
receivers perform statistical interference modeling according to the GMM or HMM algorithms
described in this chapter. Further, we simulate two reference receivers, the first of which uses
no interference mitigation. We can view this receiver as a special case of a receiver that uses
the GMM, but only with a single state (i.e., P=1). Further, this receiver does not perform
the non-linear thresholding operation described in Section 7.2.4. This receiver thus makes a
Gaussian approximation, neglecting the impulsive nature of MUI. Finally, we also simulate a
receiver that only uses a simple threshold to mitigate interference. This receiver is identical to
the receiver that uses no interference mitigation except for the fact that it uses the non-linear
thresholding operation.
7.3.1 Simulation Setup and Receiver Parameters
The performance metric we used is the bit error rate (BER) versus signal to noise ratio (SNR,
defined as Eb
N0
, where Eb is the received energy per bit) at the receiver. Our simulation setup
is the following. Tc = 2 ns, Nh = Ng = 128, which results in a pulse repetition frequency
of 1.95 MHz. Channel coding is performed with a simple pulse repetition code of rate 1/4,
resulting in a physical layer peak data rate of 0.49 Mb/s.
The pulse shape p(t) is chosen to be the second derivative of a Gaussian monopulse given
by p(t) = (1−4π(t2/τ 2)) ·exp(−2πt2/τ 2) with τ = 2.4 ns, resulting in a signal with a−10 dB
bandwidth of about B = 500 MHz. Correspondingly we sample with a sampling frequency of
1 GHz, yielding a sampling period T = 1ns.
We ran simulations for the IEEE 802.15.4a indoor office LOS and NLOS channel models.
Since we did not observe fundamental differences between these two channel models, we only
show the results for the NLOS model.
Physical layer data packets are assumed to be generated by a homogeneous Poisson process
with rate R. The simulations shown here assume a rate corresponding to one half or one fourth
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of the peak data rate. Each packet has a length of 127 bytes or Ns = 1016 data symbols. The
first Nsync = 112 symbols are assumed to be reserved for the synchronization preamble, the
next NCH = 32 symbols form the training sequence and the remaining Npay = 872 symbols
constitute the payload. Two successive packets are assumed to be at least separated by the
duration of a packet of size Nsync +NCH, leaving room for acknowledgements.
To simulate interference, different near-far scenarios with varying numbers of users were
chosen. At the receiver, the interferers have power levels of 0 dB, 10 dB and 20 dB with respect
to the UOI.
The model order of the interference models is fixed to P = 2. We also ran simulations with
a model order of P = 3. This did not change the results fundamentally, we observed a slight
improvement for the HMM and no improvement for the GMM, and hence we do not show these
results here.
Initialization of the estimators in the training phase is done as in [59], i.e. λˆ(0) = (0.99, 0.01),
σˆ
(0)
0 =
1
Ntrain
∑Ntrain−1
n=0 v
2
n, σˆ
(0)
1 = 50 · σˆ(0)0 and qˆ(0)m = 1√M . The estimator for the data sequence
aˆ is initially simply set to zero. The probability governing the threshold is set to P FAMUI = 10−4,
which was found through simulations. The number of estimated channel parameters is M = 56
which at a sampling frequency of 1 GHz roughly corresponds to the channel spread.
7.3.2 Simulation Results
Our simulations show that this 2-state model achieves a significant performance gain over tra-
ditional techniques that do not account for MUI or use a simple thresholding mechanism. In
Figure 7.2 we show the BER for a near-far scenario withNu = 4 users. The three interferers are
received with power levels that exceed the UOI signal by 0 dB, 10 dB and 20 dB, respectively.
Rate R is equal to half the peak data rate. Interference modeling achieves a significant gain,
independent of the interference model used. The difference between the GMM and the HMM
however is much less pronounced. The HMM gets a slight performance gain, indicating that it
is better suited to model MUI. However, considering the additional complexity needed by the
HMM, the GMM seems to be a more realistic solution.
Further, we find that (1) modeling of interference alone is not sufficient, thresholding is still
needed to prevent losses, and (2) these losses are effectively due to type 3 interference. This
shows the importance of establishing a classification of different interference types and justifies
our approach of mitigating each type accordingly. The corresponding results are shown in
Figures 7.3 and 7.4. All of these figures show a near far scenario with three strong interferers,
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Figure 7.2: We compare our interference mitigation technique with a receiver that neglects
multi-user interference (MUI) completely and with a receiver performing only simple thresh-
olding. The curves shown are for a near-far scenario with three interferers. The interferers have
received power levels of 0 dB, 10 dB and 20 dB with respect to the UOI. All packets are gen-
erated at half the peak data rate. It can be seen, that the performance gain from modeling the
interference is significant. Using the more sophisticated HMM to characterize MUI however
only gives a small additional gain compared to the GMM model.
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Figure 7.3: Here we show the effect of interference type 3. We use a repetition code of rate
1/4 and assume packet generation at one fourth of the peak rate. We see that whether or not to
perform thresholding greatly affects performance. Especially for the HMM the effect is huge:
Without thresholding it barely performs better than the simple thresholding receiver.
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Figure 7.4: Here we have categorized all packets depending on the type of interference they
experience and show the performance for types 1 and 3 separately. Results for type 1 are
shown in (a), results for type 3 in (b). The simulation setup is the same as in Figure 7.3. The
plots confirm our hypothesis that the losses seen in Figure 7.3 when not using thresholding are
almost exclusively due to packets that face interference of type 3. Note that for interference
type 3 both GMM and HMM without thresholding, perform worse than the simple threshold
based receiver, that does not model interference.
each having a power level exceeding the UOI by 20 dB. Packets are generated at one fourth
of the peak data rate. Figure 7.3 shows the overall BER. We further show the curves for the
GMM and the HMM when thresholding is omitted. We have a clear performance degradation
in both cases. The HMM even performs worse than the GMM in this case. We interpret this to
be due to the HMM modeling MUI better and therefore being less flexible, when encountering
situations where the predicted model does not apply. Figure 7.3 thus shows that the thresholding
mechanism is needed even when interference modeling is performed.
To confirm that the performance degradation in Figure 7.3 effectively is due to interference
of type 3, we classified all data packets with respect to the interference type they were fac-
ing. This allows us to plot the BER curve for each of the types separately, which is shown
in Figure 7.4(a) for type 1 and Figure 7.4(b) for type 3. In our classification we considered
interference present in a part of the packet, if more than 20% of this part was affected by in-
terference. E.g., interference was considered present during the data reception phase if it was
present during at least 20% of data reception. We see that for packets with type 1 interference,
the threshold has no impact. Interference of type 1 is thus efficiently reduced by the statistical
interference mitigation mechanism. Packets with type 3 interference however suffer from a
large loss if the threshold is not applied. Note that in this case both the HMM and the GMM
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perform worse than the threshold based receiver. This further confirms that better modeling
makes the receiver less flexible in situations where the model no longer applies, which can be
overcome by using the proposed thresholding algorithm.
7.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented an effective method to mitigate the effect of MUI in a mul-
tipath environment and shown that it outperforms existing techniques significantly. We have
introduced a new and more general model for multi-user interference in IR-UWB and have
compared with existing models its ability to accurately characterize interference. Finally, we
have identified three different types of MUI and the need to deal with each of them in an ap-
propriate manner.
The main goal of this chapter was to understand whether a performance improvement can
be achieved by exploiting statistical properties of MUI. There are thus several aspects that have
been omitted on purpose. First of all, we did not do a complexity analysis for the choice of
the interference model. The HMM requires much more processing than the GMM due to the
forward-backward algorithm in the E-step. Also from a viewpoint of energy consumption,
the GMM has an advantage. During chips where the signal of interest is not present, the
receiver can be turned off. The interference level can later still be estimated as there is no
time-dependence between the samples. Despite its complexity, the HMM is still of interest
because it is able to accurately model MUI. This makes it suitable for the theoretical analysis
of IR-UWB systems with MUI, which has been recognized, e.g., by [76].
Second, we concentrated on coherent receivers and the classical IR-UWB PHY. We will
show in the next chapter that interference mitigation techniques can also be applied to the
energy-detection receiver and IEEE 802.15.4a. Third, interference of type 3 may be further
reduced by re-estimating interference during idle periods. Since our initial work on this topic,
this approach has been explored in [60] and we will also use it in Section 8 for the energy-
detection receiver. Finally, other non-Gaussian models may be used to model MUI in IR-UWB
networks. For a discussion of possible options please refer to Section 3.1.2 in the related work.
Chapter 8
Non-Gaussian Interference Modeling with
an Energy-Detection Receiver
In this chapter we revisit the energy-detection receiver and show that interference mitigation
techniques based on statistical modeling, similar to those that we have seen in the previous
chapter, can also enhance the robustness to MUI of this receiver architecture.
In Chapter 7 we found the Gaussian mixture model (GMM) to be a suitable model for
noise and interference in IR-UWB networks. Hence, we also use the GMM in this chapter
and show that at the output of the energy-detection receiver this translates to a model with
a mixture of gamma distributions. The parameters of this gamma mixture model can further
be estimated from the IEEE 802.15.4a preamble without making a lot of sacrifices in terms
of receiver complexity. We then derive the optimal energy-detection receiver for the gamma
mixture model and show how to perform SFD detection and data demodulation. Furthermore,
our design explicitly addresses the time-varying nature of MUI in packet based systems through
an algorithm that constantly adapts the MUI model. We have seen in Chapter 7 that if this is not
accounted for, the gain from modeling interference can become void. Finally, our performance
evaluation demonstrates that this approach yields energy-detection receivers that are very robust
to MUI.
Although there is related work on interference mitigation by statistical modeling for co-
herent receivers (see the related work in Section 3.1.2), this study is the first one for non-
coherent energy-detection IR-UWB receivers. Further, our receiver is compliant with the IEEE
802.15.4a standard.
This chapter is organized as follows; in Section 8.1, we review the necessary details about
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the IEEE 802.15.4a physical layer needed to understand the results of the performance evalu-
ation. The interference model is introduced in Section 8.2 and estimation of its parameters is
addressed. The optimal receiver is derived in Section 8.3. In Section 8.4, we present the results
of our performance evaluation. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 8.5.
8.1 System Model and Assumptions
In this chapter, we consider an IEEE 802.15.4a IR-UWB physical layer with binary pulse po-
sition modulation (BPPM) and non-coherent reception with energy-detection. System model
and receiver architecture are thus the same we used in Chapter 5 and in Chapter 6. The details
are explained in the system model in Chapter 2. We here merely recall the notation and the
most important details.
The received signal during the IEEE 802.15.4a preamble is given by (2.28) and equals
rpre(t) =
Npre−1∑
i=0
si
C−1∑
j=0
cj · h˜(t− (j + iC)LsTc − ν0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
x˜pre(t−ν0)
+v(t) (8.1)
where x˜pre(t) is the signal contribution of the UOI and v(t) accounts for both MUI and thermal
noise. Thermal noise is modeled as a zero-mean AWGN process (bandlimited to B, the band-
width of the receiver bandpass filter) with power spectral density (PSD) N0/2. MUI is created
by the Nu − 1 interfering transmitters that use the same PHY.
During the first Nsync preamble symbols, the modulation coefficient si equals si = 1, for
the remaining Nsfd = Npre −Nsync symbols it corresponds to the SFD sequence. In this chapter
we are not concerned with robust timing acquisition. We can therefore proceed as we did in
Section 6.3 of Chapter 6 and assume that the TOA is ν0 = 0 but that Nsync is unknown. For
robust timing acquisition, please refer to Chapter 6.
Furthermore, one pulse is sent every Ls chips and modulated according to the preamble
code cj ∈ {−1, 0,+1}, j = 0, 1, . . . , C − 1. Finally, h˜(t) denotes the unknown compound
channel impulse response.
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During the IEEE 802.15.4a payload, we receive the signal
rpay(t) =
Npay−1∑
i=0
ai
Ncpb−1∑
j=0
bij · h˜(t− iTf − diTf/2 − jTc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
x˜pay(t)
+v(t). (8.2)
In contrast to the preamble signal, each of the Npay payload symbols of duration Tf is composed
of a short, continuous burst of Ncpb pulses with pseudo-random polarity, bij ∈ ±1. di ∈ {0, 1}
denotes the i-th BPPM data bit. Note that with respect to the full model given in (2.30) of
Chapter 2 we omitted the time-hopping sequence (THS) since it is perfectly known at the
receiver and only complicates the notation. In our performance evaluation, we of course take
the THS into account.
The discrete samples at the output of the energy-detection receiver are given by
ym =
∫ (m+1)T
mT
[r(t)]2 dt (8.3)
where r(t) corresponds to either (8.1) or (8.2), depending on whether we are receiving the
preamble or the payload, and the integration time is of the form T = Ls
M
Tc.
8.2 Interference Modeling and Parameter Estimation
In this section we first describe the interference model used by our receiver, then how the
parameters of the model can be estimated, and finally, a practical low-complexity parameter
estimation procedure.
8.2.1 Distribution of Receiver Output without MUI
We recall that when v(t) comprises only AWGN, the probability density function (PDF) of the
receiver output ym can be closely approximated (see Section 2.3.3) with a scaled non-central
chi-square distribution
f(ym|N0/2, BT, pm) = 1
N0/2
fNCχ2
( ym
N0/2
∣∣∣2BT, pm
N0/2
)
(8.4)
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with 2BT degrees of freedom and where the non-centrality parameter depends on the coeffi-
cients
pm =
∫ (m+1)T
mT
[x˜(t)]2 dt. (8.5)
The received signal contribution of the UOI, x˜(t), corresponds to either x˜pre(t) or x˜pay(t). The
coefficients pm depend on the channel energy-delay profile of the UOI signal and they can be
estimated during reception of the preamble, when the preamble code elements are nonzero,
i.e., cj 6= 0 and x˜pre(t) 6= 0. We have seen receiver architectures and algorithms that allow for
a robust estimation of pm in the presence of MUI in Chapter 5. We therefore assume in the
following that the coefficients pm are known.
8.2.2 Modeling of Receiver Output Distribution with MUI
If MUI is present, the AWGN assumption for v(t) does no longer hold and Gaussian approxi-
mations for v(t) are inaccurate in the case of IR-UWB physical layers [39, 41]. With coherent
receivers, a widely used non-Gaussian model for v(t) is the Gaussian-mixture model (GMM)
that we already encountered in Chapter 7. In the following we demonstrate that this model can
also be successfully used in the case of energy-detection receivers. In the next paragraph, we
extend the GMM to energy-detection receivers and derive the associated receiver output.
Let us assume a model with P zero-mean Gaussian component processes
vp(t) ∈ {v0(t), v1(t), . . . , vP−1(t)}.
The power spectral density (PSD) of every component process vp(t) is σ2p and its prior probabil-
ity is λp. Hence, under the Gaussian-mixture model, the noise contribution of every sample ym
is generated with probability λp by the component process vp(t) with PSD σ2p. The parameters
of the model are
Θ = (Λ,Σ) = (λ0, λ1, . . . , λP−1, σ20 , σ
2
1, . . . , σ
2
P−1)
with
∑P−1
p=0 λp = 1. Making the same approximations as for equation (8.4), the PDF of the
receiver output ym can be written as
fNCχ2Mix(ym|Θ, BT, pm) =
P−1∑
p=0
λp · 1
σ2p
fNCχ2
(ym
σ2p
∣∣∣2BT, pm
σ2p
)
(8.6)
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which corresponds to a mixture of scaled non-central chi-square distributions.
8.2.3 Estimation of the Model Parameters
As stated in Section 8.2.1, the energy-delay profile or, equivalently, the coefficients pm can be
estimated during the reception of the preamble when the signal of the UOI x˜pre(t) 6= 0. We next
show that the parameters Θ can be estimated from samples of the preamble where x˜pre(t) = 0
(no contribution from the UOI). This corresponds to the set of M¯ = Nsync · (C −
∑C−1
j=0 c
2
j) ·M
samples
y¯ = (y¯0, . . . , y¯M¯−1)
=
{
ym|m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , NsyncCM − 1}, c⌊m
M
⌋ mod C = 0
}
(8.7)
For all M¯ samples, pm = 0 and it follows from (8.6) that their joint PDF is given by a mixture
of gamma distributions (see also Section 2.3.3)
fΓMix(y¯|Θ, BT ) =
M¯−1∏
m=0
P−1∑
p=0
λp · fΓ(y¯m|BT, 2σ2p) (8.8)
where
fΓ(y|κ, θ) = 1
θκΓ(κ)
yκ−1e−y/θ (8.9)
is the PDF of the gamma distribution with scale parameter k and shape parameter θ.
We have transformed the problem of estimating the parameters of the model in (8.6) to the
problem of estimating the parameters of the Gamma Mixture Model given by (8.8). Note that
the payload also contains parts where the receiver knows that no contribution of the UOI is
present. This is due to the THS and the guard intervals that are introduced in the payload to
prevent inter-symbol interference (ISI). An analogous derivation that is omitted here can thus
be made for these payload parts.
To find the maximum-likelihood estimate
Θˆ = argmax
Θ
ln(fΓMix(y¯|Θ, BT )) (8.10)
of the parameters Θ, we use the classical framework for mixture-density parameter estima-
tion, which is commonly done by using the iterative Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm
[172]. The EM-algorithm starts with an initial guess Θˆ(0) = (λˆ(0)0 , . . . , λˆ(0)P−1, σˆ2(0)0 , . . . , σˆ2(0)P−1)
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of the parameters to be estimated and updates the estimate in every iteration, guaranteeing
that the log-likelihood always increases. Following similar derivations as in [173], we find the
following update equations for our model:
λˆ(k+1)p =
1
M¯
M¯−1∑
m=0
γ(k)p (m), σˆ
2(k+1)
p =
∑M¯−1
m=0 y¯m · γ(k)p (m)
2BT
∑M¯−1
m=0 γ
(k)
p (m)
(8.11)
where
γ(k)p (m) =
λˆ
(k)
p · fΓ(y¯m|BT, 2σˆ2(k)p )∑P
p˜=0 λˆ
(k)
p˜ · fΓ(y¯m|BT, 2σˆ2(k)p˜ )
(8.12)
can be interpreted as the posterior probability that a sample y¯m was drawn from the gamma
component density with scale parameter 2σ2p .
8.2.4 Low-complexity Recursive Formulation of EM-algorithm
Due to its iterative nature, the EM-algorithm given by (8.11) and (8.12), is both time and mem-
ory consuming. The algorithm must wait for all of the M¯ samples to become available and then
processes all of them simultaneously. This is impractical for a low-complexity implementation.
Therefore, we resort to a simplified recursive version [177] of the EM-algorithm that yields fast
convergence at a moderate complexity. A similar approach has been taken in [60] with a co-
herent receiver. The recursive algorithm treats y¯ in an online fashion by blocks of M˜ < M¯
consecutive samples. At the k-th recursion, the k-th block y¯(k) = (y¯kM˜ , . . . , y¯(k+1)M˜−1) is
processed. In its recursive formulation, the update equation for the parameters becomes
Θˆ(k+1) =
(
1− 1
(k + 1)ǫ
)
Θˆ(k) +
1
(k + 1)ǫ
Θ˜(k+1) (8.13)
where ǫ ∈ (0, 1) is a forgetting factor and Θ˜(k) = (λ˜(k)0 , . . . , λ˜(k)P−1, σ˜2(k)0 , . . . , σ˜2(k)P−1) with
λ˜(k+1)p =
1
M˜
M˜−1∑
m=0
γ(k)p (kM˜ +m) (8.14)
σ˜2(k+1)p =
∑M˜−1
m=0 y¯kM˜+m · γ(k)p (kM˜ +m)
2BT
∑M˜−1
m=0 γ
(k)
p (kM˜ +m)
(8.15)
With respect to the iterative version, complexity is greatly reduced: (8.12) is only computed
once for every sample and the only values that need to be kept in memory are the number
Interference Modeling and Parameter Estimation 143
of iterations performed, the current parameter estimate, the sum in (8.14) and its weighted
counterpart in the numerator of (8.15).
8.2.5 Initialization, Adaptive Model Order
MUI is a time-varying process. It may be present during some parts of a packet and absent dur-
ing others. Our receiver therefore adapts the model order to these varying conditions according
to the following procedure:
Initialize
Start with a single component (P = 1) and Θˆ(0) = (λˆ(0)0 , σˆ2(0)0 ) = (1, 1M˜
∑M˜−1
m=0 y¯m)
Add
Add a new component to the mixture at iteration k if there are samples in y¯(k) that are not
well explained by the model. We consider a sample to be not well explained if it lies above
the threshold η(k)p∗ = F−1
Γ
(k)
p∗
(0.99) where F
Γ
(k)
p∗
(x) is the cumulative distribution function of the
mixture component p∗ which has the highest associated noise variance σˆ2(k)p∗ . Let y˜(k) =
(y˜0, . . . , y˜L−1) denote the samples that fulfill this condition. The new state then has initial pa-
rameters λˆ(0)P = L/M˜ and σˆ
2(0)
P =
1
L
∑L−1
l=0 y˜l. The existing component probabilities λˆ
(k)
0 , . . .,
λˆ
(k)
P−1 are scaled accordingly such that all the probabilities sum to one. Adding new components
in this way ensures that interference that was not present before can still be appropriately miti-
gated and does not lead to a performance degradation like we have observed it for interference
type 3 in Chapter 7.
Merge
Two components xi and xj are merged if their associated noise variances are too close. They
are considered too close if F−1
Γ
(k)
xi
(0.4) < F−1
Γ
(k)
xj
(0.6) while σˆ2(k)xi > σˆ
2(k)
xj . The state resulting from
the merging operation, has parameters λˆ(k)p = λˆ(k)xi + λˆ
(k)
xj and σˆ
2(k)
p =
λˆ
(k)
xi
σˆ
2(k)
xi
+λˆ
(k)
xj
σˆ
2(k)
xj
λˆ
(k)
xi
+λˆ
(k)
xj
Remove
Components with associated probability λˆ(k)p < 10−3 are deemed irrelevant and removed from
the model.
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8.3 Decoding With the Estimated Model
8.3.1 Detection of the Start Frame Delimiter
As explained in Section 8.1, the end of the preamble is indicated with the SFD sequence. After
synchronization and channel estimation, the receiver starts to look for the SFD. When detected,
decoding of the data bits of the payload starts. We saw in Chapter 6 that the SFD detection
can be interpreted as a decoding problem where the receiver looks at Nsfd consecutive received
preamble symbols and tries to determine whether they correspond to the squared SFD sequence
s2(sfd) = (s
2(sfd)
0 , . . . , s
2(sfd)
Nsfd−1).
In Chapter 6 we also presented a suite of algorithms that are able to detect the SFD in
an online or offline fashion. All of these algorithms rely on the assumption that the samples
at the receiver output ym are independently distributed according to a non-central or central
chi-square distribution if there is no MUI. The type of the distribution depends on whether the
signal of the UOI is present or absent due to the ternary preamble and SFD codes. We further
showed, that each of the algorithms only depends on calculation of the quantity
LLR(ym|N0/2, 2BT, qm) = ln

fNCχ2
(
ym
N0/2
∣∣∣2BT, qmN0/2)
fχ2
(
ym
N0/2
∣∣∣2BT)

 (8.16)
representing the log-likelihood ratio of a sample rather being drawn from the non-central rather
than from the central chi-square distribution. The energy-delay profile
qm =
∫ (m+1)T
mT
[h˜(t)]2 dt, m ∈ {0, 1 . . . ,M − 1} (8.17)
can be estimated during the preamble, which we have shown in Chapter 5.
Under the mixture model presented in this chapter, the samples at the receiver output are
still assumed independent. Further, they are distributed according to a mixture of scaled non-
central chi-square distributions if the signal of the UOI is present, or according to a mixture of
Gamma distributions if it is not (see Section 8.2.2 and Section 8.2.3). We can therefore use the
exact same algorithms we saw in Chapter 6 to detect the SFD also with the mixture model. The
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only change we have to make is to replace the LLR given in (8.16) with
LLRMix(ym|Θ, qm) = ln
(
fNCχ2Mix(ym|Θ, qm)
fΓMix(ym|Θ)
)
= ln
(
P−1∑
p=0
0F1
(
;BT ;
qmym
4σ4p
)
e
− qm
2σ2p γp(m)
)
(8.18)
where γp(m) is given by (8.12) and the confluent hypergeometric limit function is given by
0F1
(
;BT ;
qmym
4σ4p
)
= 2BT−1Γ(BT )
( σ2p√
ymqm
)BT−1
IBT−1(
√
qmym
σ2p
) (8.19)
8.3.2 Demodulation of Payload Data Bits
For demodulation of the data bits, the exact same considerations as for detection of the SFD
apply. This time we can reuse the optimal decision rule from equation (5.5) in Chapter 5.
Again, we just need to replace the LLR with its mixture counterpart given by (8.18). With
Nf = Tf/T , this yields the following decision rule for the data symbols
M−1∑
m=0
LLRMix(ym+iNf|Θ, qm)
dˆ0=0
≷
dˆ0=1
M−1∑
m=0
LLRMix(ym+iNf+Nf/2|Θ, qm) (8.20)
8.4 Performance Evaluation
For the performance evaluation, we simulate a complete packet-based IEEE 802.15.4a system
according to the assumptions in Section 2.5. Different packet arrival rates R were considered
for the maximum allowable size of 1208 coded bits per packet.
We simulated both the mandatory low pulse repetition frequency mode (LPRF) and the
mandatory high pulse repetition frequency mode (HPRF). In all simulations, the UOI uses
preamble code 5 and the interferers use code 6.
Further, the receiver we simulated operates with an integration time of T = Tc = 2 ns.
With this choice BT = 1 and the interference model to be estimated reduces to a mixture of
exponentials. Our receiver estimates the interference model during both the preamble and the
payload, during periods where the signal of the UOI is known to be absent. The forgetting
factor that yielded best results was determined through simulations and found to be κ = 0.9.
The size of a block M˜ for the recursive estimation was set to M˜ = 384, which corresponds to
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Figure 8.1: Single user scenario. The thresholding receiver shows a loss of about 1 dB because
useful information is cut by the threshold.
the number of samples per payload symbol that do not have a contribution of the UOI.
The channel models used in our simulations are the IEEE 802.15.4a residential non-line-
of-sight (NLOS) and the office line-of-sight (LOS) models [14]. Our performance metrics are
the packet error rate (PER) and the synchronization error rate (SER) that are plotted against
the signal to noise ratio (SNR), defined as SNR = Ep
N0
where Ep is the received energy per
preamble pulse.
We compare the mixture receiver presented in this chapter (“Mixture”) with the optimal
receiver for the single user case (“No Mitigation”) derived in Chapter 5 and with a robust
receiver that uses an adaptive threshold to reject interference (“Thld”) also derived in Chapter 5.
Figure 8.1 shows the performance of the three receivers in the single user case with no
interference. The slight performance difference between the mixture receiver and the optimal
one is due to the robust but slightly suboptimal channel estimation from Chapter 5 used by the
former. The thresholding receiver shows a loss of about 1 dB which is due to useful information
being cut by the threshold.
Figures 8.2 and 8.3 show near-far scenarios where we have one interferer that is received
with a power 10 dB higher than the UOI. The interferer sends at R = 100 packets/s which
is roughly half of the peak rate. In Figure 8.2, we show results for LPRF and the NLOS
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Figure 8.2: Near-far scenario with one interferer received with a power 10 dB higher than
the UOI. Results shown are for LPRF with a NLOS channel. The proposed receiver shows a
substantially better packet error rate (PER) than receivers that do not mitigate interference at
all or use an adaptive threshold.
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Figure 8.3: Same scenario as in Figure 8.2, but this time for HPRF and the LOS channel.
Again, the receiver employing a mixture model shows a substantially better packet error rate
(PER) than receivers that do not mitigate interference at all or use an adaptive threshold.
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Figure 8.4: Scenario with three interferers that have a received power equal to the UOI. Again,
the mixture as well as the thresholding receiver outperform receivers that do not mitigate inter-
ference substantially.
channel model, in Figure 8.3 for HPRF and the LOS channel model. In both scenarios, the
optimal single user receiver that makes a Gaussian approximation is severely affected by MUI
and shows PERs in the order of 20 − 25%. Using the mixture model achieves a very good
robustness against MUI, yielding a reduction in PER of up to two orders of magnitude. We can
also see that in both cases the mixture model outperforms the thresholding receiver, resulting
in substantially lower PER floors.
Figure 8.4 shows a scenario where the interferers and the UOI have the same received
power. We simulated three interferer at a rate of R = 200 packets/s. Again, both the mixture
and the thresholding receiver improve substantially over a receiver that does not mitigate in-
terference. The mixture receiver and the thresholding receiver have almost equal performance.
Using an interference model no longer gives an advantage, the thresholding receiver already
achieves a very good mitigation. Further, the lower interference terms (with respect to the near-
far case) are more difficult to identify for the EM algorithm. It can therefore happen that the EM
algorithm finds a local minimum that does not characterize the interference sufficiently well.
This in turn may result in a mitigation scheme that is closer to the Gaussian approximation,
which has a bad performance as can be seen from the “No Mitigation” curve.
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Figure 8.5: Synchronization error rate (SER) versus SNR in a near-far scenario with three
interferers. For the DESSERT algorithm, a 2 dB gain is achieved at low SNR if the GMM is
used instead of a thresholding scheme. For the offline algorithm, no difference in performance
is observed between the GMM and a threshold based implementation.
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Finally, we also show the effect of the mixture model on the SFD detection performance.
Figure 8.5 shows results for the soft DESSERT and soft offline algorithms that were both intro-
duced in Chapter 6. The results shown are for LPRF and four users with a rate of R = 100 pack-
ets/s. The three near interferers have 10 dB higher power than the UOI. For the offline algo-
rithm we see only a negligible improvement when the GMM is used, it almost coincides with
the offline algorithm that uses only a threshold. For the online DESSERT algorithm, using the
mixture model in lieu of the thresholding scheme proposed in Chapter 6 yields a 2 dB improve-
ment at low SNR where the system is noise limited and the threshold therefore cuts useful
information as we have seen from the single user results. At high SNR, where the limiting
factor is MUI, only a small performance gain is observed for the mixture model and a threshold
is sufficient to limit the impact of MUI on SFD detection.
8.5 Conclusion and Possible Directions for Future Work
We presented an energy-detection receiver that mitigates interference from concurrent trans-
missions by employing statistical interference modeling. We showed that this approach gives
a huge performance advantage compared to receivers that do not mitigate interference. Com-
pared to receivers that use an adaptive threshold, the performance gain is smaller but still con-
siderable in near-far scenarios. Another advantage over thresholding schemes is the fact that
the mixture model includes the special case where no MUI is present, thus resulting in a smaller
performance degradation in the single user case.
Evidently, the performance increase also comes at a certain cost. We see the biggest prob-
lem in this respect in the evaluation of the log-likelihood ratio needed for the optimal decision
rule in both SFD detection and data decoding. Although the form of the expression lends itself
for tabulation, at higher model orders several evaluations are necessary, thus adding to the com-
plexity. On the other hand, the optimal expressions may prove valuable for future work since
they allow to get insight into how a suboptimal non-linearity with good interference mitigation
characteristics should look like. Another possible direction for future work is an evaluation of
a complete network to determine how the performance gain in packet error rate translates into
improvement of the overall network throughput.
Part II
Effect of Drifting Clocks on IR-UWB
Energy-Detection Receivers
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Chapter 9
Clock-Offset Tracking Software
Algorithms For IR-UWB
Energy-Detection Receivers
The implementation of IEEE 802.15.4a devices faces several challenges. First, the mandatory
medium access control layer (MAC) in the standard is based on Aloha and hence, completely
uncoordinated; receivers must be robust to occasional interference. In Part I of this thesis
we presented various mechanisms that enhance the robustness to such interference of low-
complexity receivers based on the energy-detection architecture. Further, with devices mainly
operated indoors, receivers should be able to adapt to a time-varying environment and, in par-
ticular, a time-varying propagation channel. Finally, with a strong focus on low-priced devices,
the underlying hardware can be of average quality. For instance, because of possibly low-
quality frequency oscillators used for clock generation, the standard allows for relative clock
offsets as large as 40 parts per million (ppm) [35].
In the case of energy-detection receivers, these challenges lead to a trade-off between ro-
bustness to the environment and resilience to clock drifts. Extremely low complexity energy-
detection receivers are built with a large and constant integration duration, on the order of
several tens of nanoseconds [109]; they are quite robust to clock drifts but are sensitive to noise
enhancement effects [31] and cannot adapt to channel variations. More sophisticated energy-
detection receivers attempt to estimate the power delay profile of the propagation channel.
They use a shorter integration duration and combine several weighted outputs of the energy
collector according to the estimate of the power delay profile. Examples of such receivers are
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[31, 33] and the receiver we used throughout Part I of this thesis. These receivers are robust to
noise enhancement effects, can adapt to channel variations and offer a better performance than
non-adaptive receivers. Further, they allow for receiver designs that are robust to multi-user in-
terference (see Part I). However, because of the shorter integration duration and consequently
higher sampling frequency, they become sensitive to clock offsets.
In packet based systems, such as IEEE 802.15.4a networks, there is no global synchroniza-
tion. For each received packet, the reception of the payload is preceded by a packet detection
and timing acquisition phase: Its purpose is (1) to detect the presence of the packet on the
wireless medium, (2) to synchronize the clocks of the transmitter and the receiver and (3) to
find out when the payload starts. Now, and especially with cheap hardware, the clocks at the
transmitter and the receiver drift. For instance with clock offsets of −4 ppm at the transmitter
and 18 ppm at the receiver, the overall clock offset is 22 ppm (clock drifts are measured with
respect to a global reference clock.). With a clock frequency of 500 MHz, the clock will be
offset by one sample every 90 µs. As we show in Section 9.4 of this chapter, this can severely
degrade the performance of even energy-detection receivers that are in general believed to be
robust against timing impairments.
Unfortunately, none of the classical solutions to deal with clock offsets that are known from
narrowband physical layers are directly applicable to energy-detection receivers, as we already
pointed out in Section 3.2.2 when discussing related work. Further, there does not seem to exist
any related work studying clock offsets in the context of energy-detection receivers and their
impact on this particular receiver architecture is thus not well understood.
Our main contribution in this chapter is the development and performance evaluation for IR-
UWB energy-detection receivers of (1) a clock-offset compensation solution and (2) a clock-
offset tracking algorithm. By tracking, we imply both the estimation and correction of the
clock offset. Our tracking algorithm is constructed around the Radon transform [178, 179], an
image processing tool traditionally used to detect line features in images. Our solution does not
increase the hardware complexity of the receiver and naturally takes advantage of the multipath
propagation channel for the estimation of the clock offset. Further, our algorithms are directly
applicable to the IEEE 802.15.4a standard and the tracking algorithm reduces the performance
loss due to clock offset to less than 0.5 dB.
This chapter is organized as follows: An updated system model, incorporating the effect
of clock offsets on the received signal, is given in Section 9.1. We describe our clock offset
compensation and tracking algorithms in Section 9.2 and Section 9.3, respectively. The perfor-
mance of both algorithms is evaluated in Section 9.4. We conclude the chapter in Section 9.5.
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9.1 System Model and Assumptions
Without loss of generality, we consider an IEEE 802.15.4a IR-UWB physical layer (introduced
in Section 2.4. However, everything that follows equally applies to other IR-UWB PHYs,
such as the classical one described in Section 2.2. Further, we focus on non-coherent, energy-
detection reception with binary pulse position modulation (BPPM) (see Section 2.3.3).
The received signal model is a slightly modified version of the one we already encountered
in the foregoing chapters and that was introduced in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2. A modification
is needed to incorporate the effect of imperfect clocks. The new received signal model for the
preamble is then the following
rpre(t) =
Npre−1∑
i=0
si
C−1∑
j=0
cj · h˜(t− (1 + ǫ)(j + iC)LsTc − ν0) + n(t) (9.1)
where ǫ denotes the unknown relative clock offset between the transmitter and the receiver. We
assume both ǫ and the compound channel impulse response h˜(t) to be invariant for the duration
of one packet. Further, n(t) is assumed to be a zero-mean AWGN process with power spectral
density N0/2 (i.e., we here assume no interference). In this chapter, the pulse repetition pe-
riod LsTc plays an important role as we shall see later. However, already here we simplify the
notation by introducing k .= j+ iC. This allows us to combine the Npre preamble symbol mod-
ulation coefficients si and the ternary preamble code cj of length C into a compound preamble
symbol c˜k = s⌊ k
C
⌋ · ck mod C . With this notation, the received signal is now
rpre(t) =
NpreC−1∑
k=0
c˜k · h˜(t− (1 + ǫ)kLsTc − ν0) + n(t) (9.2)
The receiver still uses the preamble for packet detection, timing acquisition, channel esti-
mation and SFD detection. In this chapter we will see that it additionally serves to perform
clock-offset estimation and tracking.
During the payload, the received signal model including the effect of clock drifts is
rpay(t) =
Npay−1∑
i=0
Ncpb−1∑
j=0
bij · h˜(t− (1 + ǫ)Ti,j − ν0) + n(t) (9.3)
with Ti,j = iTf + cTHS,iTburst + diTf/2 + jTc and where Npay is the number of symbols in the
156 9. Clock-Offset Tracking Software Algorithms
payload, Tf is the duration of a symbol, di ∈ {0, 1} is the i-th symbol of the payload, cTHS,i
denotes the time-hopping sequence and bij ∈ ±1 is the scrambling sequence.
9.1.1 Receiver Model and Receiver Operations
On the receiver side, the signal is filtered with a bandpass filter of bandwidth B, squared and
integrated by the energy-detection receiver. The output of the integrator is sampled at rate 1/T .
The integration time T is chosen such that M samples are taken per pulse repetition period of
the preamble i.e., T = L
M
Tc.
This results in the following discrete signal
ym,n =
∫ (m+1)T+ψ(n)
mT+ψ(n)
[rpre(t)]
2 dt, m = 0, 1 . . . ,M − 1. (9.4)
With ψ(n) = nLsTc, ym,n denotes the m-th sample of the n-th block of LsTc consecutive
preamble samples.
Our receiver employs the baseline packet detection and timing acquisition algorithm de-
scribed in Chapter 4. Upon detection of a signal, the receiver undergoes a verification phase. It
is also at this point that we start the clock-offset tracking algorithm proposed in this chapter. If
verification is successful, fine synchronization is performed using the jump-back-and-search-
forward algorithm that is also explained in Chapter 4. The receiver then performs a period of
channel estimation where it estimates the energy-delay profile of the channel according to what
we saw in Chapter 5. At the same time it also begins to look for a special signal sequence
called start-frame-delimiter (SFD). The SFD is used to designate the end of the preamble and
the beginning of the payload and detected according to the soft online algorithm introduced in
Chapter 6.
For the demodulation of the n-th data bit dn of the payload, the receiver may use the opti-
mum decision rule from Chapter 5
M−1∑
m=0
ym,n · qm
dn=0
≷
dn=1
M−1∑
m=0
y
m+
Nf
2
,n
· qm (9.5)
where the weighting coefficients qm are derived from the energy-delay profile of the channel.
Alternatively, a traditional energy-detection receiver with an integration window of fixed dura-
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tion TFix = LMFixTc can also be used. In this case we have
qm = 1 if m ≤MFix, and 0 otherwise. (9.6)
During data reception, the samples ym,n are given by (9.4) where rpre(t) is replaced with
rpay(t) and ψ(n) now equals ψ(n) = nTf + cTHS,nTburst + νˆ0.
9.2 Window Expansion: Clock Drift Compensation
A very simple and natural way of addressing clock drift is to gradually expand the length of the
integration window of traditional energy-detection receivers at a fixed rate ǫr. The integration
window is increased by one sample every 1/ǫr samples. Hence, as the signal drifts, the major
part of its energy stays within the window. Assuming we know the precision of the oscillators
used in our system, ǫr is typically chosen to be roughly the expected clock drift. A clock-drift
estimation is then not required. We call this method Window Expansion. The drawback of this
method is noise enhancement due to the increasing integration duration.
Window Expansion can be generalized to receivers applying a weighting function, such as
the one in (9.5): To expand the window, we smooth the weighting function employed in the
decision rule by convolving it with a time-varying window function that increases over time at
rate ǫr.
Increasing the integration time of traditional energy-detection receivers is then equivalent
to convolving the rectangular weighting function given by (9.6) with a rectangular window of
increasing length. For the receiver employing the optimum decision rule in (9.5), we found a
convolution with a triangular window of increasing length to yield better results than a convo-
lution with a rectangular one.
Note that we do not need any criterion to stop the expansion of the window. The reason
is that within the time it takes to receive an IEEE 802.15.4a packet, the window cannot grow
beyond a symbol duration, even at the growth rate corresponding to the maximum expected
clock drift.
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9.3 Radon Tracking: A Clock Offset Tracking Algorithm
Based on the Radon Transform
In this section, we present a clock-offset tracking algorithm, called Radon Tracking, which
allows for more sophisticated clock-offset compensation than Window Expansion.
9.3.1 Equivalence Between Slope Estimation of a Line in a Gray-Scale Image and
Clock Drift Estimation
During the preamble, the samples ym,n can be rearranged in an “energy matrix”,Y = [ym,n]M×N
[83, 84]. The n-th column contains the M consecutive samples corresponding to the n-th pulse
of the preamble. This energy matrix is then equivalent to a gray-scale image where ym,n is the
intensity of the pixel at coordinate (m,n). Our clock-offset tracking algorithm relies on the fol-
lowing observation: the estimation of the clock drift is equivalent to finding the slope of parallel
lines in this gray-scale image. With perfect clock synchronization (ǫ = 0), the signal in (9.2)
is LsTc-periodic. Consequently, the discrete signal given by (9.4) is M -periodic. Accordingly,
the energy matrix displays a pattern resembling parallel horizontal lines. These parallel lines
correspond to the multi-path components of the signal. Figure 9.1 (a) shows a discrete signal
with 40 samples per frame (M = 40) and two multi-path components. Figure 9.1 (b) shows
the gray-scale image of the corresponding energy matrix. We can observe the two parallel lines
corresponding to the two multi-path components.
Now, let’s assume for a sample ym,n that the integration window is aligned with the received
signal such that it captures the entire energy of a pulse. If the clocks of the transmitter and the
receiver exhibit a relative positive (respectively negative) clock drift of ǫ, the alignment of the
integration window for the sample ym,n+1 is no longer perfect: Some of the energy “leaks”
into the sample ym−1,n+1 (ym+1,n+1, respectively). In consequence, the energy matrix displays
now a pattern resembling parallel lines at a given angle φ. There is a one-to-one relationship
between φ and the clock drift ǫ:
φ = arctan(Mǫ) (9.7)
Figure 9.1 (d) shows our example signal with the two multi-path components but this time
subject to a clock offset 1 of ǫ = 1e− 3. Figure 9.1 (e) shows the corresponding energy matrix.
The signal drifts by one samples every 25 columns (= 1000 samples at M = 40), leading to
1. This value is illustrative only; relative clock offsets found in oscillators are usually two orders of magnitude
lower.
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Figure 9.1: A relative clock offset ǫ leaves a distinctive pattern resembling parallel lines at an
angle φ = arctan(Mǫ) in the energy matrix of an M−periodic signal. In Radon space the
maximum is off the right angle by φ.
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φ = arctan(1/25) = arctan(40 · 1e− 3).
9.3.2 The Radon Transform: A Tool for Line Detection
The (two-dimensional) Radon transform 2 is widely used in image processing for line fea-
ture detection. We use the common ρ, θ parametrization [180] where the Radon transform
R(ρ, θ)[I(x, y)] of the two-dimensional image I(x, y) is
R(ρ, θ)[I(x, y)]=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
I(x, y)δ(ρ− x cos θ − y sin θ) dx dy (9.8)
where ρ is the distance from a line to the origin and θ is the angle of the vector from the origin
to the closest point on the line. We refer to the (ρ, θ)-parameter space as Radon space.
Every point (ρ, θ) in the Radon space corresponds to the integral along the line y =
− cos θ
sin θ
x+ ρ
sin θ
in the original image I(x, y). Finding lines in a gray-scale image corresponds to
finding points with high intensities in Radon space. The basic idea of our algorithm is to apply
this principle to our problem of clock-drift estimation. This is illustrated in Figures 9.1 (c) and
9.1 (f) that show the Radon transforms of our example signals.
Note that the Radon transform can be computed iteratively (see the algorithm in Sec-
tion 9.3.4). Hence, we do not need to accumulate the complete energy matrix. In our sim-
ulations, we calculate the Radon transform by blocks of M samples. In principle, it can even
be calculated sample by sample.
9.3.3 Pre-Processing to Denoise the Input
The Radon transform is already quite robust to noise. However, we further increase this robust-
ness with a pre-processing on the energy matrix before the calculation of the Radon transform.
First, we take into account the preamble code by only considering samples ym,n where the cor-
responding code symbol cˆn 6= 0. Then, along the rows of Y, we apply a moving average filter
over the last G pulses, yielding a matrix Y˜ with elements y˜m,n. Finally, the elements of Y˜
below a threshold ηradon are set to zero 3. This yields the matrix Y¯ with elements y¯m,n. Because
the noise approximatively follows a chi-square distribution, we calculate a threshold ηradon to
2. For discrete binary input images it is often referred to as Hough transform.
3. This also speeds up the algorithm as zero valued entries of Y¯ do not have to be processed in the subsequent
steps.
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reject samples with a probability of more than 5% to consist of noise only:
ηradon =
N0
2
F−1χ2 (1− 0.05|2BT · G) (9.9)
where N0/2 is the (estimated) noise power spectral density and F−1χ2 (x|2BT ·G) is the inverse
of the cumulative distribution function of the chi-square distribution with 2BT · G degrees of
freedom.
9.3.4 Computation of the Discrete Radon Transform
The Radon transform in (9.8) is defined for a continuous input. Therefore, we transform the
discrete matrix Y¯ = [y¯m,n]M×N into a continuous “image” I(x, y) via nearest-neighbor inter-
polation, i.e., I(x, y) = y¯⌊y⌉,⌊x⌉, where ⌊·⌉ denotes the nearest-integer function. Further, as we
cannot store the continuous output of the Radon transform, we discretize the Radon space as
follows
ρi = i ·∆ρ, θj = j ·∆θ. (9.10)
where ∆ρ is defined with respect to the size of a pixel in the energy matrix i.e.,∆ρ = 1/8 means
that we have 8 discrete values per pixel. Hence, we calculate a discrete version R = [Ri,j ] of
the Radon transform according to
Ri,j =
∫ ρi+1
ρi
R(ρ, θj)[I(x, y)] dρ. (9.11)
Because the function I(x, y) is piecewise constant, (9.11) is actually simple to compute.
Algorithm 2 shows an outline of the algorithm we use, an illustration is given in Figure 9.2.
Furthermore, as the precision of the oscillators is known, the range of interest of both θ and
ρ is known. Therefore, the Radon transform can be calculated for only the points of interest,
limiting both processing and memory requirements. The Radon matrix that we store has a
constant size independent of the length of the observation. The Radon transform is akin to a
compression scheme: Instead of the energy matrix, it yields an alternative matrix of a smaller
dimension, which still captures all the signal information that is necessary to perform clock-
drift estimation.
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Algorithm 2: Calculates Radon Transform as in (9.11)
Input: Pixel y¯m,n of Y¯
Output: For each ρ, θ an updated entry Rρ,θ of discrete Radon transform.
if y¯m,n 6= 0 then
foreach θ do
foreach ρ do
f ← fraction of pixel with center ym,n lying between lines parametrized by
(ρ, θ) and (ρ+∆ρ, θ);
Rρ,θ ← Rρ,θ + f · ym,n;
end
end
end
x
y
θj
ρ
ρi
ρi+1
(xn, ym)
Figure 9.2: Illustration showing how to calculate Radon Transform. The total intensity of the
shaded area will be attributed to the entry (ρi, θj) of the Radon transform matrix.
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9.3.5 Angle Estimation by Detection of Maxima in Radon Space
As explained in Sections 9.3.1 and 9.3.2, an estimation of the clock drift is equivalent to finding
the estimate φˆ of the angle φ. Thus, we have to look for maxima in the Radon matrix R.
Naturally, we should find them around the true angle φ. Due to multipath, there will be more
than one such maximum at different values of ρ. We want to take advantage of this property
by combining the contributions of several multipath components. However, the column sums
of the Radon transform matrix are all equal to a constant value i.e. the integral over the whole
image I(x, y). Therefore, the naive approach of choosing φˆ to be the θj with the highest
intensity averaged over all ρ does not work. Instead, we use the following method to determine
φˆ: First, we smooth the matrix R by convolving each column with a rectangular window of
length W = 2/∆ρ, thus combining the values corresponding to two pixels in the original gray-
scale image. Then, we square each entry of the smoothed matrix and compute the column
sums. Finally, we set φˆ to the θj corresponding to the column with maximum column sum, i.e.
φˆ = ∆θ · argmax
j
∑
k
((rectW ∗ R.,j)[k])2 (9.12)
where rectW is the rectangular window and R.,j denotes the j-th column of R.
9.3.6 Continuous Tracking of the Transmitter Clock
We are not only interested in the estimation of the clock drift. We also want to continuously
compensate for it in order to stay aligned with the packet. Tracking of the transmitter clock
is commonly done by adjusting the frequency of the oscillator at the receiver. However, new
observations are obtained with an updated sampling frequency after the adjustment of the fre-
quency of the oscillator. This implies a change of the pattern in the energy matrix and a mod-
ified Radon transform. A priori, this makes a block by block operation necessary where after
each update of the receiver clock: (1) the Radon transform is discarded, (2) a large block of
new samples is collected in order to obtain a new Radon transform and (3) the current clock
drift is re-estimated on the new Radon matrix.
However, such a costly approach can be avoided. It is possible to maintain a single Radon
matrix by applying a coordinate transform to the Radon space before an update of the receiver
clock. This allows for the conservation of the entire signal history and for a continuous estima-
tion and correction of the clock drift.
An illustration of the tracking process and the involved coordinate transform is given in
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Figure 9.3: Illustration of the coordinate transform needed to cope with changing clock drifts
that are due to adjustments of the oscillator frequency. Here the drift changes from θ(0) to θ(1)
at time index x1.
Figure 9.3 and derived in the following. The example shows the simplified case of a single line,
but extension to the situation in Figure 9.2 with a small band is straightforward. In Figure 9.3
we have a line at an angle θ(0) that gets projected to ρ(0) according to equation (9.8). At
column (or “time”) index x1 we adjust the clock of the receiver resulting in a change of the
angle by ∆1 and consequently in a line at an angle
θ(1) = θ(0) + ∆1 (9.13)
For the point (x1, y1) we get the following set of equations according to (9.8):
ρ(0) = x1 cos θ(0) + y1 sin θ(0) (9.14)
ρ(1) = x1 cos θ(1) + y1 sin θ(1) (9.15)
From (9.13)-(9.15) we get after some basic algebra
ρ(1) =
ρ(0) sin(θ(0) + ∆1)− x1 sin∆1
sin θ(0)
(9.16)
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Generalizing this to the coordinate transform after k clock frequency adjustments, we find
θj(k) = θj(0) +
k∑
l=1
∆l (9.17)
ρi(k) =
ρi(0) sin(θj(k))−
∑k
l=1 xl sin∆l
sin θj(0)
≈ ρi(0)−
k∑
l=1
xl sin∆l (9.18)
where ∆l is the angle adjustment corresponding to the l-th clock frequency adjustment, ρi(k)
and θj(k) are the transformed coordinates after k adjustments, and xl is the column index
of the matrix Y¯ corresponding to the l-th point in time where the adjustment occurs. The
approximation is possible because for practical clock drifts we have that θj(m) ≈ π/2.
Equations (9.17) and (9.18) define the transformation we have to apply on the coordinate
system. To be able to do this transformation we just have to keep the two values ∑kl=1∆l and∑k
l=1 xl sin∆l up to date.
In our simulations we start filling the Radon matrix once a coarse estimate of the signal ar-
rival time is available. During the verification phase and fine synchronization, we do not enable
tracking but attempt to get a better first estimate of the clock offset. After fine synchronization,
we track the transmitter clock until the SFD is found.
9.3.7 Handling the Residual Clock Drift
The signaling format change between the preamble and the payload in IEEE 802.15.4a makes
it extremely difficult to maintain a consistent Radon matrix. Hence, we perform clock-drift
estimation and tracking only during the preamble of a packet. However, the preamble is long
enough such that the residual drift is small. Nevertheless, we find a performance increases
if we compensate for this residual drift by employing Window Expansion over the payload
(Section 9.2). Here again, the growth rate of the window is small enough, such that we do not
need a criterion to stop the window expansion (see also Section 9.2).
9.4 Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the effect of clock drift on energy-detection receivers and the performance of our
algorithms, we simulate a full IEEE 802.15.4a system with coarse and fine synchronization,
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estimation of the energy-delay profile of the channel, SFD detection, and data decoding with
the (63, 55) Reed-Solomon code.
The main assumptions for the performance evaluation are again those given in Section 2.5
of Chapter 2. In particular, we focus on the mandatory LPRF mode and use the residential
NLOS channel model. Our main performance metric is the packet error rate (PER) and we
simulate the maximum allowable packet length of 1016 bits per packet. We use the default
length of the preamble of 72 code symbols (including 8 code symbols for the SFD). The signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) is defined as SNR = Ep
N0
where Ep is the received energy per pulse (after
the convolution of the pulse with the impulse response of the channel). The physical layer is
simulated with an accuracy of 100 ps, corresponding to a simulation sampling frequency of
10 GHz. We assume oscillators with a drift uniformly distributed in the range of ±20 ppm,
resulting in relative clock offsets ǫ between transmitters and receivers of up to ±40 ppm. For
the receiver, we mainly focus on the optimal receiver (EDOPT) detailed in Chapter 5 with
T = Tc = 2 ns resulting in a 500 MHz sampling frequency. The bandpass filter is adapted
accordingly. For comparison purposes, we also simulate two reference receivers: one with
a fixed integration time TFix = 128 ns (EDFIX), and one with an integration time that was
optimized for our scenario (EDVAR). Without drift, this optimized integration time was found
to be 56 ns, which is roughly the channel spread of the residential NLOS model. Further,
EDVAR may use Window Expansion to increase the integration time at a constant rate ǫr (but
EDFIX may not). The duration of the integration time for EDFIX is motivated by the fact that
with the IEEE 802.15.4a LPRF mode the minimum inter-pulse spacing during the preamble
corresponds to 128 ns as well. Note, that for both EDVAR and EDFIX, we do not simulate the
preamble. Instead, we assume that a perfect synchronization puts the integration window such
that it captures a maximal amount of energy.
9.4.1 Trade-off Between Noise Enhancement and Robustness to Clock-Drift
Figure 9.4 shows the performance degradation due to a relative clock offset up to ±40 ppm
when no clock-offset compensation is used. We can clearly see the trade-off between noise
enhancement and robustness to clock drift. With perfect clocks, EDOPT outperforms the other
receivers, even though the curves for EDFIX and EDVAR were obtained with a perfect syn-
chronization. On the other hand, EDOPT is very sensitive to clock drifts: Indeed they cause
misalignments of the weights pm (see (9.5)) that strongly degrade the performance. Interest-
ingly, EDVAR is also severely affected by clock drift, although to a lesser extent than EDOPT.
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Figure 9.4: PER with perfectly synchronized clocks or with clocks differing by up to±40ppm.
No receiver compensates for drift. EDOPT is very sensitive to clock drift but shows optimal
performance with perfect clocks. For EDFIX the opposite is true. EDVAR is also severely
affected by clock drift showing the necessity to compensate clock offsets even in suboptimal
receivers. EDFIX and EDVAR suffer from noise enhancement.
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Figure 9.5: EDVAR and EDOPT show much better robustness to clock drift if simple Window
Expansion is used. However, with drift the performance of EDVAR is close to EDFIX and
2dB worse than the optimum receiver with perfectly synchronized clocks. Even with Window
Expansion, EDOPT shows an error floor. More sophisticated mechanisms to cope with drift are
necessary.
EDFIX, on the other hand, is barely affected due to its long integration time.
9.4.2 Window Expansion Helps to Some Extent
Figure 9.5 shows the improvement achievable through Window Expansion. We found ǫr =
32 ppm to give best performance for EDVAR and ǫr = 40 ppm for EDOPT. With drifting
clocks, EDVAR with Window Expansion performs hardly better than EDFIX, which amounts
to a loss of about 2 dB with respect to the optimum curve for perfectly synchronized clocks.
EDOPT with Window Expansion, on the other hand, crosses the other curves and still shows
an error floor. Its performance is thus still limited by packets that are lost due to clock offsets.
Although Window Expansion gives some improvement, it is definitely not sufficient, specially
in the case of EDOPT.
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Figure 9.6: PER if Radon Tracking is used. Curves are for EDOPT with different discretizations
of ∆ǫ and ∆ρ. We also show the two curves from Figure 9.5 giving best performance with and
without drifting clocks. Our algorithm performs well, with ∆ρ equal to 1/8 and 1/4. We loose
less than 0.5 dB with respect to the optimal curve.
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Figure 9.7: (a) Median and 95% confidence intervals of the (absolute) residual drift of Radon
Tracking at the end of the preamble. Finer discretization leads to a better clock drift estimate.
For all resolutions ∆ǫ of the drift estimate, the algorithm is able to approach the optimum of
∆ǫ
4
at high SNR and provided that the resolution of ρ, ∆ρ, is chosen small enough.
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Figure 9.8: Distribution of absolute residual drifts of packets after the preamble with Radon
Tracking. Distribution shown is for ∆ǫ = 1 ppm, ∆ρ = 1/4 and SNR = 11 dB.
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9.4.3 Radon Tracking Achieves Near Optimal Performance
Figure 9.6 shows the performance of Radon Tracking. We show results for different values of
the discretization step ∆ρ. The angular resolution ∆θ either corresponds to a resolution of the
drift of ∆ǫ = 1 ppm or a resolution of ∆ǫ = 10 ppm. To increase robustness against noise we
combine G = 32 preamble pulses and to account for residual drift we set ǫr = 2 ppm. We also
show reference curves for EDOPT with perfect clocks, and EDVAR with Window Expansion
and drifting clocks. The results show that our algorithm performs extremely well with a loss
of less than 0.5 dB with ∆ρ = 1/8 with respect to the optimal curve for perfect clocks. For
∆ρ = 1/4 the performance is virtually identical. If we further increase ∆ρ we get an additional
loss of about 0.2 dB at ∆ρ = 1/2. Even for a resolution of the drift estimator of ∆ǫ = 10 ppm,
we get excellent results at ∆ρ = 1/4. In general, a finer discretization yields a better estimate
of the clock drift. This is confirmed by Figure 9.7, where we show the median of the absolute
value of the residual drift at the end of the preamble. For comparison, we calculated the mean
absolute estimation error of a perfect algorithm that always finds the best estimate but also has
the same constraint on the resolution ∆ǫ. The derivation is given in Appendix A.1 and proves
that no algorithm with resolution ∆ǫ can do better than ∆ǫ
4
. We see that for all resolutions our
algorithm quickly approaches this bound as the SNR increases, provided that the resolution of
ρ is sufficient. This indicates that our algorithm has a performance that is close to the optimal
algorithm.
Figure 9.8 shows the corresponding distribution of the absolute values of the residual clock
drift for ∆ǫ = 1 ppm and ∆ρ = 1/4 at 11 dB. Only a few packets have a residual drift of more
than 2 ppm. This justifies our choice for ǫr = 2 ppm. We found this to be similar for other
angular resolutions. E.g., for ∆ǫ = 10 ppm and ∆ρ = 1/4 only few packets have a residual
drift above 4 ppm. In the case of ∆ǫ = 10 ppm we therefore set ǫr = 4 ppm.
9.4.4 Effect on Synchronization
For both ranging and communication, synchronization is the most crucial part for the reception
of a packet. Figure 9.9 shows the effect of clock drift on the synchronization error rate (SER)
for EDOPT. The SER is measured after SFD detection and includes false alarms and missed
detections. If the receiver does not use tracking, we can see an error floor at about 5% packets
lost due to synchronization errors, mainly because the estimated channel energy-delay profile
used in SFD detection is now misaligned due to drift. With Radon Tracking (here shown for
∆ρ = 1/4, results for other values of ∆ρ were practically identical), the error floor disappears
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Figure 9.9: Synchronization error rate accounting for false alarms and missed detections for
EDOPT. With clock-offset tracking enabled, the error floor disappears and performance is
within 0.3 dB of the one with perfect clocks. With only Window Expansion we interestingly
have similar performance. In contrast to data decoding, clock-offset tracking is thus not strictly
required for synchronization alone.
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and the performance is less than 0.3 dB worse than with perfectly synchronized clocks. Inter-
estingly, the same is true for a receiver that only employs Window Expansion. We attribute
this mostly to the fact that we continuously update the estimate of the channel energy-delay
profile during the preamble. Large misalignments of the weights qm are therefore not possible
during the preamble and the small ones are recovered through Window Expansion. In contrast
to data decoding, clock-offset tracking is thus not strictly required for synchronization alone.
Even in ranging applications, however, this is only of limited interest because one might need
to determine the clock offset in order to account for it in the range calculations.
9.5 Conclusion and Possible Directions for Future Work
We have shown that to prevent a considerable performance loss, clock drifts need to be ad-
dressed for energy-detection receivers. We analyzed two solutions: Window Expansion and
Radon Tracking. The latter is a clock-offset tracking algorithm based on the Radon trans-
form that yields excellent performance. Further, it can be implemented without requiring any
changes to the hardware structure of an energy-detection receiver. The output of the algorithm
can also be directly used for estimation of the clock drift between transmitter and receiver,
which may be needed to improve the accuracy of ranging measurements.
We believe that this algorithm is even more versatile and could be used for channel esti-
mation and time-of-arrival estimation purposes. An intuition of this claim can be gained by
observing that the Radon matrix (see Figure 9.1) retains all the necessary information to per-
form these tasks: the column of the matrix corresponding to the current clock offset estimate
corresponds exactly to the channel energy-delay profile. The Radon Tracking algorithm could
thus provide a compact method to perform several receiver operations in parallel. Further in-
vestigations on this are required and could form a possible future research direction.
Another point that future work should address is the performance of the algorithm under
multi-user interference. However, there is no reason to believe that techniques similar to those
that we developed in Part I of this thesis could not be applied to the samples at the input of this
algorithm.
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Effectiveness of Distance-decreasing
Attacks Against Impulse Radio Ranging
Its large bandwidth and the resulting fine temporal resolution, give IR-UWB the unmatched
capability of high (sub-meter) precision indoor ranging, even in dense multi-path environments
[181]. This ability to accurately measure the distance between two devices is crucial for many
location aware applications and services, and was thus one of the main motivations to include
IR-UWB as an alternative PHY in IEEE 802.15.4.
On the other hand, many applications that rely on information that depends on a device’s
physical location, are security-sensitive and require ranging to be executed in a secure man-
ner. By secure we mean that some trusted location information needs to be obtained, even in
the presence of an adversary that interferes with the ranging process. One example of such a
security-sensitive application is the tracking of goods and people [182]. Consider a valuable
item, such as a Swiss watch, equipped with a wireless-enabled (RFID) tag. The watch is dis-
played in a store equipped with a monitoring system that measures the distance to the tag every
few seconds. If anyone tries to move the watch beyond some distance from the monitoring sys-
tem, an alarm is triggered. The system must prevent an adversary from decreasing the measured
distance between the monitoring system and the tag. Otherwise, the adversary can remove the
watch from the store and make the monitoring system believe that the watch is still within the
store premises. Other examples for applications with similar requirements include RFID access
control [183], secure neighbor discovery [184], secure time synchronization [185], and secure
localization [152].
Significant research efforts have led to various secure ranging protocols (see [147] for the
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original description and Section 3.3 of the related work for references to alternate proposals)
that guarantee the measured distance between two devices to be an upper-bound on their ac-
tual distance. 1 With secure ranging protocols, an adversary is prevented from decreasing the
estimated distance by injecting bogus messages because the messages exchanged during the
ranging process are cryptographically protected.
While secure ranging protocols prevent distance-decreasing attacks on the protocol level,
they abstract away from the lower communication layers. Previous work [162] points out that
the physical layer (PHY) leaves space for attacks against secure ranging. Such attacks on the
PHY make it possible for an adversary to decrease the estimated distance without breaking any
cryptographic primitives or protocols. However, such attacks are, by nature, PHY-specific, a
separate evaluation of their effectiveness on different PHY technologies is necessary.
In this chapter we evaluate the effectiveness of distance-decreasing attacks against the phys-
ical layer of IR-UWB. Understanding the impact of PHY attacks on IR-UWB is of particular
interest because IR-UWB is a natural candidate for the PHY of a secure ranging protocol: IR-
UWB not only has the potential for high precision ranging, but it is to date also the only wireless
technology with a standard specifically designed for ranging applications. Further, the IEEE
802.15.4a standard even includes an optional private ranging mode meant to enable ranging in
the presence of an adversary.
We show that the de facto standard for IR-UWB, IEEE 802.15.4a, does not automatically
provide security against such attacks. We find that with the mandatory modes of the standard
an external attacker can decrease the measured distance by more than 100 meters with a high
probability (above 99%). Further, we evaluate possible countermeasures and we also analyze
the impact of different receiver structures on the attack performance.
This chapter is organized as follows: In Section 10.1 we give our assumptions on honest
and adversarial devices as well as on the secure ranging protocol. In Section 10.2 we propose
a set of attacks that compromise the security of secure ranging with IEEE 802.15.4a. These
attacks are introduced under the assumption that both honest and adversarial devices are energy-
detection receivers. In Section 10.3 we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed attacks with
detailed physical layer simulations. In Section 10.4 we discuss possible countermeasures and
explain why the private ranging mode of the standard is not resilient against the proposed
attack. In Section 10.5 we relax the assumption on the receiver architecture and reevaluate the
effectiveness of distance-decreasing attacks in different scenarios where Rake receivers may be
used in addition to energy-detection receivers. Finally, we conclude the chapter in Section 10.6.
1. For this reason, such protocols are often also referred to as distance-bounding protocols.
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10.1 System Model and Assumptions
10.1.1 Assumptions on Honest Wireless Devices
We assume that devices engaging in a secure ranging protocol share the necessary crypto-
graphic material, and that they are equipped with an IEEE 802.15.4a compliant receiver and
transmitter. A description of IEEE 802.15.4a can be found in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2 and
the reader is referred there for details. Characteristics of IEEE 802.15.4a that are essential to
understand the physical layer attacks will, however, also be highlighted when we introduce the
attacks. As usual, we restrict ourselves to the mandatory modes of the standard. Nonethe-
less, we still discuss some of the optional features, such as the private ranging mode, which is
discussed in Section 10.4.1.
The choice of transmitter is of little consequence to our investigation, any standard-compliant
transmitter is acceptable [124, 186].
In the main part of this chapter, the architecture of the receiver used by honest devices is
assumed to be the non-coherent energy-detection receiver from Chapter 5. In a second part,
we relax this assumption and also consider the implications of using a coherent Rake receiver.
Still, we deem the energy-detection receiver to be a more realistic solution for RFID in terms
of cost and complexity and easier to implement on the small and cheap active tags that we
consider. It has also been shown to have optimal performance in this class of receivers (see,
e.g., Chapter 5 or [33]) and it can be made quite robust to multi-user interference (see Part I of
this thesis).
We assume that the receiver performs the usual operations, such as packet detection and
timing acquisition, channel estimation, SFD detection and data decoding. Throughout this
chapter, we assume no multi-user interference (MUI) and the receiver considered here uses
algorithms that, as we have seen in Part I, are not necessarily robust to MUI. In particular, this
means that packet detection and timing acquisition are done according to the baseline algo-
rithm in Section 6.2 and channel estimation according to Section 5.1.2. For SFD detection,
the receiver employs the DESSERT algorithm using soft-decision decoding, described in Sec-
tion 6.3, and for data decoding the received samples are weighted with the optimal weights for
burst transmissions according to Section 5.1.1. However, all of the considered attacks equally
apply to the robust algorithms and we have no reason to believe that any of our findings would
fundamentally change in this case.
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10.1.2 Assumptions on Secure Ranging Protocol
In general, secure ranging protocols are developed without a particular physical layer in mind.
They rather act on the protocol level by enhancing traditional ranging with messages that are
cryptographically protected.
A secure ranging protocol is executed between two wireless devices, that are traditionally
called the verifier and the prover. The verifier initiates the ranging process by sending a range
request to the prover. The prover then responds with another message and the verifier estimates
their mutual distance based on the round trip time. The verifier then also verifies that the
obtained result is valid, i.e., that no one tampered with the result.
We distinguish two classes of secure ranging protocols: protocols that attempt to thwart
internal attacks and protocols that only try to prevent external attacks. An internal attack occurs
if one of the devices that execute the protocol is misbehaving. Protocols that only prevent
external attacks, assume both the verifier and the prover to be honest.
We only consider external attacks, for several reasons. First of all protocols preventing
internal attacks include, for the most part 2, a rapid-bit-exchange phase (RBE): The verifier
sends a number of single bit challenges, to which the prover must respond instantly. Such
unusual requirements make these protocols difficult to implement. 3 In particular, an IEEE
802.15.4a implementation of RBE would not only be extremely inefficient, as every bit would
have to be prefixed with a (relatively long) preamble – it would also be open to packet-level
attacks considered in [162]. Furthermore, security against external attacks is sufficient in many
applications (e.g., the theft prevention system mentioned earlier). Finally, considering only the
PHY, an external attack is more challenging to mount than an internal one. 4 Moreover, the
individual components of the attack that we will devise in the following can also be used by a
malicious prover to mount an internal attack.
On the other hand, protocols that merely try to prevent external attacks [152, 153] only
require the exchange of a small number (typically 2) of ranging messages that are several
bits long. This makes them easily implementable on IEEE 802.15.4a compliant devices. Fig-
ure 10.1 shows a typical example of such a protocol. Both ranging messages consist of nonces
that are unpredictable by an external adversary. The nonces are bound to the shared, secret
key via a message authentication code, which allows the verifier to check the validity of the
2. A recent proposal [156] shows that the RBE can be replaced by a full-duplex transmission in protocols that
provide security against internal attacks
3. To this date, no implementation of RBE for wireless networks exists.
4. The same is not necessarily true in a more global context, since one could argue that it might be difficult for
an adversary to compromise a honest device, which is required to mount an internal attack.
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Figure 10.1: Example secure ranging protocol: Device A (verifier) estimates the distance to
device B (prover) with the formula dAB = c(tRTT− tTA)/2, where c is the channel propagation
speed. MACAB stands for Message Authentication Code with a symmetric key shared between
A and B, NA and NB are freshly generated nonces, tTA is a constant turn-around time that A
and B know, and tRTT is the round-trip-time measured by A.
protocol run and prevents an external adversary from injecting bogus messages and thus from
interfering with the ranging process.
Two Strategies to Check Validity of a Nonce at the Verifier
We have already said that nonces need to be unpredictable by the adversary. This is usually
ensured by a constraint on their length, which makes correct guessing of the nonce hard. If this
were not the case, we would open the door for guessing attacks that make it possible for an
external adversary to decrease the measured distance. An example of a guessing attack, where
the adversary correctly guesses the nonce NB , is shown in Figure 10.2.
To prevent an adversary from guessing a nonce, we fix a security level Pguess, corresponding
to the maximum allowable success probability of a guessing attack. If a nonce of length Nnonce
has equiprobable bits, we have that
Pguess = 2
−Nnonce (10.1)
For a given security level, a first strategy (nonce verification strategy I) consists in fixing the
minimum required length of a nonce according to (10.1). The verifier then accepts a nonce as
legitimate if it contains no errors.
An alternative strategy (nonce verification strategy II) is to generalize the above decision
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Figure 10.2: Example of a guessing attack: The external adversary M guesses the value of
the nonce NB and starts its transmission early enough, such that the measured distance dAB =
c(tRTT − tTA)/2 at A is decreased. At the same time, M ensures that the attack is not detected
at A by blocking the legitimate response of B through, e.g., jamming the signal.
rule at the verifier and to reject a nonce if it contains more than Nerr bits that are in error, with
Nerr = F
−1
BIN(Pguess|Nnonce, 1/2) (10.2)
where F−1BIN(x|n, p) is the inverse of the CDF of a binomial distribution with parameters n and
p.
Although this strategy increases the length of a nonce for Nerr > 0, it allows the protocol to
operate at virtually any bit error rate by simply increasing the length of the nonce (we will see
in Section 10.4 why this is an important property for potential countermeasures). Indeed, we
have that
lim
Nnonce→∞
Nerr = lim
Nnonce→∞
F−1BIN(Pguess|Nnonce, 1/2) = lim
Nnonce→∞
F−1N (Pguess|Nnonce/2, Nnonce/4)
(10.3)
where F−1N (x|µ, σ2) is the inverse of the CDF of a normal distribution with mean µ and variance
σ2 and the second equality follows from the central limit theorem. The protocol succeeds as
long as there are no more than Nerr errors in a nonce of length Nnonce, resulting in a bit error rate
of BERmax = Nerr/Nnonce. From (10.3) it then follows that, as the length of the nonce increases,
the maximum sustainable bit error rate BERmax tends to the worst case of 1/2, i.e.,
lim
Nnonce→∞
BERmax = lim
Nnonce→∞
Nnonce/2 +
√
Nnonce/4Φ
−1(Pguess)
Nnonce
=
1
2
(10.4)
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Figure 10.3: Distance-decreasing relay attack setup.
where Φ−1(x) denotes the inverse CDF of a standard normal distribution.
The applicability of either of these two strategies depends on assumptions made about how
the secure ranging protocol is implemented on the honest IEEE 802.15.4a compliant devices.
Consider the likely scenario where the implementor of a secure ranging protocol buys off-
the-shelf IEEE 802.15.4a devices and implements the protocol at the application layer. In many
cases, it is unlikely that he has access to the lower communication layers and especially to the
received bits before error correction with the mandatory Reed-Solomon (RS) code is performed.
This in turn makes it impossible for him to use nonce verification strategy II because once the
RS code is applied, it is no longer possible to determine how many of the received bits were
in error. Having said that, he can still use nonce verification strategy I with Nnonce equal to
the number of information bits at the application layer. This is possible, since the maximum
number of errors that the RS code can mask corresponds to the number of parity bits added
during RS encoding.
Consequently, nonce verification strategy II can only be applied if information about the
number of erroneous systematic bits is available at the protocol level. In this case we assume
that the length of the nonce is chosen such that both ranging and communication packets expe-
rience similar packet error rates (PER). The length of a nonce is then the solution to the system
of equations formed by (10.2), that ensures a certain security level, and
Nerr = F
−1
BIN(1− PERcomm|Nnonce,BERcomm) (10.5)
that ensures a PER for ranging PERrang that is in the order of the PER for communication
packets PERcomm. Equation (10.5) is found by measuring the average BER of communication
messages BERcomm that leads to the target PER of PERcomm. Further, it is assumed that the
number of bit errors in a packet is binomially distributed. This is an approximation as individual
bits are not identically distributed because of the IEEE 802.15.4a burst transmissions.
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10.1.3 Threat Model, Assumptions on Adversary
We consider an external adversary mounting a distance-decreasing relay attack between two
honest devices, A and B, that execute a secure ranging protocol. The general setup of such
an attack is shown in Figure 10.3, the details of the attack are explained in Section 10.2. The
adversary acts as a relay and uses two devices MA and MB , where A can communicate directly
only withMA and B can communicate directly only withMB . In some scenarios this is inherent
due to the limited radio range of A and B. In other scenarios, this can be achieved by shielding
one of the victim devices (e.g., with a “booster bag” that is coated with aluminium foil [187]
and acts as a Faraday cage).
Additionally, MA and MB exchange information using an out-of-band adversarial channel.
The IEEE 802.15.4a channel propagation speed is c, the speed of light. The same speed is
assumed for the adversarial channel.
We assume that the adversary is not able to break any cryptographic primitives used by the
secure ranging protocol that is executed between A and B. We further assume that the length
of nonces is such that guessing attacks are infeasible (see Section 10.1.2).
We focus on the exchange of a single ranging message. In this case one of the honest devices
acts as a transmitter (HTX) and the other one as a receiver (HRX). Accordingly, the adversarial
devices act as a receiver (ARX), and as a transmitter (ATX). It is easy to extend this attack to
an entire secure ranging protocol. The adversary simply mounts the distance-decreasing relay
attack on all ranging messages. Any non-ranging messages of the protocol, which are not time
critical, can be relayed in an arbitrary fashion.
Assumptions on Adversarial Wireless Devices
The adversarial devices are equipped with transmitters similar to the honest devices, but able
to send non-standard-compliant pulse sequences, and to ignore regulatory transmission limits.
Analog to the honest receivers, we for now assume that the receivers of the adversary fol-
low the architecture of the optimal non-coherent energy-detection receiver for IEEE 802.15.4a,
introduced in Chapter 5. Later we relax this assumption and consider the case where the ad-
versary may also use a coherent all-Rake (ARake, introduced in Section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2)
receiver which gives him the best possibly achievable performance.
The adversary may further equip its devices with high gain antennas, allowing him to in-
crease the SNR observed by both adversarial and honest devices. Such an increase in received
SNR can also be achieved by the adversary moving its devices closer to the honest devices.
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Figure 10.4: Overview of the distance-decreasing relay attack. ARX and ATX are assumed to
lie on a line between HRX and HTX. The thick dotted arrow indicates time-of-arrival corre-
sponding to the actual distance between HTX and HRX.
10.2 Distance-decreasing Attack
The main principle of a distance-decreasing relay attack, is for an adversary to relay messages
between HTX and HRX in such a way that they seem “shifted back in time” by some positive
offset trelay that we call the relay time-gain. This is illustrated in Figure 10.4. The measured
distance is then decreased by c · trelay. 5
The difficulty in mounting this attack is twofold: (1) ATX needs to begin the transmission
of the preamble before it learns from ARX when HTX started the transmission. (2) ATX needs
to transmit the payload before it learns what bits the payload carries. Existing work has focused
exclusively on the second problem [162, 163], but the first one is equally important: Without
shifting the time-of-arrival at HRX, attacks on the payload are in vain.
Naturally, the preamble and the payload must be relayed with the same time-gain. This
implies that the upper-bound on the achievable time-gain is the minimum of (1) the upper-
bound on the time-gain for the preamble and (2) the upper-bound of the time-gain for the
payload. As we will see shortly, the payload upper-bound is more strict and determines the
achievable relay-gain.
5. Assuming an optimal configuration from the adversary’s perspective where ARX and ATX lie on a line
between HTX and HRX. In other configurations the distance decrease will be smaller. Note, however, that the
choice of the configuration rests with the adversary.
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Figure 10.5: Distance-decreasing relay attack on the preamble.
10.2.1 Attack on the Preamble
In general, the adversary cannot know when HTX will begin the transmission of a packet.
Although ATX can always choose to begin transmitting a preamble at a random time, there is
a good chance it either does this too late, resulting in a distance increase, or too early, such that
the distance-decreasing attack on the payload (which, as we already mentioned, will turn out
to be the bottleneck) fails. Even if neither is the case, the achieved time-gain is random, which
might lead to undesired results, e.g., negative distance estimates.
To circumvent these problems, we propose that the adversary mounts a distance decreasing
relay attack on the preamble according to what is depicted in Figure 10.5 and explained in the
following. For clarity of presentation, we here assume the distance between ARX and ATX to
be 0.
The received signal during the IEEE 802.15.4a preamble is given by (see Section 2.4.2 of
Chapter 2)
rpre(t) =
Npre−1∑
i=0
si
C−1∑
j=0
cj · h˜(t− (j + iC)LsTc − ν0) + n(t) (10.6)
The preamble consists of a succession of Npre preamble symbols of length Tpsym = CLsTc that
are modulated by the sequence si. The first Nsync preamble symbols form the SYNC part of the
preamble and we have that si = 1, for i = 0, . . . , Nsync − 1. For the remaining Nsfd preamble
symbols, si, i = Nsync, . . . , Npre − 1, corresponds to the ternary SFD sequence, the mandatory
one being 0 1 0 −1 1 0 0 −1. In Figure 10.5, we denote preamble symbols for which si = 1
with S, preamble symbols for which si = −1 by −S and preamble symbols for which si = 0
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with 0. Every preamble symbol is formed by C code symbols that are modulated according to
the ternary preamble code cj .
Since the preamble codes used in the mandatory IEEE 802.15.4a modes are publicly known,
ARX can use the same packet detection and timing acquisition algorithm that is used by honest
receivers. Assume that a packet from HTX arrives at ARX at time ν0 and ARX acquires timing
at time tacq. ARX then signals the fact that it acquired timing to ATX. At this point, ARX
is synchronized to the boundaries of a preamble symbol. However, the exact time it takes
to synchronize depends on the channel conditions and is therefore not known to ARX, thus
requiring detection of the SFD as it is also the case for honest receivers.
After timing acquisition, ARX performs channel estimation, again exactly according to the
procedures used by honest receivers.
Deviating from honest receivers, ARX then however continues with early SFD detection: it
chooses an early SFD detection delay tSFDED and tries to detect the presence of the SFD by delib-
erately only considering the first MSFDED = tSFDED /T samples of every received preamble symbol.
T here denotes the sampling period of the receiver. This is in contrast to the honest receiver that
will take the entire SFD sequence into account for optimal performance. Early SFD detection
can be performed according to the DESSERT algorithm used by honest receivers, with the only
difference that every block at its input yk now only consists of the first MSFDED samples and is
given by
yk = (y
pre
kCM , y
pre
kCM+1 . . . , y
pre
k+MSFDED −1
) (10.7)
instead of equation (6.11) of the DESSERT algorithm in Chapter 6. Since preamble symbols
during the SYNC part are modulated with a coefficient of 1 and the first preamble symbol
of the SFD sequence is modulated with a coefficient of 0, this boils down to testing the two
hypotheses “yk consists of signal plus noise” versus “yk consists of noise only”. The SFD is
detected if the latter is more likely.
At the other end of the relay, ATX chooses a late SFD commit delay tSFDLC and remains silent
until ARX signals that timing acquisition was successful. Then, after an appropriately chosen
(we explain how shortly) delay τ < Tpsym, ATX begins transmitting a sequence of preamble
symbols with si = 1. This is repeated until ARX signals that the SFD was detected. Imme-
diately afterwards, ATX switches to the transmission of a standard compliant SFD, beginning
from tSFDLC into the SFD. This completes our description of the distance-decreasing attack on the
preamble.
In contrast to a standard-compliant preamble, the SYNC part of the preamble generated by
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Figure 10.6: Distance decreasing relay attack on the payload symbol.
ATX thus begins with a number of 0 modulated preamble symbols. Further, the beginning of
the SFD corresponds to a preamble symbol of the SYNC part for a duration of tSFDLC , instead of
having no signal contribution as it is the case of the standard-compliant SFD. As we show in
Section 10.3, the preamble is long enough to accommodate for the missing symbols in the be-
ginning and the modified SFD sequence is close enough to the real one for HRX to synchronize
correctly.
The relay time-gain achieved by this attack is trelay = tSFDLC − tSFDED . This determines the
choice of τ , since Tpsym − τ = trelay mod Tpsym. Note that nothing prevents the adversary
from choosing tSFDLC > Tpsym. Rather, the hard upper-bound on the time-gain achievable by the
preamble attack is the duration of the SFD Tsfd.
10.2.2 Attack on the Payload
The attack on the payload is performed on a frame by frame basis and it again consists of an
early detection (ED) and a late commit (LC) part. An illustration of the attack is shown in
Figure 10.6.
The received signal during the i-th IEEE 802.15.4a payload symbol is given by (see Sec-
tion 2.4.3 of Chapter 2)
rpay,i(t) = ai
Ncpb−1∑
j=0
bij · h˜(t− iTf − diTf/2− cTHS,iTburst − jTc − ν0) + n(t) (10.8)
Since non-coherent energy-detection receivers are unable to distinguish the BPSK symbols ai,
we can for now assume that ai = 1. Further, the receivers knows the TOA from synchronization
allowing us to assume ν0 = 0. Note that both the scrambling sequence bij , as well as the time-
hopping sequence (THS) cTHS,i are publicly known. This leaves us with the BPPM symbol di
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as the only quantity that is not known to the attacker. For simplicity, we for now assume a
time-hopping index of cTHS,i = 0.
ARX performs an early detection attack by deciding on the value of di after an early de-
tection delay tED < Tf/2. Instead of taking into account the whole BPPM frame like a honest
receiver would, ARX thus deliberately ignores most of the frame. By doing so, ARX essentially
replaces BPPM demodulation on-off keying (OOK) demodulation. The maximum likelihood
decision rule is then
MED−1∑
m=0
LLR(ym|N0/2, 2BT, qm)
d0=0
≷
d0=1
0 (10.9)
instead of the optimal BPPM decision rule from Section 5.1.1 of Chapter 5. MED = tED/T
denotes the number of samples that go into the decision and where the log-likelihood ratio
(LLR) is given by equation (5.6) of Chapter 5. The time tED can be made arbitrarily small,
it determines the attack’s performance. The value for optimal performance is dictated by the
channel delay spread, as we show in Section 10.3.
After demodulation, ARX signals the result to ATX. On the other end of the relay, ATX
performs a late commit attack. ATX begins the transmission of a frame Tf/2 before the frame’s
bit value is received from ARX. At this point in time, ATX does, however, not yet know what
bit value the relayed frame should carry. It therefore begins the transmission of the frame, like
it would if a 0-bit were transmitted: since it knows both the THS and the spreading sequence it
can send an appropriate burst of pulses with energy E0 in the 0-block of the frame. Once the
bit value to be relayed is signalled by ARX, ATX acts accordingly: If it is a 0-bit, it transmits
nothing in the 1-block of the frame; if it is a 1-bit, it transmits a burst of pulses with energy
E1 > E0. The resulting transmitted signal has the form
xLCpay,i(t) =
Ncpb−1∑
j=0
bij · pLCdi (t− iTf − cTHS,iTburst − jTc + trelay) (10.10)
with pLCdi (t) given by
pLCdi (t) =
√
E0p(t) + di ·
√
E1p(t− Tf/2) (10.11)
where p(t) is the pulse shape used by the transmitter. The optimal ratio between E0 and E1,
γ = E0/E1 is determined in Section 10.3. This attack exploits the fact that HRX performs a
simple energy comparison to demodulate. The late commit delay is tLC = Tf/2. The resulting
relay time-gain due to this attack is trelay = tLC − tED ≤ Tf/2, which is considerably less than
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the upper-bound due to the preamble part of the attack.
Note that the THS does not affect the time-gain of the attack. Indeed, assume that the early
detection and late commit delays with time-hopping index cTHS,i = 0 are denoted by t0ED and
t0LC, respectively. The relay time-gain under this assumption is given by t0relay = t0LC − t0ED.
Next, consider mounting these attacks in the case where cTHS,i > 0. Because cTHS,i is publicly
known, the adversary simply shifts early detection and late commit in time. Hence, tED =
t0ED+ cTHS,iTburst and tLC = t0LC+ cTHS,iTburst, and consequently trelay = t0LC+ cTHS,iTburst− t0ED−
cTHS,iTburst = t
0
LC − t0ED = t0relay.
10.2.3 Processing Delays
An additional factor that reduces the relay time-gain, and hence the amount by which the dis-
tance can be decreased, are the processing delays at ARX and ATX for the IEEE 802.15.4a and
adversarial channels. We discuss these delays here, and argue that it is feasible to keep them in
the order of 10 − 30 nanoseconds (or below 10 meters). We focus on the payload, as it is the
bottleneck in terms of the achieved delay (the adversary has much more time flexibility during
the preamble). We distinguish two cases: (i) ARX and ATX integrated into one device, with
appropriate shielding and directional antennas, and (ii) remote ARX and ATX. The latter case
can lead to a broader scope of attacks, as the adversary has the flexibility of placing its devices
close to the corresponding victim devices. On the downside, remote ARX and ATX are subject
to an additional processing delay, due to communication over the adversarial channel.
We first consider the processing delay related to the communication with the honest de-
vices, which applies in both (i) and (ii). At ARX the delay consists of the processing due to
demodulation, after the necessary signal has been received. Most of the quantities that are
needed in the decision rule given by (10.9) can be pre-computed or tabulated such that a fast
evaluation is possible. For minimum latency, the adversary further has the option of increasing
the integration time of the energy-detection receiver to tED. In this case, the adversary looses
about 1 dB in received power with respect to a receiver that samples at the chip level. However,
since MED = 1, the decision rule can be reduced to a simple check against a pre-computed
threshold [105, 106]. Overall, demodulation should be doable in a few clock cycles, leading to
processing delays in the order of only a few nanoseconds. At ATX, the delay is of the same
order: after the bit value is received from ARX, the transmitter only needs to proceed with or
abort the transmission of a previously known burst of pulses (Figure 10.6).
In case (ii), there is an additional delay due to communication over the adversarial channel:
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more precisely, the delay of putting the bit value on the adversarial channel at ARX, and de-
modulating it at ATX. The exact numbers depend heavily on the technology ARX and ATX use
to communicate. The adversary is most likely to choose a wireless communication medium,
due to its faster propagation speed, but even more so because of the ease of attack deployment
compared to a wired channel.
We emphasize that the adversarial channel has unusual requirements. It does not require a
high bit-rate, as the adversary only needs to transmit a single bit every 1µs. However, the bit
has to be transmitted as fast as possible. Many wireless technologies, even those with very high
bit-rates, such as 802.11n, are not suitable: They achieve these high bit-rates through large
modulation constellation sizes, rather than a short symbol duration. One valid option is IR-
UWB with on-off keying, and a receiver similar to the ED receiver described in Section 10.2.2.
Naturally, the adversary will ignore the regulations and transmit with a power high enough
to achieve a negligible error rate. To mitigate the multipath delay spread, a highly directive
antenna can be used, as proposed for a narrow-band communication system in [188]. The
coherent two-level PSK scheme proposed in [188] can also be used as the adversarial channel:
It reports bit duration of only 1.6 ns. Overall, in case (ii), a processing delay in the order of
10 − 30 ns (3− 9 m) seems feasible.
10.3 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the distance-decreasing relay attacks with
packet-based system simulations. We simulate a full IEEE 802.15.4a system including all
the operations necessary to receive a packet: timing acquisition, estimation of the channel
energy-delay profile, SFD detection, and data decoding. The physical layer is simulated with
an accuracy of 100 ps.
As explained in Section 10.1.1, we confine ourselves to the two mandatory IEEE 802.15.4a
modes (LPRF and HPRF). The standard suggests using the LPRF mode with energy-detection
receivers operating in environments with a high multipath delay spread. For energy-detection
receivers operating in environments with low delay spread, using the HPRF mode is preferable.
Following these suggestions, we therefore use two different channel models to evaluate the
LPRF and HPRF modes: The IEEE 802.15.4a residential non-line-of-sight (NLOS) model for
LPRF and the the office line-of-sight (LOS) model for HPRF [14].
In all our simulations, we use the ternary preamble code number 5 of length Npcode = 31
given by the standard. The values chosen for tSFDED and tSFDLC are chosen with respect to the
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structure of this code. Further, the integration time of the energy-detection receiver is set to
T = 2 ns and all confidence intervals shown are at the 95% level.
Our main performance metrics are the packet error rate (PER) and the synchronization error
rate (SER). We consider a packet to be in error if it was not acquired during synchronization
or if it does not pass the verification at the verifier. A packet is not acquired if it is not de-
tected (missed detection) or if the synchronization is off by too much for data decoding to be
performed correctly (false alarm). We have seen in Section 10.1.2 that depending on the im-
plementation of a secure ranging protocol, different verification strategies that in turn lead to
different definitions of the PER are possible. For nonce verification strategy I, based on the RS
decoded bits at the application layer, verification fails if more bits are received in error than the
RS code can correct. In this case we assume a payload of 128 bits, which we consider a conser-
vative upper-bound on the length of a ranging message in a secure ranging protocol. For nonce
verification strategy II, that is based on the systematic bits and does not use the RS code, the
number of tolerated bit errors Nerr depends on the length of the nonce Nnonce. Having nonces of
Nnonce = 42 bits and tolerating up to Nerr = 3 errors results in a security level of Pguess = 2−32.
Further, the PERs of ranging packets in this case match those of a communication packet with
a payload of 32 bits, reaching a PER of PERcomm = 10−2 at an SNR of about 6.5 dB.
The signal to noise ratio (SNR) is defined as SNR = Ep
N0
where Ep is the received energy
per pulse (after the convolution of the pulse with the impulse response of the channel). To
evaluate the cost of the attack, we compare the benign case performance (honest receiver and
transmitter) with the performance under attack. We then express the cost as the difference
in SNR (between the two cases) necessary for the same performance (SER, PER). This tells
us by what factor the adversary needs to boost the received signal level to obtain the same
performance as in the case of an honest execution of the protocol. He can achieve this by using
a high-gain antenna, by transmitting with a higher power, or by moving closer to the victim
transceivers.
In a first part of the performance evaluation, we determine the performance of attacks on
the preamble and on the payload individually. In a second part, we look at the whole system,
putting all the components together, thus allowing us to assess the overall performance of the
distance-decreasing relay attack.
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Figure 10.7: SER versus SNR for LPRF comparing benign performance to ED with varying
ED delays tSFDED .
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Figure 10.9: Performance loss ∆SNR with respect to benign case at fixed SER = 10−2 versus
tSFDED and tSFDLC for LPRF and HPRF.
10.3.1 Attack on the Preamble
An honest receiver performing SFD detection takes the entire length Tsfd of the SFD into ac-
count. For LPRF this equals Tsfd = 31.8µs, for HPRF Tsfd = 7.95µs.
Figure 10.7 shows the SER for an honest receiver, as well as for an adversary that performs
early SFD detection with different early SFD detection delays tSFDED . The curves shown here
are for LPRF. Not surprisingly, the earlier an adversary performs SFD detection, the more
additional received power with respect to an honest receiver it is going to cost him to reach a
given level of SER. If we fix SER = 10−2, detecting the SFD at tSFDED = 3.712µs costs the
adversary ∆SNR = 2.8 dB in additional received power, detecting at tSFDED = 0.128µs entails a
cost of ∆SNR = 11.2 dB.
For tSFDED , we only consider values shorter than the length of the first SFD symbol. Larger
values for tSFDED do not make much sense for the adversary because they also force him to commit
after the first SFD symbol, which is only possible at a considerable additional cost. This can be
seen in Figure 10.8, which shows the SER of an adversary that commits late, at time tSFDLC into
the SFD. Again, the results shown are for LPRF. Committing at tSFDLC = 8 · 128ns = 1.02µs,
or earlier is within 0.6 dB of the benign case and thus comes at practically no additional cost
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at a target SER of 10−2. Committing later comes at an ever increasing cost: Committing at
tSFDLC = 29 · 128ns = 3.712µs, already costs ∆SNR = 7.5 dB. According to the preamble and
SFD codes, no pulse is sent between the 29th code symbol of the first SFD symbol and the first
code symbol of the third SFD symbol. So committing anywhere between tSFDLC = 3.712µs and
tSFDLC = 63 ·128ns = 8.064µs is equivalent to committing at tSFDLC = 8.064µs, which costs more
than ∆SNR = 9 dB.
Results for HPRF are generally close to those of LPRF shown so far. Performing ED at
tSFDED = 928 ns, for example, costs the adversary about ∆SNR = 2.9 dB, compared to 2.8 dB for
LPRF. This can be seen in Figure 10.9 where we show the additional cost ∆SNR with respect
to an honest receiver versus tSFDED and tSFDLC for both LPRF and HPRF and a fixed SER of 10−2.
The corresponding SNR values were found via interpolation of curves such as those shown in
Figures 10.7 and 10.8. Results for ED are close and within 0.5 dB. Late commit generally costs
about 1 dB more in the case of HPRF. Note the different time scales that are due to the fact that
a preamble symbol in HPRF is four times shorter (see Section 2.5 of Chapter 2).
An important observation is that none of the curves showing the performance under attack
exhibits an error floor. This indicates that by increasing the SNR, the attack success rate can be
made arbitrarily large. The same holds for the payload, as we will see shortly.
Alternative SFD detection. For completeness, we also evaluated the effectiveness of the
attack against a receiver that performs SFD detection using a correlation-based SFD detection
method (which entails a 2 dB performance loss compared to the DESSERT algorithm, see
Chapter 6). Such a receiver is also vulnerable to the attack, and the cost of the attack in terms
of ∆SNR is close to the previously shown results: for tSFDLC in the order of Tpsym, we find a cost
increase of 1 dB.
10.3.2 Attack on the Payload
We now look at the effect of ED and LC on the payload. The following results do not contain
effects of synchronization: We assume here that the receiving party, ARX in the case of ED
and HRX in the case of LC, is able to perfectly synchronize to each packet. Perfect synchro-
nization here means that an oracle returns the exact packet time-of-arrival (Hence, there are no
false alarms or missed detections.). The channel energy-delay profile is still estimated, but the
estimation is performed under the assumption that the packet boundaries are perfectly aligned.
In the case of LC, we further assume that the packet sent by ATX does not contain any errors
due to a preceding ED.
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Figure 10.10: (a): PER versus SNR for the payload assuming nonce verification strategy I.
We compare benign performance to ED with varying ED delays tED. The optimal tED is in the
order of the channel delay spread and gives a loss of about 1.7 dB.
(b): More compact representation of the data in (a), showing the loss ∆SNR with respect to the
benign case versus tED for a fixed PER of 10−2.
(c) and (d): Corresponding results for nonce verification strategy II. The cost of the attack
stays practically the same. For reference, we show the performance of a 32-bit communication
packet in addition to the performance of ranging packets.
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Figure 10.10(a) shows the PER at different SNRs for the LPRF mode and nonce verification
strategy I. We show the performance curves for a benign receiver and an adversary performing
ED at different ED delays tED. The optimal ED delay for the adversary is in the order of
the channel delay spread and found to be tOPTED = 68 ns in the present example that uses the
NLOS channel model. Deciding on the symbol at tOPTED introduces a loss of about 1.7 dB with
respect to the benign curve at a packet error rate of PER = 10−2. This can also be seen in
Figure 10.10(b). Here we show the loss in SNR, ∆SNR, with respect to the benign case versus
the ED delay tED for a target packet error rate of PER = 10−2. The curve has been obtained
from curves such as those shown in Figure 10.10(a) via interpolation. Detecting after tOPTED
gives a slightly worse performance because the adversary then merely integrates more noise
instead of useful signal. Performing ED much earlier than tOPTED results in substantially larger
loss because a large part of the useful signal energy is lost: Deciding at tED = 32 ns, for
example, introduces a loss of 5.6 dB.
Figures 10.10(c) and (d) show the corresponding results for nonce verification strategy II.
In Figure 10.10(c) we additionally show the performance of a 32-bit communication packet
that achieves a performance similar to the 42-bit ranging packet in the benign case. Nonce
verification strategy II allows the honest devices to operate at lower SNRs. However, this has
only little effect on the performance of the attack: the cost of the attack at tOPTED is now 0.2 dB
lower than in case of nonce verification strategy I.
Figure 10.11 shows the performance of LC on the payload in the case of LPRF and nonce
verification strategy I. As explained in Section 10.2.2, the LC delay tLC is fixed to tLC =
Tsym/2 = 512 ns. We show the PER for different ratios γ of the energies E0 and E1 corre-
sponding to the signal energies transmitted by the adversary during the 0-block and 1-block,
respectively. E1 here corresponds to the energy a benign receiver would transmit and E0 is
typically smaller (see also Section 10.2.2). A ratio of γOPT = 0.35 gives optimal performance
throughout the whole operating range, thus this is the energy ratio we will use in all subsequent
simulations. The optimal ratio gives a loss of about 4 dB with respect to the benign case. For
nonce verification strategy II, the optimal ratio as well as the associated cost of the attack is
identical and we therefore do not show any curves.
For HPRF, we do not show any curves either because the results are very similar to LPRF.
With HPRF and the LOS channel, the optimal ED delay is tOPTED = 48 ns. Note that this is
significantly larger than the channel delay spread. The reason is that in the HPRF mode, a
burst of 16 pulses is sent during the payload, spreading the received signal wider in time. The
difference in SNR, with respect to the benign case, is 2 dB versus 1.7 dB with LPRF. For LC,
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Figure 10.11: PER for LC on the payload with varying energy ratios γ. The optimal ratio at
γOPT = 0.35 gives a loss of about 4 dB with respect to the benign setting. The curves shown
are for nonce verification strategy I.
we find the optimal energy ratio to be γOPT = 0.35 as well, and the corresponding loss of
3.9 dB is close to the 4 dB found for LPRF.
Alternative Demodulation. We also evaluated a simplistic receiver that demodulates with-
out weighting with the estimated energy-delay profile. Such a receiver is vulnerable to the
attack as well, and the attack’s cost in terms of ∆SNR is within 0.5 dB of the cost for the
baseline receiver.
10.3.3 Overall Performance of the Attack
We now establish the overall performance of the distance-decreasing relay attack. As the relay
attack involves two transmissions, ARX and HRX potentially have different received SNRs,
which we will denote by SNRED and SNRLC. This difference can be a result of the topology,
but it can also be introduced by the adversary. Depending on his abilities, an adversary can,
for example, send with a higher power in order to increase SNRLC, or move closer to HTX,
or use a directive antenna to increase SNRED. Combined with the observation that the same
relay time-gain, trelay, can be obtained with different combinations of ED and LC delays, this
gives the adversary room for a trade-off: Depending on the SNR values achievable for SNRED
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Figure 10.13: Probability of success, Ps, for an attack trying to achieve a distance decrease of
144 m. Packet length is 128bits. (a): With LPRF, Ps > 99% is reached at a cost of (∆SNRED =
4dB,∆SNRLC = 6dB). (b): For HPRF (7dB, 7dB) gives Ps > 99%.
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(SNRLC, respectively) the adversary can choose to perform ED earlier or later (commit earlier
or later, respectively). If SNRLC is high with respect to SNRED, the adversary will prefer to
commit late in order to be able to detect late as well. If SNRLC is low with respect to SNRED,
the adversary will prefer to detect early in order to be able to commit early.
In our analysis, Figure 10.12 will serve as a benchmark. It shows the PER in the benign
case for both LPRF and HPRF with nonce verification strategy I. Packet sizes of 128 and 1016
data bits are shown. A packet size of 1016 bits is the maximum packet size allowed by the
standard; as stated earlier, 128 bits correspond to a conservative length of a ranging message.
In LPRF the factor limiting performance is the payload. This can be seen by observing that the
LPRF curve for the shorter packet size is almost identical to the benign curve in Figure 10.10
(which assumes perfect synchronization). For HPRF the opposite is true, the limiting factor
is the synchronization. This can be seen in Figure 10.12 where the size of the packet hardly
influences the PER. The reason is that in HPRF 16 times more energy is sent in a payload
symbol compared to a preamble pulse, whereas in LPRF it is only 4 times more.
Figure 10.13(a) shows the probability of success for LPRF and an attack that tries to
gain 480 ns when relaying a 128bit packet between HTX and HRX. This relay time-gain is
equivalent to a 144 m distance decrease between HTX and HRX. 6 The results shown are
for different combinations of SNRED and SNRLC. For every SNR combination, the proba-
bility of success that is reported corresponds to the tuple of (tSFDED , tSFDLC , tED) 7 yielding best
performance among all the tuples that achieve the given relay time-gain of 480 ns. In the
benign case we achieve a PER of approximately 10−2 at an SNR of around 8 dB, see Fig-
ure 10.12. In Figure 10.13(a), a probability of success of Ps = 0.9869 is achieved for the
pair (SNRED = 12dB, SNRLC = 14dB). For all pairs above (12dB, 14dB) the probability of
success is above 99%. With respect to an honest transmitter-receiver pair, an adversary thus
needs an additional 4 dB in SNR for ED and an additional 6 dB for LC, in order to reduce the
distance by 144 m with a probability of success in the order of 99%. Attaining SNR values in
this range would not pose much of a challenge to the adversary.
The corresponding HPRF results, decreasing the distance by 144 m, are shown in Fig-
ure 10.13(b). A probability of success of Ps = 0.9875 is reached at (11dB, 11dB). Compared
with Figure 10.12, the additional cost is 7 dB for both ED and LC. Compared with LPRF, we
thus see that decreasing the distance by the same amount costs a bit more in HPRF. This was
6. Here we assume for simplicity that the processing delays at the adversarial transceivers are zero. Processing
delays are discussed in Section 10.2.3.
7. Recall that tLC = 512 ns is fixed, thus limiting to some extent the degrees of freedom on the payload part.
Countermeasures 201
to be expected for several reasons. First of all we have seen that, contrary to LPRF, the per-
formance is not limited by the payload but by the synchronization. We can thus not hope to
achieve the ED/LC performance of the payload-only attacks shown in Figures 10.10 and 10.11.
Second, to obtain a given relay time-gain on the preamble is more costly for HPRF because
of the closer spacing of the pulses. We have seen in Figure 10.9 that detecting early at the ith
code symbol or committing late at the jth code symbol costs roughly the same for both LPRF
and HPRF. The distance decrease achieved corresponds to (j− i) ·L · Tc which depends on the
length of a code symbol L · Tc. At the same cost, the distance decrease achieved by HPRF is
thus four times shorter than for LPRF.
Increasing the packet length to its allowable maximum of 1016 bits decreases slightly the
probability of success: To reach Ps > 99% we see virtually no cost increase for HPRF. For
LPRF the cost in SNRED and SNRLC increases by about 1.5 dB each. A smaller distance
decrease obviously comes at a lower cost: e.g., for an attack decreasing the distance by 100 m
for HPRF with 128bit packets, we found the additional cost for Ps ≈ 99% to be 5 dB for ED
and 4 dB for LC. Compared to the corresponding attack achieving a decrease of 144 m, this
signifies a 2 dB smaller cost in SNRED and a 3 dB smaller cost in SNRLC.
We have also conducted the same experiments for verification strategy II. Compared with
nonce verification strategy I using 128 bit packets, we found the exact same costs of (∆SNRED =
4dB,∆SNRLC = 6dB) and (7dB, 7dB) for LPRF and HPRF, respectively. We therefore do
not show any additional figures.
10.4 Countermeasures
The goal of this section is to investigate possible countermeasures against the attacks that we
introduced in the preceding sections.
Two main factors determine the quality of a countermeasure. The first is its effectiveness:
the maximum distance by which the adversary can decrease the distance with the countermea-
sure in place. The second factor is its cost: how much does it cost for a receiver using the
countermeasure to reach a similar benign case performance (if no attack is taking place) as a
system without countermeasures deployed. As an additional third factor, we could consider
whether or not the countermeasure is implementable within the limits imposed by the IEEE
802.15.4a standard.
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10.4.1 Private Ranging Mode Achieves Only Weak Security
The IEEE 802.15.4a standard includes an optional private ranging mode that allows the legiti-
mate participants to secretly agree on the preamble codes used in the ranging packets. Hence,
the adversary does not know the exact structure of the preamble, which makes the attack on
the preamble harder. Nevertheless, the honest devices can only choose among 8 allowable
preamble codes, which offers little security. First, the adversary could simply guess the codes
with a decent success probability. Second, the adversary could detect a packet using, in par-
allel, all 8 allowable codes. This can be done entirely in the digital domain by correlating the
received signal with each of the 8 codes and choosing the one with the highest correlation out-
put. What additionally helps the adversary is the fact that these codes were designed to have
minimum cross-correlation. In summary, the private ranging mode only moderately increases
the complexity of the distance-decreasing relay attack, and cannot be considered a valid coun-
termeasure. Furthermore, it seems that the private ranging mode was principally designed for
more complex coherent receivers: The preamble parameters that the private ranging mode em-
ploys imply strong inter-symbol interference (ISI), which a non-coherent receiver, such as the
one used in our investigation, cannot cope with well.
A similar but more promising direction than the private ranging mode might be to use se-
cret preamble codes, known only to the communicating honest nodes. This could make (early)
preamble detection infeasible, at least within the constrained time budget available to the ad-
versary to mount the relay attack. It is uncertain, but worth investigating, how such random
codes without nice auto-correlation properties would affect the benign case performance. Al-
ternatively, secret time-hopping sequences could be used to make early detection of payload
symbols more difficult. This would also require further investigation. Both of these alternative
approaches are obviously not compliant with the current IEEE 802.15.4a standard.
10.4.2 Decrease Payload Symbol Duration
One of the most straightforward countermeasures is to decrease payload symbol duration [162],
as the distance-decreasing attack cannot decrease the distance by more than one symbol dura-
tion. This applies to the BPPM modulation used in IEEE 802.15.4a: if the symbol duration is
Tf, the time-gain of the the attack we proposed in this paper is at most Tf/2. 8
Countermeasures 203
Using Optional Modes of IEEE 802.15.4a
Decreasing the payload symbol duration as a countermeasure can be implemented even within
the IEEE 802.15.4a standard. Some non-mandatory modes have symbols as short as 32 ns.
However, reducing Tf to a value where the attack is not a threat (i.e.,, the maximum achievable
distance-decrease is only a few meters), is not without effect on the benign performance. The
first problem is ISI, which manifests itself if the symbol duration is close or below the channel
delay spread. Low-complexity non-coherent receivers cannot cope well with ISI and even if
some solutions exist, they entail a loss of 5 − 10 dB in the benign case [189]. Furthermore,
shorter symbols have less resilience to multi-user interference.
Switching to OOK Demodulation Through Early Detection
Alternatively, the symbol duration can be preserved, but the honest receiver can choose to only
take into account the beginning of the symbol [163], essentially performing early detection
with OOK demodulation at an offset tOOK from the beginning of the symbol. This is partic-
ularly attractive in our case, as switching from BPPM demodulation to OOK demodulation
significantly reduces the achievable time-gain: Indeed, tLC ≥ trelay can be reduced from 512 ns
to a value in the order of the channel delay spread Tspread ≈ 60 ns (for optimal OOK perfor-
mance). This corresponds to at most 18 m distance-decrease (assuming an unrealistic instant
ED and no processing delays). Further, this solution does not induce any additional ISI and
is compliant with the mandatory modes of the standard. Our simulations evaluating payload
early detection (see Section 10.3.2) show that such a countermeasure based on OOK decreases
the benign case performance by roughly 1.5 dB because half of the available information is
discarded. Additional coding could potentially compensated for this degradation.
In the case of nonce verification strategy II, additional coding can essentially be achieved
by increasing the length of the nonces (see Section 10.1.2). A performance evaluation of this
countermeasure for LPRF is shown in Figure 10.14. Analog to Section 10.3, we assume that
the performance goal is given by a required PER of 10−2 at an SNR of 6.5 dB. We have seen
in Section 10.3 that without a countermeasure, this can be achieved with nonces of length
Nnonce = 42, yielding a security level of Pguess = 2−32. Figure 10.14 shows the required length
of a nonce if the same performance is to be achieved with the countermeasure using different
8. We note that the attack proposed in this paper can be further improved (in terms of the achieved distance-
decrease), by employing late commit techniques in the fashion of [163]. However, the additional challenge is the
weighting by the channel mask performed by the baseline receiver. Evaluation of such attacks might thus be worth
further investigation.
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Figure 10.14: Cost of OOK countermeasure where the receiver decides on the bit value using
OOK demodulation at time tOOK. tOOK also corresponds to the maximum theoretically achiev-
able trelay. The only cost that this countermeasure entails is an increase in the required nonce
length Nnonce.
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OOK detection times tOOK. As long as tOOK ≥ 32 ns, the required length of a nonce is be-
low the maximum IEEE 802.15.4a packet size of 1016 bits. By employing the countermeasure
and increasing the number of bits per nonce from 42 to 108, we can, e.g., bring the maximum
theoretically achievable distance-decrease to 40 ns (about 12 m). A realistically achievable
distance-decrease will be significantly lower because this value does neither include the time it
takes the adversary to perform early detection and late commit, nor any processing delays. At
the same time, this countermeasure does not reduce the performance in terms of PER and we
also keep the same security level against guessing attacks. The only cost that occurs is the cost
of generating, sending and receiving the additional bits required for the longer nonces. Since
every IEEE 802.15.4a payload carrying a nonce is preceded by a preamble of considerable
length, and since a good deal of receiver complexity during reception stems from synchroniza-
tion, we argue that the cost of adding a few bits to the payload is negligible.
10.5 Beyond Energy-Detection Receivers
So far, we assumed that both honest and adversarial devices are built upon a low-complexity
non-coherent energy-detection architecture. Since the IEEE 802.15.4a standard also allows for
coherent reception, an interesting question is how a relaxation of the assumption on the receiver
architecture impacts the effectiveness of distance-decreasing attacks.
In the following, we will analyze three scenarios. First we will consider the case where
the adversary employs a coherent Rake receiver, while the victim devices remain with the
non-coherent energy-detection receiver (“Rake-vs-EnergyDetection”). Then, we will discuss
the case where all of the devices involved use coherent reception (“Rake-vs-Rake”). Finally,
we will look at an asymmetric scenario where only one of the honest devices uses a coherent
architecture (“Rake-vs-Rake/EnergyDetection”). A summary of our findings, comparing the
different scenarios, is given at the end of this chapter in Table 10.1.
10.5.1 Scenario “Rake-vs-EnergyDetection”: Adversary Uses Coherent Receiver for
Maximum Performance
In this scenario, we assume that the adversary uses coherent Rake receivers, whereas the honest
devices continue to use energy-detection receivers. This is a realistic scenario where honest
devices strive for low-complexity and the adversary does not have this limitation.
At first sight it might seem that the adversary only has a limited benefit to employ Rake re-
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Figure 10.15: Structure of IEEE 802.15.4a convolutional code.
ceivers in this scenario. After all, we have seen in the foregoing sections that highly successful
attacks can already be mounted with energy-detection receivers that have a lower complexity.
Moreover, we cannot hope to achieve any performance gain for the late commit attack, since
it is independent of the receiver used by the adversary. However, a closer analysis reveals a
whole new space for an attack due to the convolutional code employed by IEEE 802.15.4a.
The systematic rate 1/2 convolutional code is applied to the bits to be transmitted after RS
encoding. The resulting systematic bits are modulated using BPPM and the parity bits using
BPSK (see also Section 2.4.3 of Chapter 2). Both are transmitted together using a BPPM/BPSK
symbol, resulting in the received signal model for the i-th symbol given by Equation (10.8)
earlier in this chapter, and where di denotes the i-th systematic bit and ai the i-th parity bit.
The IEEE 802.15.4a convolutional code has a constraint length of 3 and generator polyno-
mials g1 = (0, 1, 0) and g2 = (1, 0, 1), resulting in the structure shown in Figure 10.15. The
problem with this code from a security perspective is that the i-th parity bit carries information
about the i+ 1-th systematic bit. Indeed, we have that
ai = di−1 ⊕ di+1 (10.12)
where ⊕ denotes modulo two addition. This implies that after demodulation of parity bit ai,
the adversary ARX can obtain full knowledge of the systematic bit di+1 of the following sym-
bol, even before it is transmitted by HTX. This allows an attack with a higher relay time-gain
than in the case where the adversary uses an energy-detection receiver, which is illustrated in
Figure 10.16.
The total relay time-gain of this attack is trelay = Tf + tLC − tED. With respect to the attacks
that we have seen before, the adversary gains one frame duration Tf because he knows the
systematic bit value one frame in advance thanks to the convolutional code.
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Figure 10.16: Distance decreasing relay attack on the payload symbol if the adversary uses a
Rake receiver. tTHS = cTHS,iTburst here denotes the time-hopping offset and tDET the portion of
the signal from the 1-block that is used in the demodulation of the symbol.
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The early detection attack at ARX is slightly different than before. The adversary has to
demodulate both the systematic bit and the parity bit in order to take advantage of the con-
volutional code. This implies that he can only decide on the bit value of the i-th bit after
tED,i = Tf/2 + cTHS,iTburst + tDET. Here, tDET denotes the portion of the signal from the 1-block
of a frame that is used in the demodulation of the bit. In the following, we will refer to tDET as
detection time.
ATX can mount the same late commit attack that we have seen in Section 10.2.2, yielding
a late commit delay of tLC,i = Tf/2 + cTHS,i+1Tburst. Note that in contrast to the attacks with
energy-detection receivers, here the time-hopping sequence matters since we commit to symbol
i + 1 (with time-hopping index cTHS,i+1) while receiving symbol i (with time-hopping index
cTHS,i). The resulting achievable relay time-gain for the i-th bit is thus
trelay,i = Tf + tLC,i − tED,i = Tf + (cTHS,i+1 − cTHS,i)Tburst − tDET (10.13)
The adversary has to ensure that the attack yields a consistent relay time-gain that remains
realizable independently of the time-hopping indices of consecutive bits. Consequently, the
maximum relay time-gain that is achievable over the entire packet is the minimum of (10.13)
over all bits. 9 The minimum is obtained if cTHS,i+1 = 0 and cTHS,i = Nh−1, where Nh−1 is the
maximum time-hopping index (see Section 2.4.3 of Chapter 2). The resulting relay time-gain
of this attack is then
trelay =
3
4
Tf + Tburst − tDET (10.14)
Note that our performance evaluation in Section 10.3.1 shows that such a relay time-gain is
easily achievable on the preamble where the attacker has more flexibility, even with an energy-
detection receiver. In what follows, we therefore omit a further investigation of preamble at-
tacks with a Rake receiver and focus on the payload.
Alternatively, the adversary can mount the attack completely without the late commit part
and still obtain a relay time-gain of
trelay =
1
4
Tf + Tburst − tDET (10.15)
this scenario is shown in the lower half of Figure 10.16. This alternative is particularly inter-
esting as it is not detectable by the OOK countermeasure as we will see shortly.
9. If this were not the case, the attacker would have to guess bits for which the relay time-gain is not realizable.
Such a strategy would of course be possible, yielding a slight improvement in terms of distance-decrease at the
cost of a degradation of the attack’s success probability.
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Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the early detection attack on the payload described above with an optimal all-Rake
receiver (aRake, see Chapter 2). Even though this receiver is idealistic and hardly realizable
in practice, it gives the best performance an adversary can possibly hope to achieve. If the
adversary were to use a suboptimal Rake receiver, the same attack still applies but the cost in
terms of required SNR levels will be higher than the ones reported in this section.
We further assume perfect synchronization and that the receiver has perfect knowledge
of the channel. Finally, we assume that the convolutional code is decoded with the optimal
symbol-wise branch metric for BPPM/BPSK given in [110].
The results of the performance evaluation are shown in Figure 10.17, which shows the PER
of the LPRF mode and for a packet size of 128 bits and nonce verification strategy I. Compared
to the energy-detection receiver (“Energy-detection, benign”) 10, the performance gain of the
Rake receiver (“Rake, benign”) is in the order of 12dB, half of which is due to the additional
coding gain of the convolutional code (see also [110]).
To mount the early detection attack, the adversary has to deviate from optimal decoding
of the convolutional code because each of the symbols has to be demodulated and decoded
instantly. With regular decoding as in [110], the convolutional code is decoded at the end of
the packet, when the full decoding trellis is available. This ensures that the maximum amount
of redundancy can be taken into account. With the attack, the convolutional code can still be
taken into account, however, only a partial trellis containing information about the symbols
received so far is available. Such an “on-the-fly” decoding reduces the coding gain by roughly
2 dB (“Coding, on-the-fly”). Decoding in this fashion, however, is still not enough to mount
the early detection attack. In addition, the adversary has to predict the position bit of the
following symbol according to (10.12), which further reduces the usable redundancy provided
by the convolutional code. Moreover, the symbol has to be detected as early as possible by
varying the detection time tDET. As long as tDET ≤ 48 ns, the additional loss is about 1.5 dB
(“Coding”). With tED = 48 ns, we have a relay time-gain of trelay = 728 ns. This corresponds to
a distance-decrease of 218 m that costs 3.5 dB compared to normal Rake reception. For a faster
decision, the adversary also has the option to decode every bit without taking the convolutional
code into account (“No Coding”). The above mentioned attack that decreases the distance by
218 m costs in this case an additional 4 dB, which is still 4 dB below the performance of the
energy-detection receiver.
10. The curve shown here for the energy-detection receiver corresponds to the one in Figure 10.10, i.e., perfect
synchronization is assumed but not perfect estimation of the channel energy-delay profile.
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Figure 10.17: Performance of early detection attack on the payload if the adversary uses an
aRake receiver. Early detection can be performed by decoding the convolutional code using
partial information (“Coding”) or by neglecting the convolutional code completely (“No Cod-
ing”). To achieve a relay time-gain, the current bit has to be detected within a short detection
time tDET allowing a prediction of the position bit of the next symbol. With respect to normal
aRake operation (“Rake, benign”), this attacks costs about 3.5 dB if coding is used, and 7.5 dB
if the code is neglected. In both cases, the performance is still significantly better than that of
an energy-detection receiver (“Energy-detection, benign”). “Coding, on-the-fly” is a reference
curve where decoding is done using partial information but future bits are not predicted, thus
yielding no relay time-gain.
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Countermeasures
The OOK countermeasure described in Section 10.4 can not sufficiently decrease the achievable
relay time-gain to levels where this attack with a Rake receiver is not a threat. The alternative
version of the attack, where no late commit is performed is not preventable since with this
attack, the signal received by HRX is indistinguishable from a legitimate signal sent by HTX.
With tDET = 48 ns this still amounts to a relay time-gain of 216 ns and a distance-decrease of
65 m.
Countermeasures that aim at preventing early detection, e.g., the use of secret cryptographic
preamble codes, may still be able to prevent this attack.
To counter this attack in the scope of the standard, however, we see only two possible
options: 1) the honest receivers also use a coherent architecture, which makes them more
complex; 2) if an energy-detection receiver is to be used, the convolutional code has to be
changed or omitted. The requirement for any suitable convolutional code is that their structure
needs to be such that all output bits must only depend on past information bits. However,
changing the convolutional code requires a modification of the standard and is therefore an
unlikely option. Omitting the code however, is realizable within the standard. IEEE 802.15.4a
foresees two optional modes, one for LPRF and one for HPRF, where the convolutional code
is not used. In both of these modes only a single pulse is sent per burst (Ls = 1, Tburst = 2 ns).
With these modes, durations of the BPPM symbols are 256 ns for LPRF and 64 ns for HPRF.
Due to the short symbol duration, the latter is only adequate for LOS environments, making the
former the most suitable mode for secure ranging with energy-detection receivers.
10.5.2 Scenario “Rake-vs-Rake”: High-End Coherent Ranging System
In this scenario, we assume a high-end secure ranging system, where all devices involved use
coherent reception with Rake receivers.
With such a setting, the attack described in scenario “Rake-vs-EnergyDetection” is no
longer possible. Since the honest devices are also capable of decoding the parity bits, the
adversary now has to relay both the systematic and the parity bits correctly. However, only
the systematic bit can be predicted from the previously received symbols. The maximum the-
oretically achievable relay time-gain is now upper-bounded by the symbol duration of a BPSK
symbol, which is in the order of the channel spread and equals 60 − 70 ns in the NLOS case.
However, we have seen in the performance evaluation of scenario “Rake-vs-EnergyDetection”
that a faster detection time of tDET = 48 ns entails practically no performance loss and can
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therefore also be adapted by a honest receiver. Considering additional processing delays, this
leaves only little margin for the adversary, who can in the best case hope to achieve a distance-
decrease in the order of 10 m. This is an order of magnitude lower than the attacks against
energy-detection receivers. Similar to the countermeasure described in Chapter 10.4, the hon-
est receivers can increase the length of the nonces which allows them to further decrease the
detection time tDET and thus the obtainable distance-decrease.
10.5.3 Scenario “Rake-vs-Rake/EnergyDetection”: Asymmetric Scenario With
High-End Reader and Low-End Tag
In this last scenario, we consider a hybrid between scenarios “Rake-vs-EnergyDetection” and
“Rake-vs-Rake”. We assume that all of the adversarial devices and one of the honest devices
are coherent Rake receivers. The second honest device continues to use an energy-detection
receiver. The motivation for this asymmetric scenario is a setting where one of the honest
devices acts as a fixed reader with no constraints on complexity, while the other one is a low-
end tag that must strive for low-complexity.
Ranging packets from the reader to the tag can be relayed according to the attack described
in scenario “Rake-vs-EnergyDetection”. Without any countermeasure in place, this results in
a maximal relay time-gain given by (10.14). Packets from the tag to the reader, on the other
hand, conform to scenario “Rake-vs-Rake”. However, since the adversary already achieves a
substantial relay time-gain in the transmission from the reader to the tag, he can relay from the
tag to the reader without time-gain, or even by losing some time, and still decrease the distance.
An alternative option might be to use an analog repeater that amplifies and forwards the signal
pulse-by-pulse with minimal delay [190]. Finally, if tag and reader are within communication
range, relaying can be omitted altogether. In all of these cases, the relay time-gain achieved is
about half the relay time-gain of scenario “Rake-vs-EnergyDetection”.
With the OOK countermeasure in place and a suitable mode that does not use the convolu-
tional code, the achievable distance-decrease is reduced to the one of scenario “Rake-vs-Rake”,
which is also equivalent to the case where the attacker uses energy-detection receivers as well.
10.6 Conclusion
We have investigated the vulnerability of the IEEE 802.15.4a standard to physical layer distance-
decreasing relay attacks. We demonstrated that without appropriate countermeasures and un-
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Architecture No counterm. With countermeasure
ARX HRX Dist.-decr.* Type Dist.-decr.*
Energy-detection Energy-detection 144 m OOK max. 12 m
Rake Energy-detection 218 m OOK + Mode
w/o conv. code
max. 12 m
Rake Rake max. 12 m - -
Rake Rake/Energy-det. 109 m OOK + Mode
w/o conv. code
max. 12 m
*Not accounting for any processing delays at the adversary
Table 10.1: Achievable distance-decrease in various scenarios with different architectures at
honest and adversarial devices.
less all of the honest devices perform ranging with coherent Rake receivers, an adversary can
perform highly effective attacks resulting in a distance-decrease in the order of one hundred
meters. E.g., in a scenarios where all honest and adversarial devices are energy-detection re-
ceivers, an adversary can decrease the distance by 144 m with an impressive success rate of
99% and at a cost of just a few dB in SNR with respect to normal system operation. A further
increase in SNR allows the adversary to make the success rate arbitrarily large.
Moreover, we unveiled an anomaly in the IEEE 802.15.4a convolutional code that allows
the adversary to further decrease the distance, provided that he uses a coherent Rake receiver.
With this additional exploit, the achievable distance-decrease amounts to 218 m. In general, we
find that the achievable distance decrease depends on the architecture of the receiver used by
honest and adversarial devices. A summary of the achievable distance-decrease for each of the
scenarios that we investigated is given in Table 10.1.
Nevertheless, we also find that secure ranging within IEEE 802.15.4a, keeping the max-
imum achievable distance-decrease at acceptable levels, is possible. Further, this is possible
even if the honest receivers are based on energy-detection, under the condition that two pre-
requisites are met. The first prerequisite is to adopt a countermeasure that requires a change
in the way symbol demodulation is performed. With the choice of a proper packet length, this
countermeasure induces practically no additional cost. The second prerequisite is that the con-
volutional code must either be turned off or its encoder structure must be changed such that a
prediction of future bits becomes impossible. Within the standard, only the former is possible
and can be achieved by switching to an optional mode without convolutional code. Based on
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our findings, we therefore also make a recommendation about which mode of the standard to
use for secure ranging.
The evaluation performed in this chapter confirms that the physical layer, and in particular
the physical layer of IEEE 802.15.4a, indeed provides a lot of space for attacks against ranging
protocols if it is not handled carefully. In the design of secure protocols, a thorough analysis of
the physical layer is therefore indispensable.
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Chapter 11
Conclusion
In this thesis we demonstrated that the effect of multi-user interference (MUI) can be effectively
mitigated on the physical layer (PHY). Further, we have shown this to be true also in the context
of the IEEE 802.15.4a standard and even with energy-detection receivers that generally have a
lower-complexity than coherent Rake receivers.
We believe that this possibility to cope with interference on the PHY is important for IR-
UWB networks because of several reasons. First of all, we can never hope to absolutely contain
interference. Even a coordinated system that perfectly isolates concurrent transmissions within
the network, is vulnerable to interference from outside the network. The more networks are de-
ployed, the bigger the chance that several of these networks interfere. We have seen in several
chapters of this thesis that, e.g., with IEEE 802.15.4a such inter-network interference can be ex-
tremely detrimental, even if precautions such as the assignment of different preamble codes and
different time-hopping sequences are taken at higher communication layers. A second point is
related to the design of medium access control (MAC) protocols for IR-UWB networks. It can
be shown that the optimal MAC protocols for IR-UWB are uncoordinated, allow for concur-
rent transmissions, and can thus be greatly simplified, provided that interference mitigation is
employed on the PHY (see, e.g., [1] and the references therein). Most recent proposals for IR-
UWB MAC protocols [54, 97] including the IEEE 802.15.4a MAC [35] follow this principle.
We have shown in the case of IEEE 802.15.4a that the benefit of concurrent transmissions is
completely lost if proper interference mitigation techniques on the PHY are not employed.
Further, we have shown that an interference robust design necessitates a system level ap-
proach, where all of the components involved in receiving a data packet are designed appro-
priately. Interference affects synchronization as well as it affects channel estimation or data
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decoding. Increasing the robustness to MUI of only one of these mechanisms in isolation will
therefore not necessarily result in a design that is more robust overall. Consequently, we pre-
sented concrete solutions, some of which have recently successfully been patented, for each of
these mechanisms.
First of all, we have addressed synchronization and shown that robust packet detection and
timing acquisition algorithms that rely on simple thresholding mechanisms are able to mitigate
MUI, showing a near perfect capture effect. However, to allow for concurrent transmissions,
the receiver also has to be able to detect the end of the preamble in a reliable fashion, even in
the presence of near interferers. This necessitates a robust detection of the start frame delimiter
(SFD), which is ignored by most of the related work, even in the single user case. We compared
different SFD detection algorithms and showed how they can be made robust to MUI. For
data decoding we have presented and compared different solutions that are robust to MUI in
the context of both coherent and non-coherent receivers. Our solutions range from simple
thresholding schemes to more sophisticated methods that model interference according to a
non-Gaussian model and that had previously not been considered in the context of IR-UWB.
What is common to all our solutions is their ability to significantly reduce the effect of MUI:
in various scenarios we found an improvement in packet error rate of at least one order of
magnitude, compared to traditional receiver designs. Further, none of our schemes assumed
perfect knowledge about any of the involved parameters, such as, e.g., the channel delay profile.
We rather proposed methods to also perform parameter estimation in a MUI resistant fashion.
Further, we have shown that even quite simple energy-detection receivers, that adapt to
varying channel conditions, are vulnerable to clock drifts, especially if the oscillators driving
the transmitter and receiver clocks are of average quality. We proposed two solutions that can
be implemented without increasing the hardware complexity. In particular, our algorithm that is
based on the Radon transform showed a performance close to the optimum. What additionally
makes this algorithm promising is its potential to also perform other receiver operations such
as channel and time-of-arrival estimation.
Finally, this thesis includes a detailed analysis of secure ranging over IR-UWB. We demon-
strated that if no appropriate countermeasures are taken, the IEEE 802.15.4a standard does not
provide security against distance-decreasing attacks on the PHY. To this end we proposed a set
of attacks, targeting both synchronization and payload decoding, and showed that they allow
an adversary to significantly alter the measured distance between two devices with an almost
perfect success probability and without breaking any cryptographic protocols. We further ana-
lyzed different scenarios involving different receiver architectures and found that they are not
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without impact on the effectiveness of distance-decreasing attacks. Based on these findings
we evaluated possible countermeasures and made recommendations on how to improve the
security of IR-UWB ranging.
11.1 Future Work and Possible Extensions
We proposed solutions of various levels of complexity resulting also in various levels of ro-
bustness to MUI. Most of them obviously do not come for free. Some solutions like the robust
energy-detection architecture for burst transmissions presented in Chapter 5 require additional
hardware circuitry, which will increase both the manufacturing cost as well as the energy con-
sumption of the receiver. Other mechanisms, e.g., the robust synchronization algorithms in
Chapter 6 require the calculation of additional thresholds.
One of the most significant advances of the work presented here would be the experimental
validation of our algorithms in a real system. This should become possible as IR-UWB hard-
ware becomes more widely available. A real-world implementation would allow for an exact
quantification of the costs involved with the different trade-offs that we discussed above.
On the other hand, not mitigating interference on the PHY also has its cost: packets that
are lost due to interference need to be retransmitted; preventing packet collisions requires so-
phisticated protocols to coordinate between nodes. There is thus another trade-off between
interference mitigation on the PHY versus interference management at higher communication
layers. Another possible direction for future work is therefore the evaluation of a complete
network. For complexity reasons, we were restricted to a single link, when assessing the per-
formance of IR-UWB systems in a multi-user environment. A next step would be to capitalize
on the insights that we gained in order to build more sophisticated models that allow for a
network-wide evaluation. Such models could also include optional IEEE 802.15.4a clear chan-
nel assessments modes and would undoubtedly lead to further insights into trade-offs between
interference management at different layers.
In a less broad perspective, we have already hinted at possible improvements of our work
in the individual chapters. For example, it might be worth investigating whether some of the
optimal decision rules, e.g., for the energy-detection receiver assuming a gamma mixture dis-
tribution, can be simplified to yield suboptimal receivers that are easier to implement but still
show a robustness to MUI comparable to the optimal solutions.
Another point that future work should address is an evaluation of clock-offset tracking
under MUI. Further, we have seen that the Radon tracking algorithm proposed in Part II might
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offer interesting perspectives also for time-of-arrival and channel estimation both of which are
certainly worth exploring.
In terms of security in IR-UWB networks in general, and of IR-UWB ranging in partic-
ular, investigations into improved location privacy would be worthwhile. Although the IEEE
802.15.4a standard already proposes some solutions, we believe that they are insufficient due
to their restricted nature. A promising direction seems to be to use cryptographic modulation,
where, e.g., the time-hopping sequence depends on a shared secrets. Such a mechanism might
also be an interesting option to thwart distance-decreasing attacks. Finally, understanding the
effectiveness of distance-decreasing attacks that are less greedy than the ones presented here
can be important for applications relying on highly accurate secure distance measurements. In
such applications much harm might already be done by an adversary that decreases the distance
by only a few meters, scraping together a few nanoseconds here and there.
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Appendix
A.1 Mean Clock-Offset Estimation Error of Perfect
Algorithm
Let ǫtx and ǫrx be the clock offsets with respect to a global reference clock of the transmitter and
the receiver, respectively. Assume that both of these quantities are independently drawn from
the same uniform distribution, i.e.,
ǫtx ∼ U(−ǫmax, ǫmax), ǫrx ∼ U(−ǫmax, ǫmax) (A.1)
where ǫmax is the maximum absolute value of the clock offset with respect to the reference
clock.
The relative offset between transmitter and receiver ǫ = ǫrx−ǫtx is then distributed according
to a triangular distribution with PDF
f△(ǫ|ǫmax) =


1
ǫmax
( 1
ǫmax
ǫ + 1) if − ǫmax ≤ ǫ < 0
1
ǫmax
if ǫ = 0
1
ǫmax
(− 1
ǫmax
ǫ + 1) if 0 < ǫ ≤ ǫmax
0 otherwise.
(A.2)
Now assume a perfect algorithm that always estimates the correct clock offset but only has
a resolution of ∆ǫ, i.e., it always finds the estimate ǫˆ from the set
ǫˆ ∈ {−ǫmax, . . .− 2∆ǫ,−∆ǫ, 0,∆ǫ, 2∆ǫ, . . . , ǫmax}
221
222 A. Appendix
that is closest to the true value ǫ. For simplicity we assume that the resolution is such that ∆ǫ
divides ǫmax.
The expected value of the absolute error of such an algorithm is then given by
E[|ǫˆ− ǫ|] = 2
[ ǫmax
∆ǫ
−1∑
k=0
∫ k∆ǫ+∆ǫ
2
k∆ǫ
(ǫ− k∆ǫ)f△(ǫ|ǫmax) dǫ+
ǫmax
∆ǫ∑
k=1
∫ k∆ǫ
k∆ǫ−∆ǫ
2
(k∆ǫ− ǫ)f△(ǫ|ǫmax) dǫ
]
(A.3)
where the factor of two follows from the symmetry of the triangular PDF, each term in the first
sum accounts for the mean absolute error during the first half of the k-th interval of length ∆ǫ
of the positive part of the PDF, and the terms in the second sum accounts for the mean absolute
error during the second half of the k-th interval.
Plugging (A.2) into (A.3) yields after tedious calculations involving only basic algebra
E[|ǫˆ− ǫ|] = ∆ǫ
4
(A.4)
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